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A B S T R A C T
The thesis aims to formulate a theoretical framework which enables us to analyze a 
coun try ’s macroeconomic policy and its impact on the domestic economy, and then relate 
this analytical framework to the case of the Philippines. This objective of the thesis (atid 
hence its contribution) was based on the argument that while externa! shocks during the 
1970s were indeed a necessary condition for the occurrence of the Philippine crisis during 
the 1980s, the domestic macroeconomic policy also contributed significantly to the 
economic debacle.
The thesis answers three central questions: the first question focuses on the 
conduct/determ ination of the Philippine macroeconomic policy -fiscal, m onetary, and 
exchange rate policy: the second question deals with the impact of domestic fiscal and 
money expansion under fixed and flexible exchange rates on the real exchange rate, the 
current account, employment and output; and the third question analyzes the impact of 
macroeconomic policy on the coun try ’s debt, investment, savings and wealth.
In response to the first central question, we provide an historical and analytical 
review of the Philippine fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy. Philippine 
macroeconomic policy during the 1966-1984 period was generally too expansionary, which 
was a departure from the conservative policy during the 1950s and the early 1960s. The 
Philippine government has relied heavily on foreign borrowings, particularly during the 
1970s, in order to finance the government budget deficits and the current account deficits. 
The Philippines had fixed exchange rate during the 1966-1969 period, and then allowed 
the peso-US dollar rate to float during the post-1970 period. The Central Bank has, 
however, intervened in the foreign exchange market.
In response to the second central question, we develop a general theoretical 
framework in the context of the Salter-Swan tradeable and non-tradeable sectoral model. 
The basic medium-run model has three central assumptions; namely, (a) a small country 
assumption, (b) flexibility of the nominal wages to guarantee full employment, and (c) 
flexibility of non-tradeables prices to assure equilibrium in the non-tradeables market. YVe 
also analyze a Keynesian short-run model incorporating nominal wage rigidity. Then, we 
analyze the impact of pure money expansion and pure fiscal expansion under fixed and 
flexible exchange rates on the real exchange rate (the ratio of the domestic prices of 
tradeables to the domestic prices of non-tradeables), the current account, sectoral 
employment and output. We are able to come up with alternative estimates of the 
domestic prices of tradeables, domestic prices of non-tradeables, and the real exchange 
rates based on three alternative classifications of the tradeable sector and the non- 
tradeable sector. We are also able to come up with alternative estimates of sectoral 
employment and sectoral output.
7Factual evidence, in the form of casual observations and some econometric work 
enabled us to confirm and conclude the* relevance of the? Salter-Swan theoretical 
framework in analyzing the effects of fiscal and monetary policy in the Philippines under 
fixed and flexible exchange rates. There also existed a significant relationship between the 
current account balance and the real exchange rate in the Philippines: the real exchange 
rate depreciated and the current account balance showed an improvement during the 
1967-1973 period; and subsequently until 1984, the real exchange rate appreciated and the 
current account balance deteriorated. Such a significant relationship was attributed to the 
linkage between changes in the real exchange rates and the exogenous changes in fiscal 
and monetary policy, and to the linkage between changes in the real exchange rate and 
changes in the terms of trade. Employment and output trends showed consistency with 
the expected theoretical results: non-tradeable output increased while tradeable output 
decreased during the post-1973 period since the price of non-tradeables increased relative 
to tradeables; and non-tradeable employment increased while tradeable employment 
decreased during the same period presumably owing to the lower product wage of the 
non-tradeable sector relative to the product wage of the tradeable sector.
In answer to the third central question, we develop a framework of analysis to 
explain each of the observed phenomena; namely, rising gross external debt, widening 
investment-savings gap. and increasing real wealth of the Philippines. We are able to 
come up with estimations or measures of the economic variables under investigation.
We concluded tha t  the financing of the current account deficits accounted for about 
two-thirds of the rise in the cumulative external debt of the Philippines during the 
1971-1984 period, and the financing of private capital outflows accounted for about one- 
third. The public sector deficit accounted for a larger share in the widening of the 
national investment-savings gap, and the private sector deficit accounted for a smaller 
share. The growth of capital stock exceeded the growth of net external debt and hence 
real savings were positive. Real wealth appears to have been increasing, and tha t  the 
Philippine debt problem is a liquidity problem which will be self-financing if the 
investments undertaken turn out to have been profitable.
8C H A P T E R  1 
I N T R O D U C T IO N
1.1 B ack grou n d  o f  th e  T h esis P ro b lem
During the last decade, the economic performance of most countries had been 
affected by the impact of both external and internal factors. External factors include 
increased world prices and increased world interest rates.
Following Sieper and Fane (1982), we can summarize the comparative effects of 
these external factors under fixed and flexible exchange rate systems.1
Under a fixed exchange rate system, increased world prices and devaluation have 
similar effects. The tradeable sector is directly stimulated generating an extra income 
which increases the demand for non-tradables; so too does the higher price of tradeables. 
Consequently, output and price of non-tradeables increase. Under flexible exchange rate 
regime, the domestic economy is completely insulated from increases in t he general level 
of world prices.'* The problem of imported inflation only exists in a system of fixed or 
managed exchange rates. Changes in the terms of trade affect the level ol real income, 
and hence a country cannot insulate itself from changes in the relative prices in the world 
market for its imports and exports.
I rider a fixed exchange rate system, an increase in the world interest rat.es lias no
1 See E. Sieper and G. Fane, 1982, "Exchange controls and exchange rate systems’ , in Australian 
Financial System Inquiry, Part 2 Macroeconomic Policy: External Policy, particularly pages 
237-256. Among the major issues, the report included an examination of the implications of the 
exchange rate system for monetary policy in particular arid economic policy in general.
“If world prices increase by 1 %,  then domestic currency appreciates by 1%, leaving t he domestic 
prices of foreign goods unchanged
9domestic effects in the absence of capital mobility. With some capital mobility, the 
demand for non-tradeables is depressed so that- output,, employment and prices in this 
sector decline. Under flexible exchange rate system, an increase in the world interest rates 
has no domestic effects in the complete absence of capital mobility. With perfect capital 
mobility, domestic interest rates rise and hence reduces the demand for money. A fall in 
the demand for money improves the trade balance, which in turn has an expansionary 
multiplier effect on the rest of the economy. The rise in interest rates results in the 
contraction of the non-tradeables sector and in the expansion of the tradeables sector.0
As a consequence of the oil price shocks, of the recession in the developed 
economies, and of the related fall in the terms of trade, oil importing developing 
countries, which have been heavily dependent on imported oil, extremely suffered the 
brunt of oil price increases via experiencing not only external payments difficulties 
(because of the marked increase in their import expenditures) but also domestic inflation 
and unemployment problems.
While, on the one hand, most oil-importing countries had been adversely affected by 
the oil price increases (the quadrupling of prices in 1973-1974 and the doubling of prices 
in 1978-1979); on the other hand, the major oil-exporting countries had benefited 
tremendously via enormous foreign exchange earnings. These surplus funds were then 
deposited in the banking sector (mostly large commercial banks) which in turn recycled 
the funds via lending them to oil-importing developing countries. The latter were induced 
to borrow at reasonably lower and even negative interest rates particularly between 1974 
and 1978 (when nominal interest rates were low and inflation rates were high) so that 
borrowing by these countries would presumably be justified. Continuous dependence on 
foreign financing created a serious problem during the early 1980s when real interest rates
3 Sieper and Fane (1982, page 256) reported, among others, that the greatest shocks to the 
Australian economy appear to have come from changes in world prices with The Great Depression, 
the Korean War and the commodities boom of the early 1970s as obvious examples; and indicated 
further that fluctuations in export prices will continue to be a major source of disturbance to the 
Australian economy.
10
rose (nominal rates were adjusted upwards and inflation rates declined). Consequently, 
external debt of most countries rose enormously.
1.2 S ta te m e n t o f the T h esis  P rob lem
In his address before t.he Philippine Economic Society during its ‘21st annual 
meeting, G. P. Sicat (1984) claimed that since the advent of the economic crisis in the 
Philippines, there had been a surfeit of explanations about what went wrong with the 
Philippine economy. Among the studies which attempt to explain why the Philippine 
crisis has occurred, Sicat commended the Task Force report of some professors at the 
University of the Philippines School of Economics (UPSE) and cited that it, has become a 
major document due to the thoroughness of its coverage and the depth of the effort at 
quantifying its claims which has opened some interesting proportions that would in the 
future be debated.^
In their analysis of the Philippine economic crisis, the participants of the University 
of the Philippines School of Economics workshop (June 1984) concluded that
Different and often competing explanations have b e e n  put forward for the 
occurrence of the country’s economic debacle lover the period I960 to 1984], 
among which were], that (l) it was entirely or primarily ;due to external 
circumstances Iwhich were] affecting all developing countries, and over which the 
present leadership had no control; (2) it was entirely or primarily due to 
mismanagement of the iMarcos] regime 'w hich was generally too expansionary in 
its fiscal and monetary policy, and hence was a complete departure from the 
conservative macroeconomic policy during the 1950s and the 1960s], and (3) it 
was entirely or primarily due to an unforeseen random event which w'as the 
1983] assassination of Aquino [whi< >• affected the economy through the 
following channels: capital flight from >ht  Philippines and waning investors’ 
confidence on political and economic stability of the Philippines], While there is 
some truth to each of these (factors], none of them is a sufficient explanation by 
I itself.0
4 See G. P. Sicat, 1984, rA historical and current perspective of Philippine economic crisis’, 
Discussion Paper 8409, University of the Philippines School of Economics, page 3.
‘’See 1). B. Can las, E. S. De Dios, R.V. Fabella, F.M. Medalla, S.C. Monsod, M.F. Montes, V.B. 
Paqueo. E.M. Remolona, E.A J an and R L.P Tidalgo, 1984. Analysis of the Philippine 
eco n o m ic  crisis a workshop report , page M This report embodies the results of a series of 
workshops on the economic crisis besetting the Philippine economy until 1983. These workshops 
were held between November 1983 and May 1981 in which interested faculty members of the 
University of the Philippines School of Economics participated
IT I m* UPSF« w ork sh op  repoH (198-1) furl her c la im ed  that (lie A qu in o  a ssa ss in a t io n
simply bore through the already weakened fabric of the Philippine economy.*’ Si cat
(198-1) also argued that his assassination did an enormous damage of setting back a large
part of the timetable of development in the nation, undermined the credibility before t in-
world of the [previous] government, and took away the confidence that was already shaky
at th a t  point and made it a large event of consequential dimensions, thus aggravating a
7crisis tha t  was already showing its head.
Moreover, the World Bank (1984) concluded that the adverse exogenous external 
developments, combined with expansionary demand policies, led to an increase in the
o
country’s current account deficit and a rapid accumulation of external debt.
On the external front, some studies had investigated the effects of external shocks 
on the economic activity of some countries including the Philippines.9 Balassa (1981) 
decomposed and estimated the impact of external shocks on the current account balance 
of payments effects into their two components: (a) the terms of trade effects (changes in 
the prices of exports and imports), and (b) the volume effect (changes in volume); arid 
indicated the relative importance of the former over the latter in the case of the 
Philippines: i.e. 78°L of the balance of payments effects was due to terms of trade effects
6See Canlas, and others, 1984, page 3.
~See Sicat. 1984, page 5.
I s See World Bank, 1981, The Philippines: A review of external d eb t , page i. The Philippine 
government invited a World Bank mission to examine the grow-th and structure of the Philippine 
debt analyze the policy implications of the country’s debt burden and assess the institutional 
framework for debt management.
^See. for instance, B. Balassa, 1981, ’’The policy experience of twelve less developed 
um.-.es 1973-78” . World Bank Staff Working Paper Number 449; S. Naya, 1984, "Effects of 
external shocks on the balance of payments, policy responses and debt problems of Asian 
developing countries” , The Philippine Economic Journal Volume 13, Number 1, University of the 
Philippines School of  Economics, pp. 23-49; VV. E. James, 1983, External shocks, energy policy 
and macroeconomic performance of asian developing countries:« policy analysis” , Economics Staff 
P aper, Number 17, Asian Development Bank; and .1 le e  and L. La bios, 1985, ” The effects of terms 
of trade changes on the balance of payments and real national income of asian developing 
countries” , Report Number 28. Asian Development Bank
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while 22% was due to the*  volume* efforts. * Following Balassa’s met hodology, Maya 
(1983) estimated that 75% of the balance of payments effects was due to the terms of 
trade effect and 25% was due to the volume effect,.* 1 James (1983) reported that external 
debt of the non-oil developing Asian countries had mounted over the period ol the two oil 
shocks, but did not constitute a serious problem until very recently as relatively high debt 
countries (measured as the ratio of debt service to export receipts) have also tended to 
have strong average rates of growth in exports and GNP: this is true for t he case of the
I *)
Republic of Korea and Thailand but less so for the Philippines.1
The role of external shocks in the economic performance of the Philippines, 
therefore, cannot be denied. Thus, the Philippine economy, like other economies, had been 
affected by t he occurrence of external shocks particularly the deterioration in t he terms of 
trade. If the terms of trade deteriorated a country could ad ju st by reducing absorp-
13tio n , and run a current account d e fic it  and build up foreign debt.
In the second case, absorption need not increase; it, fails to be reduced. II there is 
actually a rise in absorption then there is more than a failure of adjustment to the 
external shock; there is an internally-generated shock.
Despite the existence of external current account deficits and internal inflationary
, 0 See Balassa, 1981, page 31a. F igures in per cent, were ob ta ined  as annua l averages for the 
period 1974 to  1978. A fu rthe r  investigation of ex ternal shock« experienced hv th e  bD C s and the 
ad ju s tm e n t  policies followed by these countries in the years 1971 1976 and 1979-1981 is analyzed in 
Balassa, 1984, ’’Exte rna l  shocks and adjustment, policies in twelve L1H s, World Bank Report 
n uni her DR 1)80
11 See Naya. 1983, page 30. T h e  figures in per < ent were .»blamed as annua l averages for tin- 
period 1974 to 1982. In his paper, Naya a t tem p ted  to assess the m agn itude  of the external shocks in 
te rm s  of the ir  advere im pac t  on the  balance of paym ents  of twelve Asian developing countries and 
to  exam ine  the  policy responses to  these shocks
1 “Jam es .  1983, page 5. In his paper, Jam es presents an analysis of the  macroeconomic 
perfo rm ance  of selected Asian developing countries in a period of global economic d is turbances 
(1970 to  1983) particu larly  the  im pact of the two oil price shocks and two deep recessions in the 
industria lized  countries and of the  oil glut on the growth, inflation and t rade  performance ol the 
coun tr ies  examined.
* "F o r  analysis of economic policies pursued by some countries in response to ex ternal shocks, see 
B. Balassa. 1981, ” T he  policy experience of twelve less developed countries: 1973-78” World 1 Iank 
S taff  W orking P a p e r . No. 449; B. Balassa, 1984a. "E x te rn a l  shocks and ad ju s tm e n t  policies in 
twelve LDCs: 1974-76 and 1979-81. World Bank R e p o r t , N um ber  1)R 1)80. B Balassa. 1984b. The  
problem  of debt in developing countries, World H ank Discussion P a p e r , Num ber DRD8K
problems during the post-1973 period, the Philippine government continued to adopt 
absorption-increasing policies via increased government expenditures on non-tradeables 
and tradeables and faster growth of domestic credit creation. With unmatched revenues, 
t he increased government spending resulted in higher government budget deficits. In order 
to finance the rising government expenditures and the external deficits, the Philippines 
had relied heavily on foreign borrowings made available by the oil-exporting countries 
through foreign commercial banks.
From 1966 onwards the Philippine government embarked on expansionary demand 
policies via persistent rise in government spending on non-tradeables and tradeables and 
Financed in large part by the growth of the narrow money supply. The Philippine 
macroeconomic policy differed from that of several more conservative oil-importing 
developing countries such as Thailand and Republic of Korea. These countries also 
experienced external deficits and domestic inflationary pressures following OPEC 1 (when 
oil prices rose during 1973-1974) and OPEC II (when oil prices rose during 1978-1979). 
They followed, however, the orthodox stabilization policy of restrictive fiscal and/or 
monetary policy and a switching policy via devaluation of the exchange rate.
We have known that  the economic performance of the Philippines during the 
1966-1984 period had been affected by both external and internal factors. While it is true 
th a t  external shocks during the 1970s had affected the Philippine economy adversely, the 
thesis argues that the domestic macroeconomic policy also contributed significantly to 
the occurrence of the Philippine crisis during the 198(8; This argument supports the claim 
of the UPSE workshop report th a t  while external difficulties were certainly a necessary 
condition for the crisis, the major explanation lor its occurrence must lie with the 
charact er of economic policies, and of policy making by the leadership.
Rather than focusing on the different external factors and their impact on the 
doniestic economy, the thesis problem would, therefore, concentrate on the role oT 




The major concern, and hence the contribution of the thesis is the formulation of a 
general theoretical framework which will enable us to analyze macroeconomic policy 
-monetary and fiscal policy- under fixed and flexible exchange rates, and its impact on the 
domestic economy. Then we will relate the formulated framework to the case of the 
Philippines; ie. to analyze fiscal and monetary policy and its effects on the Philippine 
economy.
1.3 O b jectives  o f  th e  T hesis
The research has two specific purposes: analytical and policy, and three central 
questions.
The analytical purpose poses the first central question: ” How are monetary fiscal 
and exchange rate policies determined in the Philippines?r It is indeed important to 
understand the mechanism of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies in the 
Philippines and the institutional environment in which those policy actions and changes 
have been followed, in order to have an appropriate diagnosis of the scope of such policy 
actions.
The policy purpose focuses on the second and third central questions. The second 
central question is, ” What are the effects of macroeconomic policy on the real exchange 
rates, the current account, employment, and o u tpu t?”
In the thesis, changes in macroeconomic policy refer to a pure fiscal expansion and a 
phre money expansion. Pure fiscal expansion refers to the case where the government 
increases its expenditures on non-tradeables via the sale of bonds (the budget deficit is 
equal to change in bonds, money supply remaining constant). The measure of pure fiscal 
expansion tha t  we will use is the amount of any bond-financed rise in government’s 
domestic budget deficit. An increase in the domestic budget deficit results from an 
increase in government expenditures on non-tradeables unmatched by revenues. Pure 
monetary policy refers to domestic credit creation via open market operations. A budget
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deficit financed by domestic credit creation, therefore, involves both, fiscal and monetary 
expansion.
The policy purpose also seeks to determine the long-run aspect of macroeconomic 
policy as full internal and external balance are restored. Thus, the third central question 
is ” W hat are the long-run effects on the country 's debt, investment., savings, and 
wealth?"
1.4 A p p roach  to  th e  S tu d y
In order to accomplish the desired objectives, the following activities are 
undertaken. The approach to answering the first, central question is via an historical and 
analytical investigation of macroeconomic policy (and the corresponding economic 
reforms) in the Philippines using relevant economic indicators.
The approach to answering the second central question is to develop a general 
theoretical framework of analyzing monetary and fiscal policy under fixed and flexible 
exchange rates. In analyzing the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy, 
macroeconomic theorizing has developed from the traditional closed economy assumption 
toward considering the openness of the economy. In open economy macroeconomic 
models, we need at least two goods, distinguishing between a domestic good and a 
foreign good, or alternatively between a traded good (tradeable) and a non-traded good 
(non-tradeable).
The traditional approach to open economy macroeconomics in the context of the 
domestic and foreign good model w'as developed by Meade (1951), Mundell (1968) and
Hi
Fleming (1962).14 According to Mundell, for example, both monetary and fiscal policy 
work more effectively under flexible than under fixed exchange rates without capital 
mobility. In the presence of perfect capital mobility, monetary policy is ineffective under 
fixed exchange rates and fiscal policy ineffective under flexible exchange rates. Fleming 
has suggested that the use of fiscal policy under flexible exchange rates may lead to a 
smaller increase in employment and income than under fixed exchange rates.
The approach to open economy macroeconomics can also be done in the context of 
the Salter (1959) and Swan (1960) two sector model: tradeables and non-tradeables. This 
thesis is developed in the context of this framework.15 Salter illustrates by means of 
variations on one simple diagram certain features of the relationship between internal arid 
external balance. Its object is merely to indicate the intimate relationships between price 
and expenditure effects in reconciling full employment policy with balance of payments 
policy. Swan explores, in a simplified economic system, conditions under which the 
objectives of internal balance, external balance, and internal price stability, may be 
realized, together severally.1() Other important contributions which have been developed
^4See .1. E. Meade, 1951, The Theory of Economic Policy, Volume L The Balance of Payincnts, 
London; R. A. Mundell, 1968, International Economics, New York, and J. Marcus Fleming, 1962, 
” Domestic financial policies under fixed and under floating exchange ra te s ’, 1Mh S taff Papers, 
pages 369-79. Other relevant studies are as follows: A. O. Krueger 1965, ” The impact of 
alternative government policies under varying exchange rate systems” , in Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Volume 79, pages 195-206; K. Brunner and A. H. Meitzer, 1976. ’’Monetary and fiscal 
policy in open, interdependent economies with fixed exchange rates” , in Recent Issues in 
International Monetary Economics. E. Claassen and P. Salin (editors), North Holland Publishing 
Co., Netherlands; V. Galbis, 1975, "Monetary and exchange rate policies in a small open 
economy” , in IMF Staff P apers , Volume XXII, Number 2, pages 313-343; V. Argy and J. Salop, 
1979, ” Price and output effects of monetary and fiscal pole y under flexible exchange rates” , in IMF 
Staff P apers . Volume 26, Number 2, pages 224-256 Y\ II Branson and W.1L Buiter, 1982, 
’’ Monetary and fiscal policy with flexible exchange raie^ NBER Working Paper number 901; and 
P De Grauwe, 1983. Macroeconomic Theory for the Opejn Economy. England.
15See W Salter 1959, ” Internal and external balance (he role of price and expenditure effects” , 
in The Economic Record, Volume 35, pages 226-238: and T. Swan. 1960, "Economic control in a 
dependent-economy model” in T h e Economic Record Volume 36. pages 51-66.
1 ^Internal balance refers to the maintenance of a balance between effective aggregate supply of 
and demand for goods and services produced by domestic resources, corresponding with some 
definition of "full employment without inflationary pressures". External balance refers to the 
maintenance of a balance between effective aggregate supply of exports and demand for imports, 
corresponding (after allowing for the terms of trade and for financial transfers) with some definition 
of balance of payments equilibrium. Internal price stability refers to the maintenance of a specified 
general price level of goods and services bought domest ically corresponding with some definition of 
price stability  in terms of an index number
in the context of the tradeable/non-tradeable framework are Corden (I960, 1981),
Dornbusch (1973, 1980), Turnovsky (1980), Sieper and Fane (1982), Fane (1982, 1985), 
and Pitchford (1985).17
The approach to developing the structure of the basic model is as follows. Firstly, a 
basic model is formulated via integrating various elements of the existing macroeconomic 
theory. A simple mathematical treatment of t he model is aimed to facilitate our analysis. 
It has to be stated that the mathematical formulation of the basic model facilitates the 
analysis of the theoretical framework, and also provides a more convenient manner of 
evaluating Philippine macroeconomic policy and its impact on a number of economic 
variables under investigation. Moreover, it was agreed during the mid-term review10 of 
my thesis progress that 1 would not undertake an empirical estimation of a complete 
nriaeroeconometric model for such an approach was believed to be far too ambitious for 
this academic exercise, given the time constraint and the difficulty of formulating an 
appropriate econometric model for an economy like the Philippines which is highly 
regulated.
After specifying the structure of the basic model, we introduce changes in the 
macroeconomic policy via a pure money expansion, and a pure fiscal expansion and 
analyze their effects on the current account, the real exchange rates, output and 
employment under fixed and flexible exchange rat,es.
17 ^1 See, for instance. W. M. Corden, 1960, ” The geometric representation of policies to attain 
internal and external balance” , in Review of Economic Studies, Volume ‘28, pages 1-22; 
W. M. Corden, 1981 (2nd edition), Inflation, Exchange Rates and the World Economy, chapters 
1-3, pages 1-52; R Dornbusch, 1973, ”Devaluation, money and non-traded goods” , in American 
Economic Review, Volume 63, pages 871-880; R. Dornbusch, 1980, Open Economy 
Macroeconomics, chapter 6, Home goods and traded goods:the dependent economy model, pages 
93-116; S. Turnovsky, 1980, ’’Monetary and fiscal policy in a long-run macroeconomic model” , in 
The Economic Record, Volume 56, pages 158-170; E. Sieper, and G. Fane, 1982, ’’ Exchange 
controls and exchange rate system ” , Technical Paper No. 6, Australian financial system inquiry, 
particularly pages 237-279; G. Fane, 1982, ” A geometric analysis of exchange rate adjustments 
under static and rational expectations” , The Economic Record. Volume 58, pages 367-374; and 
.) Pitchford. 1985, "Fiscal deficits, exchange rates and the current account” , Australian National 
Un iversity.
IS Members of (lie mid-term review cornmiti.ee during 25 November 1985 were Professor W. Max 
Corden, Drs. George Fane, Peter Warr and Hal Hill. A S im u la tio n  e x e r c i s e  VSS not
c a r r i e d  out due t o  th e  u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  of some p u b l ish e d  s tu d ie s  which 
could  have p rov ided  some re a s o n a b le  p a ram e te rs  and a l s o  due t o  time
c o n s t r a i n t ,
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We distinguish three ” runs” of the model: the very short-run in which money wage 
is assumed sticky and full employment is not guaranteed; the medium run in which the 
money wage adjusts to give full employment but the current account may not balance 
and the country is saving or dissaving; and the very long run in which the current account 
surplus (or deficit) is corrected via wealth effects e.g. with current account deficit , wealth 
is falling so tha t  spending gradually falls. The current account tends towards balance in 
the long-run.
From the theoretical framework, we can distinguish the effects of a pure money 
expansion and the effects of a pure fiscal expansion under fixed exchange rates and 
flexible exchange rates. Under fixed exchange rates and given some (but not perfect) 
capital mobility, the effects of a pure money expansion in the Keynesian short-run (when 
money wages are fixed) are an appreciation of the real exchange rate (domestic prices of 
tradeables remain constant and domestic prices of non-tradeables rise) so that the 
demand for tradeables increases resulting in a current account deficit, and an increase in 
the employment and output in the non-tradeable sector (while employment and output in 
the tradeable sector remain unchanged). The product wage in the non-tradeable sector 
increases so that employment and output in that sector gradually fall back to their 
original levels. In the long-run, a pure monetary expansion has zero effects in both 
sectors.
Under flexible » **Tange rates and given high capital mobility, the effects of a pure
money expansion in the short-run are to stimulate employment and output in both
sectors and to produce current account surplus as the exchange rate depreciates and
capital account deficit. Over time, the wage ra tes and the p rices of non-traded 
goods w i l l  gradually r i s e .  Und^r p lau sib le  assum ptions, tne exchange rate  
may i n i t i a l l y  overshoot: in  which case the medium-run adjustment w il l  
involve some reduction in  the oeso orice of traded goods.
Under fixed exchange rates and given some but not perfect capital mobility, a pure 
fiscal expansion (an increase in goverrimem spending on non-tradeables financed by
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bonds) does have Keynesian short-run effects: to increase the domestic prices of noti- 
tradeables relative to the domestic prices of tradeables which results in a rise of the 
demand for tradeables and hence to a current account deficit and to increase employment 
and ou tpu t in the non-tradeable sector (while those of the tradeable sector remain 
unchanged). In the medium-run, we expect the same qualitative effects as in the short-run 
to hold except tha t  this time when the money wage adjusts, t he relative wage in terms of 
tradeables increases so tha t  employment and output in t he tradeable sector declines. In 
the long-run, the fall in wealth due to a current account deficit reduces spending by the 
private sector so tha t  the real exchange rate depreciates and the current account, tends to 
balance.
Under flexible exchange rates and given high capital mobility, the increased 
government spending on non-tradeables surely increases the prices of non-tradeables and 
hence its price relative to tradeables also increases in the short-run, ie. the real exchange 
rate appreciates and this results in an increased demand for tradeables giving rise to a 
current account deficit. Employment and output of the non-tradeable sector certainly 
increase while those of the tradeable sector decrease. As money wages adjust in the 
medium-run, the relative wage in terms of tradeables increases so that, employment and 
ou tpu t in the tradeable sector decrease. The relative wage in terms of non-tradeables 
declines so that, employment and output in the non-tradeable sector increase. In the long- 
run, we expect the same qualitative effects as in the medium-run except th a t  the current 
account, balances, so that in transition from medium-run to long-run, the tradeable sector 
expands a bit and the non-t radeable sector contracts.
I
Then we analyze macroeconomic policy in the Philippines in tin* context of the 
formulated theoretical framework. Appropriate econometric (or simple statistical) 
techniques/tools are employed in cases where they are essential in order to facilitate the 
analyses.
fhe approach to answering the third central question is to develop a theoretical 
framework and then relate it to the case of the Philippines.
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W h en  t,ho govern m en t  in creases  it s  e x p en d itu re  on n o n -tr a d e a b les ,  t he real ex c h a n g e
rate appreciates in the short-run so tha t  the production of non-tradeables increases and
the consumption of non-tradeables falls. The appreciation of the real exchange rate
switches the excess demand from non-tradeables to tradeables thereby producing a
current account deficit. Equivalently, national investment exceeds national savings; ie. 
up f o r e i g n  d e b t  *
the country b u i l d s  Real wealth falls which in turn reduces private spending. As 
spending falls, (1) there is a  real depreciation to preserve equilibrium in the non- 
tradeables market, and (2) the current account deficit disappears. Thus, there exists 
natural long-run equilibrating forces which remove current account imbalances in the 
absence of destabilizing government, policies.
Instead of allowing the long-run equilibrating processes to take place, some 
countries, the Philippines for one, allowed persistent budget deficits. The availability of 
loans from abroad during the 1970s encouraged these countries to finance their persistent 
budget deficits and even to allow their real exchange rates to continue to appreciate 
thereby preventing or at least inhibiting the depreciation of the real exchange rate 
required for the long-run current account balance. As the real exchange rate appreciates,
I
the current account deficit grows. Although there is no one-to-one causal link from the
relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables (P^r/Pyi) to the current account, keeping up
government spending on non-tradeables (Gp^) and financing the current account deficit
and Gjy, by external borrowing, a country can prevent/postpone the fall in private
spending (due to the reduction in wealth which o c c u rs  i f  t h e  government, sp e n d in g  
i s  c o n c e n t r a t e d  on c o n su m p tio n  goods and i f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  c u t s  back
i t s  own s p e n d in g  by l e s s  t h a n  t h e  r i s e  i n  governm ent s p e n d in g )  and t h e
/ 19a s s o c i a t e d  f a l l  i n  P , , /P n, w hich would o th e r w i s e  o c c u r .
*‘^ ln his study "The role of international reserves and foreign debt in the external adjustment, 
process” , in Adjustment.. Conditionality, and internal ional F inancing, The International Monetary 
Fund, S. Edwards (1983, page 143) noted that during the 1970s, the developing countries 
underwent serious current account deficits in their balance of payments, which led, inter alia, to 
major increases in their foreign debt. In his study, ” External debt., budget deficits and 
disequilibrium exchange rates” , NBEH Working Paper. Dornbusch (J984. page 1) pointed out that 
oil, int erest rates and world recession are often isolated as the chief causes of the world debt crisis. 
I hit these factors only have made much more apparent and unsustainable an underlying 
disequilibrium in which exchange rate overvaluation and/or budget deficits were perpetuated by 
continuing ami excessive recourse to the world capital market.
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The period of investigation is from 1966 until 1984 but highlighting on some 
particularly significant episodes. The year 1966 was the year when Mr. Marcos assumed 
presidency for the first time. The year 1984 represents the terminal year of analysis 
due to the unavailability or inaccessability of relevant da ta  and information for the 
subsequent years.
1.5 O rgan iza tion  o f  the T h esis
The thesis is organized as follows.
The second chapter presents the historical and analytical review of the Philippine 
fiscal policy and experience. The main aspect of fiscal policy which we analyze is that 
associated with the government budget deficit (as the indicator of fiscal policy). We also 
analyze the changing patterns of government spending by sectoral classification and by 
economic classification. In this chapter, we also look into the Philippine monetary policy 
and experience. In particular, we analyze the growth and development of the financial 
sector, the determination of monetary policy, and changes in the narrow money supply.
The third chapter analyzes the Philippine exchange rate policy and experience. In 
this chapter, we are concerned with the determination of exchange rate policy in the 
Philippines, an analysis of the factors for the choice of the exchange rate system, an 
analysis of exchange controls and the black market for foreign exchange.
The fourth and fifth chapters provide the theoretical framework of analysis. The
on
Mr. Marcos assumed presidency for the first turn m 1966 via a landslide victory over his 
predecessor He was re-elected in 1969 for another 4-year term. Before his term would have expired, 
the President declared martial law in September 1972 which empowered him to dissolve the then 
existing bicameral legislature (which was patterned after the United States) and instead created a 
unicameral legislature known as Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly) whose members were 
elected at-large but the majority of which belonged to the President’s party known as Kilusan ng 
Bagong Lipunan (New Society Party) with Mr. Virata as the Prime Minister. The 1935 
Constitution of the Philippines was in effect until 1972 but it was then radically changed resulting 
in the 1973 Philippine Constitution which in turn essentially assured the President of his strong 
hold to power via granting him enormous power to issue numerous Presidential Decrees, Executive 
Orders ,  and the like. Mr. Marcos was the Philippine President for 20 years until he was forced to 
give up his presidency in February 1986 via the interplay of different factors; namely, people 
power, military’s cooperation and support, the Church, and the domestic and foreign media
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s tructure  of the basic model is analyzed in the fourth chapter. The basic model is 
formulated via integrating the existing elements of macroeconomic theory such as (a) 
small country assumption, (b) labor market condition, (c) output market condition, (d) 
internal balance condition, (e) private spending function, (f) money market condition, and 
(g) balance of payments equation. 'Then, we provide a summary of the basic model in the 
medium-run, under fixed exchange rates and under flexible exchange rates. The fifth 
chapter enables us to analyze the effects of pure money expansion and pure fiscal 
expansion under fixed and flexible exchange rates on the real exchange rates, the current 
account balance, sectoral employment and sectoral output.
The sixth chapter provides an analysis of the real exchange rates, the current 
account, sectoral employment and sectoral ou tput in the Philippines within the context of 
the theoretical framework developed in the fourth and fifth chapters. Estimation 
procedures for relevant da ta  input requirements and other economic variables are also 
discussed. An important part  of this chapter is the grouping of the 12 sectors of the 
economy into two sectors: the tradeable sector and the non-tradeable sector, which then 
enables us to come up with alternative estimates for domestic price of tradeables,
i
domestic price of non-tradeables, the real exchange rates, sectoral employment and 
sectoral output.
The seventh chapter provides a theoretical framework which enable us to analyze 
the long-run effect of macroeconomic policy on each of the following economic variables: 
the coun try ’s gross and net, external debt, national and sectoral (public and private) 
investment and savings, and real wealth, and then we relate each of these framework to 
the case of the Philippines. Estimation procedures for relevant da ta  input requirements 
and other economic variables are also discussed.
The final chapter provides the summary and conclusion.
C H A P T E R  2
F I S C A L  A N D  M O N E T A R Y P O L IC Y  & E X P E R IE N C E
2.1 I n tr o d u c t io n
In this chapter, we present an historical and analytical review of the Philippine 
fiscal and monetary policy and experience during the 1966-1984 period. The main aspect 
of fiscal policy which we will analyze is th a t associated with the government budget 
deficit (as the indicator of fiscal policy). We will also analyze the changing patterns of 
governm ent spending by sectoral classification and by economic classification. In this 
chapter, we will also look into the Philippine, m onetary policy and experience. In 
particu lar, we will analyze the growth and development of the financial sector, the 
determ ination of m onetary policy, and changes in the narrow money supply.
2 .2  F is c a l  P o l i c y  a n d  E x p e r ie n c e
i
The main aspect of fiscal policy which we are interested in is tha t associated with
th e  government budget d e f i c i t  which we w i l l  use a s  th e  i n d i c a t o r  of
f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  F ine d e t a i l s  of th e  s ta n c e  of f i s c a l  p o l i c y  would
r e q u i r e  c a l c u l a t i o n  of th e  f u l l  employment budget d e f i c i t .  However,
th e  broad  p a t t e r n s  w ith  which we a re  concerned h e re  ( i e ,  th e  o e r s i s t e n t
budget d e f i c i t s  of th e  l a t e  s i x t i e s ,  th e  s u r p lu s e s  of th e  e a r l y  seven-  
»
t i e s ,  and t h e  d e f i c i t s  of th e  p e r io d  s in c e  th e  m id - s e v e n t ie s )  a re  so 
c l e a r - c u t  t h a t  th e y  would not be changed by u s in g  a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  
i n d i c a t o r  of t h e  s ta n c e  of f i s c a l  p o l i c y .
Changes in  f i s c a l  p o l ic y  can be b rought about by changes in  
government e x p e n d i tu re s  and by changes in  t a x e s .  P e r s i s t e n t  budget 
d e f i c i t s  can come from e i t h e r  th e  e x p e n d i tu re  s id e  v ia  an in c re a s e
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in  government spending or from th e revenue s id e  v ia  a decrease in  ta x e s .
In the P h il ip p in e  c a s e ,  the  p e r s is t e n t  d e f i c i t s  have stemme-: irom p e r s i s ­
t e n t ly  high l e v e l s  of government spending, s ince  there  have hardly neen 
any ta x  cut* in  the P h il ip p in e s  in  1967-84 neriod . Moreover, Mansur (1084) 
concluded th a t the n a t io n a l  governm ent's budgetary p o s i t io n  appears t o  
have remained expansionary during the p ost-19  70 p er iod .
Let us analyze the trends of the governm ent budget deficit during the 1967-1981 
period. It will be helpful to  consider the two sub-periods, ic. the pre- and post-1973.
Figure 2-12 shows th a t during the pre-1973 period, the Philippine government 
generally adopted a fiscal restra in t. While the the governm ent budget deficit remained 
constan t a t 0.82% of GNP during the 1967-1968 period, it increased significantly, 
however, to 2.84% of GNP in 1969, being a presidential election year. Then, we observed 
th a t the governm ent budget deficit improved markedly and even registered surpluses in
1970 and 1973.
Figure 2-1 also shows th a t the Philippine governm ent generally adopted a fiscal 
stim ulus during the post-1973 period. From a surplus in 1974, thtf government budget 
deficits as a proportion of GNP generally deteriorated. Fiscal authorities continued their 
expansionary stance during the second half of the 1970s via m aintaining high levels of 
budget deficit (except in 1979), and increasing further during the 1980-1982 period. Hill 
and .Jayasuriya (1985) claimed th a t  a major expansion of government expenditures from 
1974 onwards was justified as being countercyclical; th a t is, increased government 
expenditures helped to m aintain growth m om entum .3 Deficits, however, were cut down 
during 1983 and 1984 but were still a t high proportions of GNP (even higher than the 
1967-1968 ratios).
'.See A.H, Mansur, 1986, " E ffec ts  of th e  budget d e f i c i t  on the cu rrent 
account b a la n ce:th e  case  o f th e  P h il ip p in e s « . In t h i s  stu d y , Mansur exa­
mines the r e la t io n s h ip  between f i s c a l  d e f i c i t  and th e  current account 
b a la n ce , and concludes th at th e P h ilip p in e s ' current account balance i s  
s ig n i f ic a n t ly  in flu en ced  by movements in  the o v e r a ll  budget d e f i c i t ,
“Sec Appendix C, Table 5 for the data on national government budget deficit as a proportion of 
GNP.
•> 4
"'See H. Hill and S. Jayasuriya , 1985, ’’T h e  Phil ippine econom y: performance problems and
prospects” , W orking Paper N um ber 8 5 /3 ,  T h e  Australian National University, pages I 5 - M i . _______
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Figure 2-1: G O V E R N M E N T BU D G ET BALANCE AS A PROPORTION OF GNP
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2.2 .1  G overn m en t Spend ing b y  Sectoral C la ssifica tio n
Lot us analyze the changing p a t te rn s  of government spending by sectora l 
classification. The dominant shift has been away from spending on social services towards 
spending on so-called ”economic services” and debt servicing.'1 'fable 2 - l f> shows that tin 
share of spending on social services dropped from 44 .2%  of t he total government spending 
in 1965 to 26.8% in 1984 thereby reflecting a sharply reduced priority for social services 
since 1970. Expenditures on education and manpower services (which comprised the bulk 
of social services in 1965) declined considerably to 16.4% of GN P in 1984 from 36.5% in 
1965. The declining shares of spending on social services was accounted for by the 
marked increase in the shares of the spending on ”economic services” from 16.7% of GNP 
in 1965 to 45.0% in 1975. (Government spending on utilities and infrastructure registered 
the big growth area; ie. its share to total spending rose slightly from 3.2% in 1965 to 5.9% 
in 1970 and markedly to 32.4% in 1975). On the surface, this looks like a shift from 
government ” consumption” to government ’’investment” , which should improve growth 
and the balance of payments in the long-run, but which did not happen. This could be 
a ttr ibu ted  mainly to the large ’’uneconomic” investments in hotel and related facilities 
during the second half of the 1970s. In 1984, however, the share of government spending
I
on economic services declined to 26.8 percent.
The shift in expenditure allocation from socially-oriented toward economic-oriented 
services implied the changing priorities of the Philippine government. During the 
post-1970 regime, fiscal authorities shifted toward investing heavily on supposedly 
income-generating projects and services particularly on utilities and infrastructure. The 
utilities and infrastructure sector (which was managed mostly by a select group of 
presidential appointees) was, therefore, the most favored sector during the post-1970
^Social services include education and manpower training; housing, population, public health; 
social welfare and other community services. Expenditures on ’’economic services” include 
spending on government programs and projects (in agriculture, fishery and forestry; industry, 
trade, labor and tourism; and utilities and infrastructure) which were designed to help augment 
people’s incomes, particularly those of the poor who were the targeted beneficiaries. In reality, 
however, such objective was not achieved since more and more Filipinos become poorer and poorer.
See Appendix C, I able 6 for the basic data on national government spending by sectoral 
classification.
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regime. A cut in ' government spending in this sector would have been politically 
undesirable.
The share of expenditure on national defense increased from 10.7% of GNP in 1905 
to 20.9% in 1975 and subsequently declined to 9.2% in 1984. On the other hand, the share 
of spending on general public service (including debt service payments) declined from 
22.3% in 1965 to 14.6% in 1975. The significant increase in the share of the general public 
services to total spending, from 24.0% in 1980 to 37.2% in 1984 can be a ttributed to the 




Table 2-1: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING BY SECTORAL
CLASSIFICATION
1965 1970 1975 1980 1984
Total Government Spending
(In million pesos) 1894 4053 19049 36935 60403
(As percent of GNP) 8.1 9.7 16.7 13.7 11.2
Shares to total spending, in percent
1. Economic Services 16.7 31.6 45.5 42.5 26.8
Agriculture.fishery k 
forestry 7.1 6.4 5.4 6.7 6.6
Industry, trade,
labor k tourism 6.4 19.3 7.8 3.9 2.0
Utilities k infra­
structure 3.2 5.9 32.4 32.0 18.1
2. Social Services 44.2 34.9 19.0 20.5 26.8
Education k Manpower 36.5 28.0 11.6 11.4 16.4
Housing, Population 
and Public Health 6.2 5.6 4.1 7.2 6.9
Social Welfare k Other 
Community Services 1.5 1.3 3.2 1.9 3.5
3. National Defense 16.7 15.2 20.9 12.9 9.2
4. General Public Services 22.3 18.3 14.6 24.0 37.2
Debt Service Payments 5.0 6.0 5.0 10.8 20.0
Source of Basic Data: See Appendix C, Table 6.
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2 .2 .2  G o v e r n m e n t  S p e n d in g  b y  E co n o m ic  C la s s i f ic a t io n
Let us now analyze national government, spending by economic classification from 
"fable 2-2. We observe again a shift in spending allocations away from current 
expenditures towards spending on capital outlays thereby reflecting the changing 
priorities of the government; that is, there exist,ed a growing increased importance of 
capital expenditures relative to current expenditures. Current expenditures declined 
sharply in 1975 and rose slightly during the next decade. Capital outlays, on the other 
hand, rose markedly in 1975 (which was mainly due to the large government’s 
investments in hotels and other related facilities). During the post-1975 period, capita) 
outlays remained in high levels.
During the 1965-1970 period, the expenditure share on personal services accounted 
for half of the tota( government spending only to be reduced drastically to about one- 
fourth in the succeeding years. The combined shares of maintenance and operating costs, 
and transfer payments rose slightly from 24.7% in 1965 to 28.0% in 1983. Debt service 
payments as a proportion of to ta l spending, on the other hand, increased four times, from 
5% in 1965 to 20% in 1983. The rising debt service payments reflected the increasing 
repayments on public borrowings which financed public sector deficits.
I
(jSec Appendix C, Table 7 for the data on national government, spending by economic
c i as s i l i ca t  i o n .
Table 2-2: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING BY ECONOMIC
CLASSIFICATION
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
Shares to total spending in percent
CURRENT EXPENDITURES 85.3 80.1 61.3 65.8 72.3
a.Personal Services 55.6 46.0 23.6 26.2 25.4
b .Maintenance and other 
Operating Costs 16.8 16.8 22.1 18.8 18.0
c.Debt Service Payments 5.0 6.0 5.0 10.8 20.0
d.Transfer Payments 7.9 11.3 10.6 10.0 8.9
CAPITAL OUTLAYS 14.7 19.9 38.7 34.1 27.6
Expenditures on personal services include salaries and 'wages of
government employees, life and retirement benefits provided by the 
Government Service Insurance System, contractual services, overtime 
pay and other benefits. Maintenance and other operating costs include 
expenditures on travelling, communications, repairs and maintenance 
of government facilities, transportation services, supplies and mate­
rials. Debt service payments include interest payments and loan repay­
ments. Transfer payments include grants, subsidies and contributions 
awards and indemnities, benefits provided by the Social Security 
System and other claims. Capital outlays include land and land 
improvement, building and structure outlay, furniture and equipment 
outlay, investment outlay and loans outlay.
Source of basic data: See Appendix C, Table 7.
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It, has to he emphasized tha t  one of the most significant developments during the 
po s t-1970 period was the rapid growth of the government corporate' sector. Hill and 
Jayasuriya (1985) reported tha t  the government’s role has expanded during the martial 
law period and beyond." Leviste (1985) concluded tha t  the growth of the public sector 
had accelerated from being a relatively small public sector (which consisted of the 
national government playing the major role, local governments and a small number of 
public corporations providing basic services like electricity, water supply and sewerage, 
gas and public transport) into a large public sector (bot h in expenditures and in number). 
Public investment in the Philippines grew from 1.5% of G N P in 1970 to an average of 
8.4% of GNP during the 1978-82 period.*'
The growth of public expenditures during the post-1970 period was accompanied by 
a seemingly uncontrolled growth in the number and size of public corporations. From a
I
total of 65 government corporations (47 parents and 18 subsidiaries) in 1970, there were 
more than 259 (93 parents and 166 subsidiaries) in 1984. As to the legal basis for creating 
public enterprises, Briones (1985) pointed out tha t  about 30 per cent (of 259) were
created via Presidential Orders (ie. Presidential Decrees, Executive Orders, Letters of
\
Instruction, and Letters of Implementation); 13 per cent were created via legislative 
enactment; and 58 per cent were created via registration with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.®
During the period of rapid economic growth (whi< h ended in t he 1980s), the 
government adopted a countercyclical policy to respond to adverse external 
circumstances, and carried out a massive public investment program aimed at reducing 
imported energy requirements and expanding basic infrastructure. During tin' 1978-83
Mlill and Jayasuriya. 1985, page 51.
"See ,I.P Leviste, Jr., 1985, ’ The management of public enterprises and the monitoring of 
government corporations” , Philippine Budget Management,, page 50.
'S ee  L. Briones, 1985, ”The relationship o f  public enterprise with the national government in the 
Philippines” , Lecture delivered at the international seminar on ’’The role and performance of public 
enterprises” , held on June 17- 28, 1985, page 27.
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period, ovi'r  70 % o f  the public invest,merit, was for infrastructure, primarily in the energy 
and transport areas. This shift in policy was partly responsible for the growth of the 
public corporate sector.
2.3 M on etary  P o l ic y  and E xp er ien ce
2.3.1 G row th  and D e v e lo p m e n t  o f  the F inancia l  Sector
A joint Philippine-United States Finance Commission was created in 1946 to study 
the financial and budgeting problems of the Philippine government. Following its 
recommendations, Republic Act (R.A.) 265 also known as the Central Bank Act, J was 
passed in June 1948 which established a managed monetary system under the authority of 
the Bank.
The institutional and legal foundations for the establishment of the banking sector 
(or simply banks) were laid down during the 1950s via the approval and adoption of the 
different banking acts or charters which provided the operating guidelines, rules and 
regulations for these banks, e.g. the General Banking Act (1948) for the commercial 
banks, the Rural Bank Act (1951) for the rural banks, the DBP charter (1954) for 
Development Bank of the Philippines, and the amended PNB charter (1955) for the 
Philippine National Bank, and a law establishing the privat,e development banks (1958).
Since 1948 until 1972, the Bank had supervisory authority over the banks alone. 
The banks consist of (a) deposit money banks, denoted as (DMBs), such as commercial 
banks and rural banks which accept demand deposits, and (b) non-deposit money banks 
(non-DMBs) such as thrift banks (savings banks, private development banks, and savings 
and loan associations), and some government banks. The basic distinction between DMBs 
and non-DMBs is that the former are authorized to accept demand deposits while the 
latter are not,. * 1
The rural banks service the needs of farmers and small producers in the rural areas. 
These banks were responsible for encouraging the flow of surplus funds from the rural
ll)By convention, we refer to the Central Bank as Bank throughout the thesis.
* ^Since 1972, deposit money banks include commercial banks, rural banks which accept demand  
deposits,  and unibanks or expanded commercial banks. See pages for the discussion of
unibanks.
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areas into the hanking sector. The Development Bank of the Philippines and the 
Philippine National Bank are government financial institutions which direct credit 
allocation for the government basically to priority industrial activities. Rural hanks and 
private development hanks are private institutions hut subsidized by the Bank for 
capitalization arid funded for operation.
Between 1960 and 1970, the size (number and financial assets) of private banks 
increased considerably which was attributed to the favorable circumstances then 
prevailing which enabled them to generate substantial profits. These presumably were the 
” inconsistencies” referred to by Tan (1980) .12 Firstly, private commercial and rural 
banks were given discounting incentives by the Bank for expanding their loanable funds, 
but were restricted from offering deposit rates high enough in order to induce savers. 
Consequently, banks relied on borrowing from the Bank rather than borrowing from the 
public via deposits. Secondly, both loan and deposit rates were fixed a t low levels which 
resulted in excess demand for loans at the ceiling rates. Loan rates were limited by the 
Usury Law to only 12% per annum and 14% per annum  for secured and unsecured loans, 
respectively. The interest rate was 6.5% per annum for savings deposits, and 6.5%-8.0% 
for time deposits. Private banks, therefore, charged effective rates higher than the ceiling 
rates. The lower rates for savers’ deposits and higher effective rates for loans resulted in 
unusually comfortable profit margin for the banks.
On the other hand, government banks and government-supported banks giving 
longer term loans followed strictly the interest rate  regulations and hence resulted in 
perverse interest rate structure, i.e. longer term loans granted by government banks were 
charged the legal ceiling while shorter-term loans granted by private banks were charged 
higher effective rates.
* ~See E. A. Tan, 1980, ’ Philippine monetary policy and aspects of the financial market: a review 
of the literature” , in Survey of Philippine Development Research I Philippine Institute for 
Development Studies, pages 185-186. In her study. Tan provides a comprehensive and critical 
review of  the Philippine monetary policy
Also bet,ween'1960 and 1970, non-bank financial intermediaries denoted ns NBFIs 
1:1 increased more rapidly relative to private banks since the former were not regulated, 
i.e. these institutions were able to offer higher interest rates to financial savers (as 
opposed to the banks which offered low static deposit rates). In 1961, Private 
Development Corporation of the Philippines (the first investment house) was established 
with the support of the World Bank, the. International Finance Corporation, the US 
Agency for International Development and a consortium of American banks. In 1965, 
PANCOM Development Corporation (the second investment house) was established and 
was organized by foreign banks led by Bankers T rust and American Express. Other 
investment houses were subsequently set up.
During the 1965-1970 period, the International Labor Organization (1974) reported 
th a t  the growth of assets was more pronounced among the NBFIs (9.1% per annum) than 
within the banking system (8.4% per annum ).1 *4
In 1971, a joint 1MF-CB Banking Survey Commission undertook a study of the 
Philippine financial system. Major reforms of the financial system were made in 
November 1972. following the recommendations of the IMF study. Several presidential 
decrees were promulgated, which revised existing bank laws. Among the reforms were (a) 
an increase in the minimum required capital of commercial banks to at least 100 million 
pesos which resulted in the mergers of existing banks, and (b) the placing of all NBFIs 
under the supervision and control of the Bank since t he NBFE were engaged in borrowing
1'’Non-bank financial intermediaries arc primarily engaged in long-term financing for the
expansion and modernization of productive ventures and. to a minor extent, for facilitating short­
term placements in other financial institutions. These include investment houses, finance
companies, and others, whose main functions include lending, investing, or placement of funds or
evidence of indebtedness or equity deposited with them, acquired by them or coursed through
them, either for their own account or for the account of others. Investment houses are enterprises
engaged in guaranteed underwriting of securities of another person or enterprise, including
securities of government and its instrumentalities. For a historical review of NBFIs, their types and
functions and Financial highlights during 1975-1985, see P. L. Teodoro, 1985, ”Non-bank financial
intermediaries- a decade of performance” Central Bank Review . Volume XXXVII. Number 9, pages
16-20.
*‘ See International Labor Organization, 1971, Reform of credit and interest rates” in Sharing
ill Development,: A  Programme of Em ploym ent, Equity and Crowth in t he Philippines. National
Economic and Development Authority, pages 231-232.
with the issuance 6f their own debt instruments in which the extension of credit was
beyond the scope of the statutory capability of the Hank. Moreover, the expanded 
supervisory authority of the Bank was aimed fit closing or narrowing down the regulatory 
gap between banks and NBFls. Only banks were then subject to such regulations as 
interest rate ceilings, reserve requirements and others.
Despite the supervision and control of the Bank, the faster pace of development of 
the NBFls continued during the early 1970s due to the unregulated higher rates of return 
offered to savers or lenders of funds even including commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. Consequently, transactions in the money market (including short-term 
interbank call loans, bank acceptances, and large company claims) increased rapidly and 
even rose four times in 1973 relative to 1972. Thus, the market for short-term 
instruments expanded considerably. The rapid development of the money market 
(particularly interbank call loans) during the early 1970s was in response to the 
increasingly restrictive interest rate ceiling and hence resulted in lower real interest rates 
offered to bank depositors. Nominal deposit rates were kept at low levels while inflation 
rates were high. Thus, the money market seemed to be a legitimate way of evading 
interest rate regulations.
W hat was worrying was the heavy participation in the money market by the 
investment houses whose primary responsibility was to provide longer-term financing. 
With a high rate of return on liquid money market instruments, there was no incentive 
for the investment houses to shift, to the long-term capital market. In order to lessen the 
participation of investment houses in the money market, the Bank (a) directed them to 
meet a target volume of underwriting which was set initially at. 25% of the paid-in-capital 
of an investment house, (b) imposed a reserve requirement of 5% on the previously 
exempt deposit, substitutes, and (c) imposed a 35% final tax on money market 
transactions. Lee and Jao (1982) pointed out that tin* controversial growth appeared to 
be somewhat reduced in 1979 when the investment houses started to shift their funds to
equity issues arid long-term instruments as a, consequence of the new tax measures.1 ’*
In their analysis of the Philippine financial system during the second half of the 
1970s, the joint IMF-World Bank mission in 1979 had the following conclusions. 
I() Firstly, much of the outstanding credit maintained by the system was short-term in 
nature  and the existing financial structure  as a whole was not conducive to tin* 
development of an industrial base, which requires long-term financing to maintain 
operational viability. Secondly, the preference for short-term investments was attributed 
to the prevailing interest, rate s tructure and the legislated specialization of financial 
institutions.
The mission’s recommended monetary and banking reforms which were instituted 
during the early 1980s were aimed a t  (a) increasing the competitive conditions with 
resulting greater efficiency, and (b) increasing the availability of and accessibility to 
longer-term funds. The first objective was to be achieved via lessening the enforced 
specialization of banks and broadening the range of services offered by financial 
institutions. Thus, while the three main categories of banks, i.e. commercial banks, rural 
banks, and thrift banks were kept, the functional differentiations between them were 
lessened. Rural banks may now offer broader domestic banking services and broader 
clientele (before they serviced basically farmers and small merchants). Thrift banks may 
now offer full domestic commercial banking services, i.e. excluding international banking 
operations and hence narrow' down the distinction between the powers of the thrift banks 
and t he commercial banks.
A notable feature of the 1980 reforms w as the introduction of universal banking, i.e.
1 '’See S.Y. bee and Y.C. Jao, 1982, "Financial structure and monetary policy in the 
Philippines”, in Financial Structure and Monetary Policies iji Sout heast Asia, page 183.
|( See International Monetary Fund-World Bank Report, 1979, in P h ilippines: Aspects of the 
Financial Sector. Both the IMF' and the World Bank maintain an on-going interest in the financial 
sector in the course of  their operation. The particular report looks at the situation of the financial 
sector in the light of  t he need to increase the flow of long-term credit.
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s o m e  c o m m e r c ia l  banks a rc  now o p e r a t i n g  w i t h  e x p a n d e d  b a n k in g  p o w e r  and l ienee a re  
know n as ” un iversa l banks or u n iba nks ” , w ith  a c a p ita l base o f a t least 500 m illio n  pesos 
(achieved th ro ug h  m erger o r co nso lid a tio n  or o u tr ig h t increase in  c a p ita liz a tio n ). 
U n ib a n k in g  is s im p ly  defined as a co m b in a tio n  o f com m erc ia l bank ing  ( fu ll dom estic and 
in te rn a tio n a l b an k in g ) w ith  the powers o f an in ve s tm e n t house (u n d e rw r it in g , securities 
dea le rsh ip  and e q u ity  in ve s tm e n t). N on-bank fin a n c ia l in s t itu t io n s  engaged in quasi­
bank ing  fu nc tio ns  denoted as N B Q B s (e.g. in ve s tm e n t houses and finance com panies) are 
now g ran ted  a d d it io n a l b ank ing  powers v ia  go ing  in to  tru s t  ope ra tions  and fore ign 
exchange opera tions. D u rin g  the  early  1980s, the re  are a t least ten un iversa l banks 
o p e ra tin g  in the P h ilip p in es . In ves tm e n t houses have been acquired by un ibanks to  
com p lem en t th e ir  opera tions. Some ru ra l banks have merged w ith  com m erc ia l banks.
In o rder to  encourage lo n g -te rm  lend ing  by banks and non-banks, lo n g -te rm  papers 
are now e lig ib le  lo r  red iscoun ting  w ith  the B a nk , and a low er reserve ra te  o f 5% was 
imposed on lon g -te rm  deposits o f banks and non-banks as opposed to  18% reserve ra te  for 
s h o rt- te rm  deposits.
2 .3 .2  D e te r m in a t io n  o f  M o n e t a r y  P o l i c y
This section summarizes the process of determining monetary policy in the 
Philippines and the changes in monetary policy via variations in the use of the different 
instruments of monetary control.
Monetary policy is defined as the deliberate manipulation of the monetary policy 
instruments by the monetary policy makers. Within the existing legal and institutional 
s tructure of the Philippines, monetary policy makers, often referred to as monetary 
authorities, are the Central Bank of the Philippines and the Treasury insofar as the
la t te r ’s monetary functions and transactions with the International Monetary Fund are
1 7concerned.
The primary responsibility for the conduct of monetary policy, rests with the Bank. 
The [lowers and functions of the Bank, however, has been exercised by a Monetary Board 
which consists of the following: the Bank Governor (chairman of the Board), the Finance 
Minister, the Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority 
(formerly known as the National Economic Council), the Chairman of the Board of 
Investments, and three part-time members from the private sector appointed by the 
President. The Bank via its Monetary Board has, therefore, determined and implemented 
monetary policy in the Philippines. The President has, however, had ultimate 
responsibility for monetary policy via his appointed officers and members of the Monetary 
Board.
An indicator of the conduct of monetary policy is changes in the narrow money 
supply which has two components (a) changes in the money base and (b) changes in 
credit created by banks. The first component, changes in the money base, is equal to the 
balance of payments (which in turn is equivalent to the changes in foreign reserves), plus 
the budget deficit, minus bond sales. The difference between the budget deficit and bond
17 See Philippine Financial Statistics, December 1982, Central Bank of the Philippines, page 2.
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sales is referred to äs changes in domestic credit by the Bank. An increase in the money 
base, therefore, steins from an increase in domestic credit a nd /o r  an increase in foreign 
exchange reserves (via a balance of payments surplus). A zero growth of the money base 
indicates tha t  the expansionary monetary impact of an increase in domestic credit is fully 
offset by a contractionary monetary impact of a balance of payments deficit.
Because the Bank is not an independent financial institution, the conduct of 
monetary policy by the Bank is largely influenced by the Philippine President, the 
Philippine Government and the Treasury via the different components of the money base. 
In particular, the Treasury controls the government budget deficit. Thus, via the budget 
deficit there exists a link between fiscal and monetary policy. The President, the 
Treasury, and the Government, influence the sale of bonds by the Bank thereby 
influencing the conduct of monetary policy.
The second component of changes in money supply is changes in bank lending which 
is influenced by the Bank and by the controls or regulations instituted by the 
government, by the Bank, and by the Treasury.
Until 1972, the Bank had supervisory authority over the banks alone. 
Subsequently, however, the Bank’s supervision has been expanded over the entire 
financial system i.e. including authority over both banks, and non-bank financial 
institutions. With the use of the different instruments of monetär) policy, the Bank has
exercised supervision and control over the whole financial sector.
*
The set of monetary policy instruments controlled by the Bank consists of the 
following: ( l)  open market operations (OMO) which refer to purchases and sales of 
government bonds; (2) changes in rediscounting policy which refer to increases (decreases) 
in the rediscount ceilings set bv the Bank aimed at increasing (decreasing) the volume of 
credit granted by the Bank to the domestic banks, changes in the Bank rediscount rates 
and changes in bank lending rates of papers eligible for rediscounting with the Bank; (.'!)
interest rate regulations via ceiling rates on interest rates t hat, banks can pay on deposits
(savings, time, and deposit substitutes); (4) variations in reserve requirements of banks;
1 8and (5) quantitative controls on bank loans and advances.
(]).  Open Market, Operations. In regulating the conduct of monetary policy, the
Bank has depended mostly on the use of open market operations (OM O), which have now
become the major monetary policy instrument, of t he bank.1'* A strategy of using OMO is
fundamentally advantageous relative to other monetary policy instruments because of its
flexibility so that the direction and strength of monetary policy can be shifted daily.
Aghevli, Khan and others (1979) have argued that, OMO of the Bank have been fairly
successful in the Philippines relative to other Asian countries because of (a) the
availability of sufficient suitable government securities, and (b) the existence of a more
2 ()developed secondary financial market relative to other Asian countries.
l s p or studies which have analyzed the d ifferent ins trum ents  o f m onetary po licy in the 
P h ilipp ines , see E. A. T an , 1980; J. Encarnacion, J r., 1972, ” A m onetary subm odel o f the 
P h ilip p in e  economy 1950- 1969” , The P h ilipp ine  Economic J o u rn a l, U n ive rs ity  o f the P h ilipp ines 
School o f Economics, Volum e X I, N o .2; B. Aghevli, M. S. K han , P. R. N arvekar, and B .K  Short, 
1979, "M o n e ta ry  po licy in selected Asian countries” , IM F  S ta ff Papers. Vo lum e 26, N o.4, pages 
775-824; J. T . Degamo, 1981, ” The rediscount policy and its  im pac t on the lending patterns o f 
com m ercia l banks and on the economy” , in The P h ilip p in e  Economic J o u rn a l. N o.48, \o lu m e  X X , 
pages 311-336; S. Y . Lee, and Y . C. Jao, 1982. "F in a n c ia l s truc tu re  and m onetary po licy in the 
P h ilipp ines” , in F inancia l S tructure  and M onetary Policies in Southeast Asia The M acm illan  Press 
L td ., pages 172-197; C. T . Arguelles, 1982, ’’ C entra l bank cred it p r io ritie s  and rediscounting 
opera tions” , B ond line , C entra l Bank o f the Ph ilipp ines, pages 12-15; ( C. Polvorosa, J r., 1983, 
"G ove rnm en t securities as fiscal and m onetary policy ins trum en ts ’ , in C entra l Bank R eview . 
C en tra l Bank o f the Ph ilipp ines, pages 11-15 and 21; A San Jose, 1985. "T h e  reserve requirem ent 
and P h ilip p in e  m onetary policy: a h is to rica l perspective' , in Cent ral Bank R eview , C en tra l Bank 
o f the P h ilipp ines, pages 9-11; and O. V ita l, 1985, "P h ilip p in e  interest rates and m onetary policies; 
a. perspective” , in C entra l Bank R eview , C entra l Bank o f the P h ilipp ines , pages 10-14.
’19The basic p rinc ip le  involved is th a t when the Bank undertakes O M O . the reserve base o f the 
banking system is affected w hich in tu rn  affects credit or lending a c tiv ity  o f the banks. I f  the Bank 
buys governm ent securities from  banks, the ir p r im a r\ reserves rise w hich in it ia l ly  creates excess 
reserve position and hence provide a base for cred it expansion. Consequently, the money supply 
expands by a larger am ount than the orig ina l O M O -induced rise in t he base. In terest rates in the 
money m arket w ill go down since th e ir excess reserves induces banks to  lower th e ir lending rates in 
order to  encourage borrow ing and use o f idle funds fo r lending purposes. The sale o f governm ent 
securities, on the other hand, w ill lead to a contraction  of p rim a ry  reserves thus resu lting  in a 
tig h te n in g  o f bank credit. The money supply, therefore, contracts. In terest rates in the money 
m arket increase
“>llSee A ghevli and others, 1979. The study provides an overview o f the role o f money and 
m onetary policy in selected Asian countries inc lud ing  the P h ilipp ines , and focuses on a general 
cross-country analysis ra the r than on the ind iv idua l experiences o f the countries and does not deal 
in det ail w ith  the in s titu tio n a l aspects o f monetary po licy as such.
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In 1970, the-Bank started issuing its own certificates of indebtedness popularly 
known as CBCIs and repurchased them (even prior to their date of maturity) in order to 
change banks reserve position. Because of the flexibility of OMO, the Bank has been in a 
better position to reduce the money supply if conditions so require. The Bank initiated a 
rationalization program for government securities in 1981. It started phasing out its 
CBCIs in 1981 to pave the way for making the Treasury Bill the primary short-term 
government security in the securities market. In 1984, OMO became more active with the 
introduction of high yielding Bank Bills and the unprecedented increase in the 91-day 
'Treasury Bill rates to as high as 41 percent.
o  I
(2). Changes in rediscounting policy. Via the use of rediscounting, the Bank can 
(a) increase (decrease) the volume of credit through an increase (decrease) in 
rediscounting ceilings of borrowing banks, i.e. overdraft facility, the allowable maximum 
outstanding loans of a particular bank with the Bank; (b) regulate the cost of credit via
o o
an increase or decrease of the rediscount rat,czz charged by the Bank on its loans and 
advances to banks via the rediscounting facility; (c) increase or decrease the maximum 
bank lending rates and cither authorized bank charges on rediscounted securities; and (d) 
affect the character of credit by setting priorities in the types of collateral papers eligible 
for rediscounting.
Under a system of rediscounting, there can be a preferential rediscount rate and /or  
a basic rediscount röte.. Changes in these rates reflect, the direction of the development 
policy of the government and hence the responsiveness of the policy to the needs of the 
economy. T'rom 1949 until 1958, only one rate was then prevailing. In 1959, a differential
o  1 r
The Bank services the eligible credit, requirements of banks and NBQBs. The process of 
rediscounting has two interpretations. In a strict sense, a borrowing bank discounts with the Bank 
its customers’ promissory notes or other credit instruments previously discounted by t he borrowing 
bank. This definition makes rediscounting tantamount to a purchase at a discount of a bank’s 
assets by (lie Bank. In a broader sense, rediscounting includes the privilege extended to banks and 
NBQBs of the guaranteed right to borrow or obtain loans and advances from the Bank against  
eligible papers of their debtors. It is this definition of rediscounting which is adopted in this study.
*2'2r
t he bank negotiates to sell its customer papers to the Bank at an amount which is iess than  
the lace value of the papers. The amount deducted, which is the interest collected in advance by 
the Bank, is the rediscount rate.
rate existed, i.e. the agricultural sector received preferential rediscount rates, and hence 
depicting tha t  the development, policy of the government was directed towards the 
development of the agricultural sector.
In 19(>7, the preferential rediscount rates reflected the emphasis of t he government 
on the growth of the export sector.
In 1975, the Bank prescribed a rediscount rate of 1% per annum for eligible credit 
instruments falling under a supervised credit program, and 5% for those not under the 
supervised program. Since 1979, the system of rediscounting under preferential and basic 
rates has been existing. The Bank prescribed a basic rediscount rate at 11% and raised 
the rediscount rate for traditional exports from 4% to 6 percent.
In 1981, the rediscount rates were increased to 3% for supervised credits, and to 8% 
for non-supervised credits, export-oriented industries and small-scale industries. In 1983, 
non-traditional exports were charged a higher 7% rediscount rate while other categories 
were charged the same as in 1981. In 1984, the rediscount rates were adjusted based on 
Manila Reference Rate (MRR)-90, which refers to the reference rate* for 90 days 
determined and announced by the Bank for floating rate loans.
(3). Interest Rate Regulations. Interest rates can be either nominal or real. During 
periods of stable prices, nominal and real interest rates are tin same. During periods of
unstable prices, they differ. As indicators of monetary policy, high real interest rat.es
)
usually indicate a tight monetary policy, while low interest rates, an easy monetary 
policy. This is not always the case since nominal interest rate policy, either as a main or 
complementary part of monetary control depends positively on the rate of inflation.
Officially quoted bank interest rates in the Philippines were subjected to ceilings 
from the beginning of central banking until the middle of 1981. Interest rate.-, on three 
sets of instruments -savings deposits, time deposits, loans and discounts, were controlled.
11
From time to time, maximum interest rates had Ween adjusted upwards. Real rates of 
return were, however, more often than not negative during the 1970s which was 
characterized with minimal adjustments in the ceiling rates of interest and higher rates of 
inflation. Thus, interest rates movements were not as volatile as the fluctuations in the 
rates of inflation. Changes in the nominal interest rate ceilings were, to a large extent, the 
consequence of policy decisions stemming from the need to compensate for faster rates of 
inflation, and the need to align the country’s rates of interest with foreign rates.
In response to the increasingly restrictive interest rate ceilings on banks, the non­
bank financial market expanded very rapidly during the 1970s. New instruments of 
financial claims were offered in order to cope with the varied preferences for liquidity and 
riskiness of borrowers and lenders. Transactions in the money market on short-term 
interbank and large company claims increased rapidly because of the relatively high rates 
offered in this market. This market might have been a legitimate way of evading the 
interest rate regulations.
Another problem in enforcing interest rate ceilings in the Philippines is the fact t hat, 
banking institutions have evaded ceilings on their lending rates via imposing service 
charges and withholding interest a t  the time th a t  loans were disbursed so that, effective 
interest rates had risen.
fhe adoption of flexible interest rate policy had its beginning in the early 1970s
when G. P. Sicat, in his capacity as Chairman of t he National Economic Council, argued
>
the need for a fundamental reform of the interest rate policy characterized with the 
existence of ceilings on loans (and deposits) and therefore resulted in the rigidity and 
inefficiency of the interest rate structure.^*' As a consequence, the policy of interest rate 
deregulation has evolved gradually when the Hank lifted the interest rate ceilings on time 
deposits and deposit substitutes with maturity of over two years, in August 1980, the
23
Sec ( j . P. Sicat, 1972. Report of the inter-agency committee on the study of interest rates”, 
pages 09-78.
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Bank floated the interest rates on loans with maturity of over four years.  ^ 1 hen in .July
1981, the interest rate ceilings on short-term deposits and deposit substitutes, and on 
long-term loans, were lifted. In January 1983, the interest rate ceilings on short-term 
loans were also lifted. Zialcita (1983) pointed out tha t  while it is true th a t  t he financial 
market has been freed of the Bank administered ceilings, it is still very much subject to 
the open market operations of the Bank and to a lesser extent by its rediscounting 
operations (in which the rediscounting banks peg their lending rates to priority industries 
at certain rates ) . ^
Both deposit and loan rates, however, were fully deregulated beginning in the 
eighties. The deregulation of the interest rates was part of an overall plan to liberalize a 
repressed or controlled economy and to make it more market-oriented and hence to make 
the economy more efficient and competitive.
(4). Variations iri Reserve Requirements. ^  Compared to open market operations, 
the use of reserve requirements is a relatively inflexible instrument oi monetary policy 
since it cannot be easily changed, i.e. small changes in legal reserve ratios result in 
relatively large shifts among bank assets.
Reserve requirement for commercial banks. Prior to 1968, the legal reserve 
requirements of commercial banks against demand deposits were higher than those 
against savings and time deposits, and hence effectively discriminated against demand 
deposits in favor of the other two kinds of deposits. Subsequently, reserve requirements
For an analysis of the financial reforms undertaken by the government during the eighties, see 
E. Remolona and M. Lamberte, 1985, "Financial reforms and balance of payments crisis:the case of 
the Philippines: 1980-83”, Seminar Paper, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
“ ’For a short survey of the interest rate policy of the Philippines particularly during the eighties, 
see E. P. Zialcita, 1983, ’’Issues on interest rate  policy”, Staff Papers, Number 9, Central Bank of 
the Philippines.
A lowering of the reserve ratio will provide banks with excess reserves for lending which in 
turn will be accompanied by the creation of additional deposits. This also results in an increase not 
only in deposits but also in holdings of currency outside the banking system. A lower reserve ratio, 
therefore, increases the money supply at a given level of reserve money.
against all forms o f  deposit, liabilities were made uniform for commercial banks, at 18% of 
the deposit liabilities. Following the heavy deficit spending in 1969, the reserve 
requirements were raised on a staggered basis from 17% starting 16 February 1970 to 
20% on 1 August 1970. Subsequently until early 1981, the reserve requirement for 
commercial banks remained at 20 % since there was a prolonged period of liquidity crisis 
during the 1970s (which was began by the insolvency of one bank) so tha t  changes in 
reserve requirements would have been an impractical policy. The Hank allowed some 
government securities to form part  of bank reserves.
Reserve requirement for rural banks and thrift banks. Prior to 1975, reserve ratios 
against savings and time deposits were different for thrift banks and rural banks. During 
the second half of the 1970s, these ratios were made uniform at a rate of 8% of deposit 
liabilities (while th a t  of commercial banks remained at 20 percent).
Reserve requirement for NBQBs. The previously exempt ”deposit substitutes’' were 
subjected to a 5% reserve requirements starting February 1974, except those m aturing in 
more than two years. During the 70s, deposit substitutes became increasingly a ttractive 
so that, an imposition of reserve requirement would regulate their effect on domestic 
liquidity. The reserve requirements against deposit substitutes were raised by one half 
percentage point per month effective April 1976 until it reached 20%i in September 1978. 
Other than regulating the growth of domestic liquidity, this regulation also removed the 
discrimination between peso deposits of commercial banks and deposit substitutes of 
NBQBs.
I
Reserve requirement for all banks and NBQBs. The structure of the reserve 
requirements was revised toward a less differentiated financial system in line with the 
adoption of universal banking in 1980 via equalizing the reserve requirements against 
short-term deposits and deposit substitutes resulting in a uniform rate of 16 percent for
A l
banks and NBQBs.27
The composition of required reserves was made uniform for all thrift banks, rurnl 
banks and commercial banks based on that of the commercial banks thereby supporting 
th e  equalization thrust effected by universal banking.
2 .3 .3  M on ey  Supply  C hanges
The evolution of the changes in the narrow money supply28 in Figure 2-229 reflected 
a generally increasing trend during the 1966 to 1977 period, followed by a decreasing 
trend until 1982, increased significantly in 19811, and subsequently declined.
27The reduction was to be carried out in stages at the rate of one percentage point every 
semester (starting February 1981) until 16% would be reached in the latter half of 198,1. 1 lie 
lowering of the reserve requirements for commercial banks and thrift banks (from 20% to 16%) 
would assist them absorb the impact of the deregulation of interest rates.
In 1982, the reserve requirements were increased to 18% (and therefore, suspended the scheduled 
reduction of the reserve requirement in January 1988 from 18% to 17%) in order to prevent further 
increase of excess liquidity emanating from the reduction of reserve ratios.
The reserve ratios were increased in 1983 on four occassions from 19% on lf> September to 2.1/o 
on 1 December. This was implemented in order to carry out a tighter monetary policy aimed at, 
avoiding further deterioration of the balance of payments.
The reserve requirements were increased to 24% on 25 April 1984 in order to help siphon oil 
excess liquidity effected by non-payment of matured and maturing foreign obligations following a 
declared moratorium on external debt.
*1 or an analysis of the formation of money supply and bank credit in the Philippines during 
the p er io d  1970-1980, see T. Daquila. 1987a, "Analysis of money and bank credit in the 
Philippines, an application of the Brunner-Meltzer framework” , Working Paper in Trade  and 
Development 87/3, The Australian National University.
O Q
See Appendix C, Table 8 for t he d a ta  on narrow money supply changes and its components.
Figure 2-2: ANNUAL CHANGES IN THE NARROW MONEY SUPPLY
IN PERCENT
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The narrow money supply grew at, rates of growth which wen1 as high as 20% per 
annum  in some years. The growth of the money supply during the entire period can be 
a ttr ibu ted  to the combined expansionary monetary impact of increases in the money base 
and in credit created by banks. Figure 2-3 shows that their shares to total money supply 
were almost equal during the period 1966 to 1968. Subsequently until 1978 (except in 
1972, 1974 and 1975), increases in the money base accounted lor most of the expansion of 
the money supply since its share to total money exceeded the shares of the credit created 
by banks.
The 1979-1984 period reflected the reverse picture of the earlier period. Credit 
creation by banks accounted for most of the growth in the money supply during the 
eighties, ie. the shares of credit created by banks exceeded the shares of the money base to 
total money. >
The expansion of the money base can be attributed to increases in domestic credit 
by the Bank and /or  a balance of payments surplus. In the case of the Philippines, Figure 
2-3 shows tha t  the expansionary monetary impact of domestic credit by the Bank more 
than offset the contractionary monetary effect of balance of payments deficits throughout 
the entire period (except in 1973, 1974, and 1983), and hence resulted in the expansion of 
the money base. Domestic credit by the Bank, therefore, assumed a dominant and 
increasing role in the upward movement of the money base (and hence the money supply). 
In 1973 and 1974, the balance of payments surpluses generated additional expansionary 
monetary effects to domestic credit by the Bank. Only in 1983, the fall in reserves of 
foreign exchange due to a balance of payments deficit exceeded the expansionary impact 
of credit by the Bank and hence resulted in an over-all contraction of the money base.
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Figure 2-3: C O M P O N E N TS  OF C H A N C ES IN T H E  N A R R O W  M O N E Y  SUPPLY
SHARES OF CHANGES IN THE MONEY BASE AND CREDIT CREATED BY BANKS TO 
CHANGES IN THE NARROW MONEY SUPPLY
SHARE IN %
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■  Changes in foreign exchange reserves to changes in the money base 
1Ü Changes in domestic credit by the Central Bank to changes in the money base
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C H A PT E R  3
E X C H A N G E  R A T E  POLICY A N D  EX P E R IE NCE
3.1 In tro d u ctio n
Currencies are bought and sold against each other in the foreign exchange markets. 
Exchange rates are the prices per unit of one currency in term s of another, in most 
countries, exciiange rates are quoted as the price of a unit of foreign currency in terms of 
dom estic currency. In the Philippines, the domestic currency is the  ’’peso” and 
historically, it used to be tied to the United States dollar. The rate was 2 pesos/US$ in 
1949 and had declined through a series of devaluations to 4.0 pesos/US$ in 1969. The 
fixed rate  system was replaced by a flexible rate  system in 1970 when the exchange rate 
depreciated to 6.0 pesos per US dollar. The Bank has, however, intervened in the foreign 
exchange m arket. In 1984 the ra te  was 16.7 pesos per US dollar.
The task of this chapter is to analyze the exchange rate policy and experience in the 
Philippines. This chapter consists of four sections. The first section deals with the 
determ ination of exchange rate  policy in the Philippines, which is then followed by an 
analysis of the Philippine choice of the exchange rate system. The third section analyzes 
the various exchange controls. Finally, we analyze the impact of exchange rate policy and 
of t he existence of exchange controls via the black m arket for foreign exchange.
3.2 D e te rm in a tio n  o f E x ch an ge  R a te  P o licy
Exchange rate policy in the Philippines has been determined and administered by
th e  Bank, s in c e  i t  began o p e r a t io n s  in  1949. For most of th e  p e r io d  
1949-69, th e  Bank p r e s c r ib e d  th e  c o u n t r y ’ s exchange r a t e  and ag reed  
w ith  th e  IMF t o  keep i t s  c u r re n c y  w i th in  one p e r c e n t  of an ag reed  upon 
par v a lu e  ( th e  o f f i c i a l  p r ic e  a t  which th e  P h i l i p p in e s  was r r e p a re d  to  
t r a d e  i t s  c u r r e n c y ) .  The r a r  v a lu e  of th e  P h i l i p p in e  peso was s e t  
i n i t i a l l y  in  te rm s of g o ld .  But i t  became an e s ta b l is h e d ,  p r a c t i c e
f o r  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  t o  s t a t e  t h e  p a r  v a lu e  i rr  te r ra s  of  t h e  TInited S t a t e s  
d o l l a r .  For most of 1962, the peso was a l lo w e d  to  f lo a t .
The Bank uses its dollar holdings when intervening to keep the peso-dollar rates 
within the agreed margin of one percent. If the price of the peso neared one percent below 
the par value, the Bank used its foreign exchange reserves to buy its own currency in the 
foreign exchange market. Similarly, if the price of the peso increased towards the upper 
intervention point, the Bank would sell pesos (buy dollars) until its price dropped.
Since 1970, the Philippines has had a floating exchange rate. The spot peso-dollar
rate has been determined daily in interbank trading in the foreign exchange market. Until
April 1972, the daily interbank spot peso-dollar exchange rale was based on the buying
arid selling rates of the last transaction in the foreign exchange market. , i e ,  p r e v io u s  
d a y ’ s t r a n s a c t i o n .
Although officially the exchange rate is market-determined, monetary authorities, 
however, intervened in the foreign exchange market via purchases and sales of foreign 
exchange to commercial banks and other entities. Table 3-1 shows tha t  during the 
post-1970 regime, the Bank has sometimes intervened quite heavily in the foreign 
exchange market. The Bank made a cumulative net purchase of US$906.40 million from 
1970-1974 when there was an increase in foreign exchange reserves due to balance of 
payments surpluses. The Bank made a net sale amounting to US$7435.74 million from 
1975 to 1984 during which period the foreign exchange reserves declined because of the
balance of payments deficits.
)
The Bank has also managed the exchange rate via maintaining bands or margins 
around a guiding rate, i.e. there exists regulatory ceilings on the maximum and minimum 
rates and the Bank prohibited individual traders, mostly commercial banks, from trading 
outside t his range. Pante (1982) reported that until April 1972, the guiding rate refers to 
the daily interbank spot peso-dollar exchange rate which was based on the buying and
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Table 3-1: CENTRAL BANK PURCHASES k SALES OF FOREICN EXCHANGE
Y e a r
(I n M i l l i o n  U S D o 1 1 a r s)
Purchases Sales
(1) (2)
Net Purchase or 
Net Sale (-)
(3)
1970 495.27 444.23 51.04
1971 708.40 521.30 187.10
1972 776.77 620.33 156.77
1973 1244.24 783.25 460.99
1974 1524.81 1414.25 110.56
1975 2013.12 2544.38 -531.26
1976 2199.19 2224.03 - 24.84
1977 1776.31 1724.90 51.41
1978 1989.82 2213.13 -223.31
1979 3794.81 4309.63 -514.82
1980 6720.81 7322.00 -601.19
1981 12864.09 14398.96 -1534.87
1982 20250.83 22145.32 -1894.49
1983 26972.85 28086.36 -1113.51
1984 7113.33 6028.48 -1048.85
Column 3 is obtained by subtracting column 2 from column 1.
Source: Department of Economic Research, Central Bank of the 
Philippines.
previous day 's
selling rates of the transaction in the foreign exchange market.1 Subsequently until
A
1984, the guiding rate was established on the basis of the weighted average of exchange 
rates for all sales made in the preceding day. Starting December 13, 1984, the guiding 
rate is now called Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) Reference Rate which has 
been determined by the weighted average of all spot transactions on and off the trading 
floor inclusive of the Bank’s transactions for the day. No ceiling on the buying and selling
* See K Panto, Jr., 1982, ’’Exchange rate flexibility and intervention policy in the Philippines, 
1973-1981” , The Philippine Economic Journal Volume XXI Number 49, University of the 
Philippines School of Economics, page 6. Panto’s paper deals primarily with the implications of 
exchange rate flexibility in less developed economies and a ttem pts to cvalutate the exchange 
experience of the Philippines during the period of generalized floating of major currencies.
rates has been set. As a result the system is more competitive (as opposed to the previous 
non-competitive system characterized with regulatory ceilings on the maximum and 
minimum rates).^
On the buying side (i.e. buying US dollar and selling pesos), the maximum and 
minimum rates were 0.50% and 1.0% below the guiding rate or central rate, respectively, 
during 1970-72. Subsequently until 1976, the maximum buying rate was changed to 1 f ' l  
of 1.0% below the guiding rate while the minimum buying rate remained the same. From 
1977 until 1983, the 1976’s rates were applied to spot transactions of less than 
US$100,000 and no ceiling on the buying rates was set for transactions exceeding 
US$100,000. In 1984, no ceiling on the buying rates was set, regardless of the amount of 
transactions.
On the selling side (i.e. selling US dollar and buying pesos), the minimum and 
maximum rates were 0.75% and 1.25% above the guiding rate, respectively, (hiring 
1970-72. Subsequently until 1976, the minimum rate was changed to 3/4 of 1% above the 
guiding rate while the maximum rate remained the same. From 1977 until 1983, the 
1976’s rates were applied to transactions of less than US$100,000 and no ceiling was set 
on the ceiling rate for transactions exceeding US$100,000. In 1984, no ceiling on the 
selling rates was set. regardless of the amount of transactions.
Figure 3-1 shows that, buying, selling and guiding rates remained generally stable 
during the 1970-1982 period. Subsequently these rates increased markedly. Figure 3-1
I
also shows the annual percentage changes of t he interbank guiding rate, which st.ood a t an 
annual average of 3.0 % during 1971-82; and increased significantly in 1983 and in 1984.
51
2, ^
This has lo be distinguished from a competitive system where the private buyers and sellers 
were free to trade in an open market (where there no controls). The fact that, the Hank also trades 
in I his market and stands ready to buy and sell to keep rate within some range does not make the 
system non-competitive.
See Appendix 1), 3 able 9 for the data on the nominal peso-US dollar rates during the period of 
1970-198.1.
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Figure 3-1: M O V E M E N T S  IN T H E  N O M IN A L  PESO-US D O LLA R  R A TE
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3 .3  C h o ic e  o f  th e  ^Exchange R a t e  S y s t e m
A very important international institution which has influenced t he choice of the 
exchange rate system in the Philippines is the International Monetary Fund. In 1944, the 
Fund established an international monetary system known as the Bretton W oods system 
which rested on the maintenance of stable exchange rates. In agreement with the Fund, 
the Philippines4 5 *7adopted a fixed exchange rate system at the end of World War II and 
simultaneously imposed exchange controls.0 A fixed rate of 2 pesos per US dollar was 
maintained from 1946 until 1960.
Then during the early 1960s, the Philippines switched to a dual exchange rate
system which stemmed from the need to lessen the extent of overvaluation of the peso
which in turn caused growing current account deficits.' There existed (a) an official rate
of 2 pesos/US$ plus a margin fee of 25% (or effectively 2.5 pesos/US$) for imports of
consumer and producer goods, and (b) a ’’free market” rate of 3.2 pesos/US$ plus a
margin fee of 25% (or effectively 4.0 pesos/US$) for all other import transactions. The
f r e e  market r a t e  of 3 .2  pesos/US$ only  l a s t e d  from A p r i l  t o  September 
I960 ,  I t  was th e n  reduced  t o  3 .0  pesos/US$» where i t  remained u n t i l  
J a n u a ry  1962, The a c t u a l  exchange r a t e  t h a t  a p p l ie d  t o  s a l e s  of f o r e ig n  
exchange e a rn in g s  t o  th e  Bank r e l i e d  on th e  p ro p o r t io n s  a t  which t h i s  
exchange could  be c o n v e r te d  a t  th e  o f f i c i a l  and f r e e  market r a t e s ,  A 
d u a l  exchange r a t e  system in  which im p o r te r s  nay 4 .0  pesos/US? and ex­
p o r t e r s  g e t  3 .2  pesos/US'i; i s  » eq u iv a len t  t o  f r e e  r a t e  of 4 .0  pesos/USd 
o lu s  a uniform  t a x  on e x p o r ts  a t  20%, i e ,  3 .2 = 0 ,8 x 4 .0 ;  and» e q u iv a le n t  
t o  f r e e  r a t e  of 3 .2  pesos/US^ p lu s  a uniform  t a r i f f  on im ports  a t  25%, 
i e ,  4 .0= 1 ,25x 3 ,2  pesos/U S$,
4
Until mid 1960s, the Bfetion Woods system functioned reasonably well. However, in the late 
1960s, the system was unduly strained by the world inflation emanating from the easy monetary 
policies in the United States. The system was further strained in 1970 via the lowering of 
American interest rates in order to combat its recession and via the strict monetary policies 
adopted by European countries, Germany in particular, to contain inflation. The changing interest 
rat es led to substantial capital outflow s of American dollars from US. The major recipient of these 
outflows from the US was West Germany. This resulted from increased integration of capital 
markets.
r) l >For an interesting historical account of the exchange rate system in the Philippines since 1946 
until 1971, see R E. Baldwin, 1975, Foreign Trade Regime and Economic Development:!!)« 
Philippines, Volume 5, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York.
(>See discussion of exchange controls in section 3.5.
7
Hill and Jayasuriya (1985, page 9) concluded that throughout virtually the entire independence 
period post V \  orld War I J j ,  the peso has been overvalued which has the familiar effects of
f l  K r m i r u f T i n r r  ü Y i v o r l c  n n / . / x , . w n  __________
Profits arid dividends earned on foreign investments approved after .January 1, I960, 
were permitted to be remitted entirely at, the "free market rate. Foreign workers 
employed by firms doing business in the Philippines were allowed to remit abroad up to 
50% of their salaries a t  the ’’free market,” rate.
In 1962, the peso was floated temporarily in the free market (simultaneously with 
the liberalization of exchange controls). The Bank, however, intervened in order t.o 
prevent excessive short-run movements of the exchange rate. Follow ing t h e  f l o a t  of 
t h e  p eso , th e  fr e e  market r a te  s ta b i l iz e d  a t 3 .9  pesos/US$ a s  e a r l y  as 
t h e  end o f 1962, On 8 November 1965, t h e  peso was form ally  d e v a lu e d
from th e  o f f i c i a l  r a te  of 2 .0  pesos/US$ to  3 .9  pesos/U S$, This ra te
l a s t e d  u n t i l  1969.
Faced with the balance of payments crisis which was aggravated by the rising level 
of m aturing external obligations and the unavailability or shortage of foreign exchange 
reserves, the government adopted a floating rate system during the early 1970s8 as pari of 
the stabilization package agreed between the Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
The peso was floated (with some administrative controls) in February 1970 and stabilized 
a t  the rate of 6.4 pesos/US$ in October 1970 (a 60% depreciation relative to 4.0 
pesos/USS). Thus, it would seem th a t  the monetary authorities floated the exchange rale 
a t  th a t  time mainly to determine the new peso-dollar rate rather than to switch to a 
flexible exchange rate system. Bautis ta  (1981) further claimed that it cannot be said, 
however, that, the country opted for exchange rate flexibility at the time, since the 
declared objective of floating was to seek the exchange rate tha t  would balance
^Developments in the international monetary system since 1970 are very well documented by 
Sodersten (1980, pp. 441-485). All major currencies, except the yen, were floated (subject to 
controls and official intervention) following President Nixon’s declaration of inconvertibility of the 
( !S dollar into gold on 15 August 1971. The leading currencies; namely, the US dollar, the Japanese 
yen and the German mark, were realigned under the Smithsonian agreement in late 1971. The US 
dollar was devalued in terms of gold by 8%, the Japanese yen was revalued by 17% relative to US$ 
and the German mark by 14% relative to IJS$. The agreement also widened the permissible band of 
movements of the exchange rates to 2.25% above or below the new parities of central rates The 
change of parities and the widened band were both steps in the direction of a needed adjustment of 
the exchange rates. This agreement lasted only for 14 months until March 197.'', when all the major 
currencies were allowed to float more or less freely, thereby effectively ending the Bretton Woods 
system.
international t ransactions.9
Licaros (1982) indicated that the adoption of a ”floating rate” system was one of 
the throe alternatives available to the Hank ; the other two were: maintaining the A.0
pesos per US$ or devaluing the peso to a new fixed rateJ^ The decision of the Hank to 
"float” the peso was based on the following premise. The old parity rate of 4.0 pesos/US$ 
could no longer be kept since the foreign exchange reserves were at a very low level. 
Moreover, the no-devaluation policy would hold back export growth. Additional foreign 
borrowings without new foreign exchange income sources for repayment could no longer 
be continued. The devaluation of the peso could not be done since the peso had been 
supported for too long at an artificially overvalued level. International reserves were so 
small that if the rate had been fixed, rigid import and exchange controls have had to be 
imposed.
Exchange rate policy in the Philippines has shown consistency or conformity with 
the developments in the international monetary system since 1973, the period knowui as 
generalized floating.** * The exchange rate has continued to be determined by market 
forces during the post-1973 regime. The Bank, however, has directly controlled the 
exchange rate via purchase or sale of foreign exchange to commercial banks and other 
entities and via maintaining bands or margins around the guiding rate within which the 
peso-dollar rate is allowed to float.
*See, R. M. Bautista, 1981, ’’Exchange rate flexibility and the LDCs: a survey of empirical 
research and policy issues” .The Philippine Economic Jou rna l . University of the Philippines School 
of, Economics, Volume 20, Number 1, page 2. His study is an exploratory survey of policy issues
and empirical work related to the implications of generalizd currency floating for the LDCs.
***Sec C. Licaros. 1982, Philippine Monetary Policy-Making i£ the Seventies: Selected Speeches 
and Papers , Central Bank of the Philippines, pages 122-123.
1 * The Bretton Woods system had suffered from want of an effective adjustment mechanism. 
Then in March 1973, members of the European Economic Community and two non-EEC members 
Norway and Sweden floated jointly their currencies. The common European float limited the 
fluctuations of their currencies relative to each other to a smaller band. Fluctuations with other 
curencies would remain within the limits provided by the band proposal. Thus, a new era of 
floating exchange rates was born. The strive towards international monetary cooperation has 
continued. In March 1979, the European Monetary System was created which has tried to limit the 
internal exchange rate movements among the participating European currencies by not more than 
2.2 >'t from the central rates. At the heart of the system is the European Currency Unit (ecu)  
which is a basket currency of a unit of account made up of the major European currencies. Over 
‘>0% of the ecu consists of the German mark and the French frank.
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We can therefore, conclude, that the exchange rale system in the Philippines since 
the 1970s is essentially a managed float. On some occasions, the peso was allowed to float 
freely, with the Bank then attem pting  to stabilize the peso-dollar rate once it had readied 
its equilibrium level. This conclusion is consistent with other studies, liana (1981)  
observed th a t  the official Philippine exchange rate policy (since July 1975) has been one 
of managed f l o a t i n g . P a n t e  (1982) also characterized the exchange rate system during 
the post-1970 regime as one of limited rather than full flexibility.
The fact th a t  the Philippines has allowed less than full flexibility of the peso-dollar
rate can be a ttr ibu ted  to (a )th e  geographic co n cen tra tio n  of tr a d e , (b )th e
ex ten t of c a p it a l  m o b ility  and (c ) th e  s ta t e  of c a p ita l  and f in a n c ia l  
markets* Each of th e se  fa c to r s  w i l l  be d is c u s se d J ^
The theory of optimum currency areas*0 suggests tha t  in small and very open 
economies, such as the Philippines, fixed rales work better than floating rates because 
domestic residents would tend to make contracts to be effectively denominated in foreign 
currency so th a t  there will be little basis for domestic currency. The proportion of trade 
in goods and services to G D P (a measure of openness) ranges from 36% to 50% during 
1970-1984.
Moreover, the greater the geographic concentration of trade and payments the 
stronger might be the case for pegging the country’s currency to that of its major trading 
partner. Pegging has prevented a disruption of trade and capital flows and has been
*^See P. P. Han«)., 1981, AS E A N TOxlion{",<• Hal es: Policies an<I Trade Effccts, Institute <>l 
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, page 14.
*‘'See Pante, 1981, page 4.
*'*ln his study, Exchange-Rate Management m Theory and I Tact ice, Princeton Studies in 
International Finance, Number 50, V. Argy (1982, page 28) cited the studies of Heller (1978) and 
Holden and others (1979) which relate "country characteristics” to the appropriate degree of 
exchange rate flexibility. Argy provides an analysis of techniques in managing exchange rates, 
theoretical rationale for exchange rate management, and experience with exchange rate 
management in Germany, United Kingdom and Japan.
15
For a very good exposition on the theory of optimum currency areas and exchange rate 
flexibil ity, see E. Tower and T Willett, 1976. The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas and 
Exchange Rale F lexibility , Special Papers in International Economics No. II Princeton 
U n iversity.
convenient administratively. The Philippines has continued to peg the peso to the US 
dollar since Philippine trade is heavily concentrated in the United St.at.es. During the 
1970-84 period, Philippine trade with the United States in proportion to total trade has 
remained high ranging from 25% to 40 percent.
Even with perfect capital mobility, a flexible exchange rat«' system gives
some
government authorities aut onomy in their conduct of domestic monetary policies, without
A
being constrained by the balance of payments. Under a fixed rate, with perfect, capital 
mobility, authorities have no control of domestic monetary policy. With imperfect or even 
zero capital mobility they have some control in the short-run -but even with zero capital 
mobility the domestic money supply cannot be controlled in the long-run under a fixed 
rate- and a ttem pts  to control it in the short-run are likely to produce de-stabiiizing 
speculation.16 Therefore, the case for flexible exchange rate does not depend on the 
assumption of perfect capital mobility. For some countries, a fixed rate may be optimal 
bu t if a fixed rate is adopted, it is necessary to abandon the a ttem pt to use monetary 
policy either for countercyclical policy or to influence inflation. If the labor market can 
not be left to take care of itself (via flexible money wages) then it is better to abandon a 
fixed rate, than to try to combine a fixed rate with active countercyclical monetary 
policy.
Both the capital and financial markets in the Philippines are still at low levels of 
development. The process ol financial intermediation is not vet developed and is still very 
lim ited.17
16See Sieper and Fane, 1982, pp. 273-275.
1 ' 1 his was also the situation in Australia before the relaxation of exchange controls (Jet rid of 
the controls and countries like Australia and the Philippines can quickly reach the level of 
development and sophistication of Hongkong
( »I
3.4 E x c h a n g e  C o n tr o ls
The foreign exchange market has functioned mainly via the Bank and some foreign 
exchange dealers. Pantc (1982) reported that there is no domestic forward exchange 
market, but forward cover is made available by the Bank (or transactions involving swap 
a r r a n g e me n t s . T h e  slow pace in the development of the foreign exchange market has 
been attributed to a higher degree of government intervention. Thus, with less developed 
financial and capital markets, the Philippines has continued to fix the exchange rate ol 
the peso to the US dollar.
Monetary authorities have, likewise, relied on the use of trade and exchange 
controls.19 The 1950s was known as the period of controls, when exchange controls were 
implemented and intensified. One particular form of exchange controls required importers 
to secure import licenses. Exchange controls became increasingly used to promote import- 
substitution; that is, substituting domestic manufacturing for imports of manufactures. 
The rate of growth of imported consumer goods dropped drastically from 50% in 1950 to 
15% in 1960. The success of the exchange control measures was, however, more than 
offset by the unfavorable export prices so that the current account deficits remained in 
t he red during the 1950s.
From April 1960 to mid-1967, exchange controls were liberalized; this period was 
characterized as the period of ”decontrol”. This liberalization involved the removal of 
most exchange controls; elimination of margin fees; elimination of special time deposits 
requirement, for all import letters of credit; and elimination of reserve requirements 
against special time deposits and elimination of dual exchange rate system.
The period from mid-1967 until February 1970 could be characterized as a return to
1 ''See Pante, 1982, page 6.
1 'For a historical account of trade and exchange controls in the Philippines over the period 1946 
until 1975, sec ( '  \1 Jurado, 1978. "Foreign trade and external debt” . The Philippine Economic 
Problems m Perspective, Encarnacion, J.Jr. and others, University of the Philippines School of 
Economics Philippines, pages 262-288. Also, see Pante (1981) and Baldwin (1975).
moderate exchange co n tro ls .  The fo l low in g  m easu res  were introduced: (a) All com m ercial  
h an k s  were required to maintain a one-to-one ratio between actual foreign exchange asse ts  
and foreign exchange liabilities; (b) An absolute limit on the foreign exchange liabilities of 
commercial banks was imposed; and (c) The requirements tha t  importers make special 
t ime deposits against import letters of credit a t  the Bank was re-introduced. Higher rates 
of special time deposits were required for less essential imports.
The monetary authorities have still relied on the use of trade and exchange controls 
during the post-1970 regime basically to ration the limited supply of foreign exchange. 
However, these restrictions were less stringent than those during the 1950s and the 1960s. 
The government has decided to leave a certain amount of administrative regulation over 
foreign exchange disbursements while leaving the exchange rate to be determined in the 
market subject to Bank intervention. The government has prohibited the use of foreign 
exchange for some imported goods.
Profits and dividends are now remitted free of restrictions. Quantitative limitations 
are imposed on travel expenses abroad, educational expenses abroad, and maintenance of 
dependents overseas. All inward and outward capital movements require prior and 
specific approval of the Bank, with the exception of certain banking operations and 
certain transactions related to the financing of international trade. For the inward foreign 
investments and new foreign borrowings, preference is given to projects approved by the 
Board of Investments. The Board has especially favored investment, in export-oriented 
industries. Foreign direct cash investments made aft.er March 15,1973 are freely 
repatriable without the need for formal clearance. Without prior Bank approval, 
commercial banks may not receive credits from abroad other than credit arising from 
normal international trade transactions.
Domestic residents are not allowed to purchase foreign securities nor maintain bank
“^Presumably they receive them, but have to surrender the foreign exchange at the official 
exchange rate.
balances overseas. They can, however, maintain foreign currency deposits domestically,
o  f
provided the source of the deposit is eligible for deposits.
In 1983 additional exchange; controls were> adopted via (a) creating a foreign 
exchange pool for priority import payments by requiring all banks to sell 100% of their 
foreign exchange receipts to the Bank; (b) setting priorities in the allocation of foreign
o n
exchange to certain goods, c and (c) setting ceilings lor payments anel ne'W import. letters 
of credit. Import licenses were also re-introduced for some categories. In October 1984, 
the Bank abolished the foreign exchange priority allocation program for imports. The 
Bank also increased the proportion of foreign exchange receipts tha t  commercial banks 
can keep (for their own desired purposes, sell in the open market, buy US$ securities, etc.) 
from 20% in June 1984 to 30% in December 1984.
3 .5  T h e  B lack  M arket for F ore ign  E xch an ge
A black market for foreign exchange has existed in the Philippines since exchange 
controls were established in 1949 as a means of circumventing Bank’s control over the 
price (exchange rate) and the quantity  of foreign exchange. Since exchange controls have 
been geared toward rationing access to the limited supply of foreign exchange, importers 
who are not able to obtain foreign currency legally resort to purchasing from the black 
market. Also exporters and other recipients of foreign exchange are usually tempted to 
sell their foreign exchange holdings in the blackmarkct to obtain higher rate of exchange 
t han the official rate. The black market has also served as a vehicle for t he substantial 
capital flight from the Philippines via Hongkong and Singapore to Switzerland and the 
United States and other countries. Black market operations are widely believed to have 
been mostly in the hands of Chinese dealers wit h international connections. These beliefs 
are supported by reports in Pick’s World Currency Yearbook.
2 |
Foreign exchange earned from Philippine exports, foreign exchange earned by resident owners 
or operat ors of ocean-going vessels, US dollar pensions received by Philippine residents, and foreign 
exchange acquired by resident insurance companies, are required to be surrendered to the Bank or 
its agent banks, and thus, are not eligible for deposit.
22 , ,
There is a priority system under which foreign exchange for import payments is provided in 
order of  importance for (a) oil imports, and (b) trade related payments for (i) inputs into export 
production, (ii) raw materials for vital domestic industries and (iii) food grains.
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Table 3-2 shows that the ratio of blackmarket prices to official prices stood al an 
average of 1.086 during the 1970-83 period, which is lower than the average of 1.674 and 
1.099 during the 1950s and 1960s, respectively. This trend was a ttributed to the fact that 
exchange controls were less stringent during the pos t-1970 regime than in the previous 
two decades. Moreover, speculative activities wert1 more important during the 1950s and 
the 1960s (a period of fixed exchange rate system) than during the* post-1970s (a period of 
limited exchange rate flexibility). Expected large devaluations generated substantial gains 
for speculators during the earlier period of adjustable par values. Because of minimal 
ad justm ents  in the nominal exchange rates during the post-1970 regime, incentives for 
speculation might have been decreased.
Table 3-2: OFFICIAL AND BLACK MARKET RATES OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE













1950-1959 - - 1.674+
1961-1969 - - 1.099*
1970 6.680 5.904 1.131
1971 7.005 6.431 1.089
1972 7.033 6.671 1.054
1973 7.170 6.756 1.061
1974 7.132 6.788 1.050
1975 7.895 7.248 1.089
1976 7.905 7.440 1.062
1977 7.800 7.403 1.053
1978 7.857 7.366 1.067
1979 7.966 7.378 1.080
1980 8.035 7.511 1.070
1981 8.298 7.900 1.050
1982 9.079 8.540 1.063
1983 14.350 11.113 1.291
1984 n . a. 16.700 -
1970-1983 8 158 7.502 1.086
Sources: * Average ratios of black market to official rates for 1950- 
1959 and for 1960-1969, data were taken from Pante (1982, 
page 18).
(1) Annual averages based on monthly rates published in Pick’s 
World Currency Yearbook (1970 1983).
(2) Annual averages obtained from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics, 1981 issue for 1970-1980, page 353, 
and December 1985 issue for 1981-1984, page 380.
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C H A PT E R  4
ST R U C T U R E  OF THE BA SIC  M ODEL
4.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Wo have seen in the introductory chapter that in the case of the Philippines, the 
role of external shocks in its economic performance cannot be denied. We have also 
concluded that internal factors have contributed to a larger extent. While external 
difficulties were indeed a necessary condition for the present economic crisis, the domestic 
macroeconomic policy also contributed significantly to the economic debacle.
The major concern and hence the contribution of the thesis is to provide a 
theoretical framework for analyzing macroeconomic policy and its impact on a country’s 
economic activity. The analytical framework is developed in the context of the Salter- 
Swan two-sector model: tradeables and non-tradeables. Then, we relate this framework 
to analyze Philippine macroeconomic policy and its impact on the domestic economy.1
The assumption  of  f i x e d  te rm s  of  t r a d e  i s  of cou r se  an o v e r s i m p l i ­
f i c a t i o n ,  In some of i t s  expo r t  marke t ,  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  may w e l l  have 
some monopoly p o w e r ; t h i s  would be im p o r ta n t  in  an a n a l y s i s  of op t im al  
t a r i f f s  bu t  i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  be s i g n i f i c a n t  i n  an a n a l y s i s  of macroecono­
mic p o l i c y : spend ing - induced  changes i n  domest ic  consumpt ion of F i l i p i n o  
e x p o r t s  a r e  n o t  l i k e l y  t o  amount t o  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  f r a c t i o n  of t o t a l  world 
consumption of  t h e s e  p r o d u c t s ,
1 Equivalently^ wo are in te rested  in form ulating  a macroeconomic model based on existing 
theore tical  literat ure of developed economies and d e te rm ine  its relevance in t he case of developing 
economies such as the  Philipp ines.  In his s tudy  " T h e  relevance for developing countries of recent 
deve lopm ents  in m acroeconom ic theory  in developed coun tr ies” , W orking P aper  m T ra d e  and 
D eve lopm ent N um ber  86 /1 ,  T h e  A us tra l ian  N ationa l  University , W. M Corden (1986) claimed 
th a t  every idea t h a t  can be found in the  recent l i te ra tu re  in developed economies can be shown to 
have some relevance for some L D C  somewhere. In teres t ing  country  applica tions of the  t radeable  
and non - tradeab le  framework include (a) case of S ingapore , see, W. M. Corden, 1984,
” M acroeconom ic ta rge ts  and in s t ru m e n ts  for a sm all open economy” , T he  Singapore Economic 
R eview , Volume XXIX, N u m b er  2, N ational U nivers i ty  of Singapore, pages 27-37; (b) case of 
In d ones ia , see P .  W arr ,  1984, "E x c h an g e  ra te  p ro tec tion  in Indonesia” , Hu I lot i n of Indonesian 
lOconom ic S tu d ies . Volume XX, N u m b er  2, The  A us tra l ian  National University , pages 53-89, and 
P. W arr ,  1986, ” Indonesia’s o th e r  du tch  disease: economic effects of the petroleum boom", in 
Nat ion a I Resources and the  M acroeconom y , J P Neary and S. van W ijnbergen (eds), Oxford, 
pages 288-320: and (c) case of the  P h i l ipp ines , see. I). Lai, 1983, "R eal wages and exchange rates in 
I he P hil ipp ines” , World Hank S taff  W orking P ap e r  N um ber  604, and T . Daquiia, 1987b, 
M acroeconomic policy and its im p a c t  on the Philipp ine  econom y” , W orking P aper in T ra d e  and 
D eve lopm en t , N um ber  87 /12 , T h e  A ustra l ian  N ationa l  University.
The highlight, of this framework is an analysis of fiscal policy and monetary policy  
under fixed and flexible exchange rates. The measure of pure Hscal expansion that, wc will 
use is the amount, of any bond-financed rise in the government’s domestic budget deficit. 
An increase in the domestic budget deficit results from an increase in government 
expenditures on non-tradeables unmatched by revenues. Pure monetary policy refers to 
domestic credit creation via open market operations. A budget deficit financed by 
domestic credit creation involves both fiscal and monetary expansion.
Following Ahmed (1983), we can distinguish the assumption of the monetarists 
from that, of the Keynesians in their analysis based on the tradeable/non-tradeable
o
approach. Monetarists assume tendency to nat ural rate of unemployment (which we can 
call full employment) while Keynesians tend to assume downward rigidity of nominal 
wages so tha t  the economy is a t  less than full employment.
Consider an economy which is initially disturbed by an increase in government 
budget deficit (rise in expenditures measured in terms of non-tradeables which is 
unmatched by revenues). There is a direct effect on demand via an increase in the public 
sector component, of demand. If the budget deficit were financed by increases in domestic 
credit creation, there is an indirect effect on demand: raising the rate of growth of 
domestic credit induces an increase in nominal expenditures.
According to the m onetarists model, if the economy is ai full employment the rising 
expenditure level results in a real appreciation, reduces the competitiveness of the 
tradeable sec to r  and causes a shift in the ou tp u t  « o m p o s it io n  (m ore  ol non-tradeables and 
less of  tradeables). According ;to the Key nesian model (where the economy is a t  less than 
full employment,), with nominal wages relatively rigid, an increase in demand for non- 
tradeables generates domestic inflation and hence lower the real wage. Output o f  non-
2
For a survey of what existing analytical models can tell us about, the effects of and policy 
tradeoffs involved in the implementation of stabilization incomes in LDCs, see L. Ahmed, 1983 
Stabilizat ion Policies m I)evcloping Countries: A Survey, World Hank.
tradeable sector expands. Because of the increased demand for tradeables there is an 
external (current account) deficit.
Bot h monetarist and Keynesian models indicate that an increase in the government 
budget, deficit, resulting from extra spending on home goods, which is financed by an 
increase in domestic credit creation leads to an appreciation ol the real exc hange rati (ie. 
the relative price of home goods rises), an increase in domestic inflation, and a current 
account deficit. These effects will also be associated with an increase in output and 
falling real wages according to the Keynesian model. Full employment models put 
emphasis on the changes in the composition of output.
In this chapter, the structure of the basic model will be analyzed. The basic model 
will be formulated via packaging or integrating various elements of the existing 
macroeconomic theory such as (a) a small country assumption, (b) labor marke i 
condition, (c) output market condition, (d) internal balance condition, (e) private 
spending function, (f) money market condition, and (g) balance of payments equation. 
Then, we will provide a summary of the basic medium-run model under fixed and flexible 
exchange rates.
4.2 T h e  B as ic  M odel
Although our analysis will center in the medium-run, we might as well distinguish 
the three ’’runs” : the short-run Keynesian, the medium-run and the long-run/' (1) The 
very short-run: this is defined as a period in which money wage is assumed sticky and full 
employment is not guaranteed. (2) The medium run: this is defined as a  period in which 
money wage adjusts to give full employment but current account may not balance. ! he 
country is saving or dissaving. (3) The very long run: this is defined as a period in which
''In his study ” A geometric analysis of exchange rate adjustment under static and rational 
expectations” , The Economic Record, Volume .r>8, Number 163, pages 367-. iH,  (■. I'ane (1982) 
formulated a macroeconomic model with short-run Keynesian and neoclassical or monetarist 
properties in the long-run. In this paper, Fane presents a simple geometric apparatus for analyzing 
macroeconomic questions relating to small open economies, particularly, the adjustment of a 
floating exchange rate regime to a step increase in the money supply.
the  c u r r e n t  account  s u r p l u s  (or  d e f i c i t )  i s  c o r r e c t e d  v i s  w ea l th  
e f f e c t s  e t <7 » w i th  c u r r e n t  account  d e f i c i t ,  w ea l th  i s  f a l l i n g  so t h a t  
spending g r a d u a l l y  f a l l s .  The c u r r e n t  account  t e n d s  towards  b a l a n c e ,  
' "b i le  t h e  concep ts  of s h o r t - r u n ,  medium-run and long - run  a re  used 
he re  only  in  an a n a l y t i c a l  s e n s e ,  i t  may be h e l p f u l  t o  thinV of the  
" s h o r t - r u n ”as co v e r in g  a per iod  of  up t o  1 or 2 y e a r s ,  and th e  " long-  
r u n ” as  . cove r ing  a pe r iod  of more t h a n  5-10 y ea rs?  th e  "medium- 
run"  would t h e n  cover  t h e  i n t e r v e n i n g  p e r i o d .
4 .2 .1  S m a l l  C o u n tr y  A s s u m p t io n
The model is a two-sector model: tradeable sector (T) and non-tradeable sector (N).
Tradeables consist of exportables and importables. Exportables consist, of exports, and
export-substitutes which are sold dom estically. Importables consist of imports, and
im port-com peting goods. Assume that, the country (the Philippines) is a price taker in the
world market for importables and exportables. Equation (4.1) represents the small
country assum ption, ie. the dom estic prices of tradeables (Prp) are determined by the
nominal exchange rate (e, which is pegged under fixed exchange rates, and floating under
*
flexible exchange rates), and the foreign prices of tradeables (Prp). With the small country
small coun try  assum ption  epables one to handle  analysis  wi th convenience, and  it  also follows 
the  assum ption  of Lai (1983) in his s tudy ,  "R ea l  wages and exchange ra tes  in the Philipp ines” . He 
aggregated  com m odities  into two com posite  goods: t raded  and non -traded  whose re la tive  price was 
used as the  real exchange rate .  In an o th e r  s tudy  "E conom ic  liberalization and the  real exchange 
ra te  in developing countries" ,  a pape r  presented a t  the  C arlos  Diaz- A lejandro Memorial 
Conference, S. E dw ards ,  1986, cites, am ong  others ,  the  stud ies  of Dornbusch (1974, 1980), Krueger 
( 1978, 1983), Katseli (1983), Neary and Purv is  (1983), which have defined the real exchange rate in 
I he con tex t  of the dependen t econom y-type  models, as the  re la tive  price of tradeables  to non- 
t radeah les  Assuming tha t the law of one price holds for tradeables ,  the real exchange rate is
defined by these au th o rs  as p =  (Prp/Pjy,) (<‘ P j / P ^ t) where Prp is the  domestic  price of
*
t radeables, Prp is the  world price of t radeables .  P ^ ; is the dom estic  price of non-tradeables,  e is the 
nom inal exchange rate.
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assum ption, the terms of trade1’ are exogenously given so that, we can aggregate 
exportables and importables into a com posite com modity called the tradcables. With 
given terms of trade, the relevant measure of real exchange rate is the domestic price of 
tradeables relative to the dom estic price of non-tradeables (Prp/Pj^).
*
J>rp -  e l\p  (4.1)
INontradeables consist of all goods and services the prices of which, P^, are 
determined by dom estic supply and demand.
4 .2 .2  Labor M arket  C on d it ions
With fixed capital and dim inishing returns, the demand for labor in the tradeable 
sector, Lrp, and the demand for labor in the non-tradeable sector, L^, are decreasing 
functions of the real wage in each sector which is defined as the nominal wage (W ) 
deflated by the price of goods in each sector, P-p and P^, respectively.
Lt ( W / P t ) (4 .2)
1-n ( W / P n ) (4.3)
’’Terms of trade, TOT is defined as the ratio of the domestic price of exportables, I’v ,  to t he 
domestic price of importables P ^  If we allow terms of trade effects, we must consider a three- 
good model: export,aides ( \ )  importables (M), and non-tradeables (N). Terms of trade
deterioration can be effected via (a) a decline in the domestic prices of exportables with constant 
domestic prices of importables, (b) an increase in the domestic prices of importables with constant 
domestic prices of exportables, of (c) domestic prices of importables rise faster than the fall in the 
domestic prices of exportables. Given the exchange rate and foreign price of exportables, if the 
foreign price of importables rises, then the domestic price of importables rises proportionately. 
Given the exchange rate and the foreign price of importables, if the foreign price of exportables 
falls, then the domestic price of exportables declines proportionately.
If we introduce the terms of trade effects, it is indeed necessary to distinguish between 
importables and exportables. In the basic model, we are concerned with only one measure of (lie 
real exchange rate - t he relative domestic prices of tradeables to domestic prices of non-tradeables 
(p I’t / I ’jnj)- With terms of trade effects, wo have t wo measures of the real exchange rates such 
as (a) p x which is the domestic price of exportables relative to domestic price of non-tradeables; 
and (b) pm , which is the domestic price of importables relative to the domestic price of non 
tra dea bles.
71
Assume th a t  the total labor force (L) is fixed but the allocation between sectors is 
endogenous; th a t  is, labor is mobile between sectors. Assume factor-price flexibility to 
ensure full employment. Equilibrium in the labor market is obtained when
I, =  LT ( W / r T ) + Ln ( W / P n ) (4-1)
From equation (4.4), we can obtain the nominal wage W which equates the demand 
and supply of labor. Thus, in order to ensure continuous full employment, the nominal 
wage W is assumed to be perfectly flexible. In its simplified notation, equilibrium wage W 
is expressed as
W =  W (P T , P N) (4.5)
By log-differentiation of equation (4.4), we obtain the relationship between wages 
and goods prices.
VV = /JPN + (1-/3)Pt  (1.6)
or
W I>rp - ß( * PN) (4.7)
where a (A) denotes a percentage change. The symbol ß  is denoted as
ß — (^n cn ) / (^ n <n l ^t *t ) (^-^)
where, ( = elasticity of labor demand in each sector 
b  -  share of labor in each sector
Equation (4.7) means th a t  the change in the equilibrium wage rate equals the
6See Appendix A, section J for the derivation of the rolationsip between wages and goods prices.
change in the price of tradeables ad justed  for changes in the relative price of tradeables  in 
te rm s of non-tradeables. M anipu la tion  of equation (4.7) yields
W - iCp =  - « I ' j ,  - f«N) (4.9)
or, equivalent,ly
^  /s  /s
W - P n  =  (1-j8 )(P t - P n ) (410)
An increase in the domestic price of t radeab les  relative to  th e  domestic price of non- 
t radeab les  reduces the  equilibrium  relative wage in term s of t radeables  as in equation 
(1.9) and raises the real wage in te rm s  of non-tradeab les  as in equation  (1.10). Given the 
capita l stock in each sector and the  technology, a lower real wage in te rm s of tradeables 
increases the  dem and for labor and  hence em ploym en t in th a t  sector, while a higher real 
wage in the  non-tradeables sector decreases the  dem and for labor and hence employment 
in th a t  sector.
4 .2 .3  O utp ut M arket C on d it ion s
Assume th a t  non-tradeables  and tradeab les  are produced by inpu ts  of capital (in 
fixed supply) and labor which is mobile between sectors.
P roduction  of non-tradeables ,  Q ^ ,  and of tradeables ,  Q'p are assumed as increasing 
functions of labor in each sector.





Assume com petitive p roduc t  m arke ts  and  profit m axim ization, we can now express 
t he production of non-t radeables and tradeables  as follows:
(4.13)Qj\j QxO-'ivl w  / P]\))
Qrp — Qrj,(Lq>( W /]>rp)) ( t . H)
Substituting the equilibrium value of W in a simplified notation, and with t he price 
of non-tradeables as numeraire, the supply functions now depend only on the relative 
price of tradeables to non-tradeables.
Qt ~ Qt (pt / p n)
+
QN = Qn(Pt / Pn) (4-16)
An increase in the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables increases the output 
of tradeables and decreases the output of non-tradeables. The supply schedules correspond 
to full employment supplies along the production possibility curve (ppc) since they are 
obtained from labor market, equilibrium. In other words, equations (4.15) and (4 .1(>) are 
consistent with a ppc denoted as T T 1 in Figure 4-1, around which output moves because 
relative price changes.
Equation (4.17) expresses the aggregate supply Q using non-tradeables as 
numeraire.
Q (p t / p n ) ~  Qn (p t / p n ) +  (p t / p n )*Qt ( p t  p n ) H -17)
+ +
With full employment level of output Q. an increase in the relative price of 
tradeables to non-tradeables will change the composition of output. It will also 
unambiguously raise total output measured with non-tradeables as numeraire (and lower 
total output with tradeables as numeraire). In Figure 4-1, with an increase in l >rp / P N 
(slope of the price line through Qj is steeper than the price line through Q(j), more of 
t radeables and less of non-tradeables will bo produc ed.
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We can now summarize the effects in the output and labor markets of an increase in 
the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables. In the labor market, the relative wage 
in terms of tradeables declines while the relative wage in terms of non-tradeables 
increases. The effect on the real wage as perceived by workers depends on t he proportions 
of t radeables and non-tradeables in their total consumption. Demand for labor and hence 
employment in the tradeables sector increases while demand for labor and hence 
employment in the non-tradeables sector decreases. Total employment does not change.
In the output market, production of tradeables increases while production of non-
tradeables declines. The d i r e c t i o n  of t h e  e f f e c t  on a g g r e g a te  o u tp u t  depends  
on t h e  c h o ic e  o f  n u m e r a i r e ;  i e ,  t o t a l  ou t  n u t  i n c r e a s e s  i f  m easured w ith  
n o n - t r a d e a b l e s  a s  n u m e r a i r e ,  and d e c r e a s e s ,  i f  m easured  w i th  t r a d e a b l e s  
a s  n u m e r a i r e .
4.2 .4  Internal B a lan ce  C on d it ion
Equation (1.18) states th a t  there is internal balance when the total supply of non- 
tradeables (Qn ) equals the total demand for non-tradeables (when the non-tradeables 
market clears).
Q n (F t / P n ) ~  ^ n (P t / P N’ z) T (1-18)
+ +
The total demand for non-tradeables is the sum of the private demand (D^) and 
the government demand (G ^) for non-tradeables. The demand for non-tradeables by the 
private sector is positively related to the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables and 
also positively related to the real private spending (z).
When total supply of non-tradeables exceeds its total demand, unemployment 
occurs in the non-tradeables sector in the short-rnn. The excess supply of labor, however, 
will be absorbed by the tradeables sector so w'e are back to full employment in the 
medium-run. It has to be remarked 1 hat, in order for equation (4.18) to hold, the prices of 
non-tradeables are assumed flexible. \ n  important point is th a t  the output of tradeables 
can only be increased by reducing the labor available to the non-tradeables sector. This 
movement of labor requires an increase in the relative price of tradeables to non-
tradeables.




slope is  p
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4 .2 .5  P r iv a te  Spehding F u n c tio n
E qua tion  (4.19) gives the  real p riv a te  spending  fu n c tio n  as a fu n c tio n  o f the 
dom estic  in te res t rates ( r ) ,  fo re ign  in te re s t rates (r ), incom e derived  from  o u tp u t (Q ), 
and w ea lth  ( W i) .
z -  z (r, Q , W h) (4.19)
—  + +
Heal p riv a te  spending is o b ta ined  by d iv id in g  the  nom ina l va lue  o f p riva te  
e x p e n d itu re  Z ( — D ^P .p  - f D ^ P ^ ) ,  by the aggregate price  index P (w h ich  is w eighted by 
11 if' share o f tradeab les in the  p rice  index, a , and the  share o f non-tradeab les in  the price 
index , l - o ,  ie. P — o P j.  +  ( l-o )P jy j) .  An  increase in  the  price  o f tradeab les, ho ld ing  P ^  
co n s ta n t, increases the  aggregate p rice  index so th a t the real va lue  o f expend it ure, z, fa lls  
fo r g iven Z. We assume th a t p r iv a te  spending varies inverse ly w ith  the  dom estic  interest 
ra te , is p o s itive ly  re la ted w ith  in co m e  d e r iv e d  f r o m  o u tp u t  and v a r ie s  d i r e c t l y  
w i t h  w e a l th *
W e also assume th a t the  p riva t,e dem and fo r tradeab les and fo r non-tradeab les are 
given as fo llow s:
l)rp =  D rp (P rp /P jvj, z) (4.20)
—  +
Djyj — Z) '  ('1-21)
+ +
An increase in the  re la tiv e  p rice  o f tradeables to  non-tradeab les, g iven z, reduces the 
dem and fo r tradeab les and increases the dem and fo r non-tradeab les. A n  increase in real 
spending , z, raises both  dem ands.
4 .2 .6  T he M o n ey  -Market C on d it ion s
Changes in the nominal money stock (ziM) consists of two components: changes in 
high-powered money or base (z\H, credit creation by the Bank) and credit creation by 
domestic banks, (Z\CC). Thus,
A M  = AH  + Z\CC (4.22)
In an open economy, changes in the high-powered money {AH)  originate from 
changes in the foreign exchange reserves (ziFX, or equivalently the balance of payments), 
and from changes in the domestic credit (ZH)C). Base money creation, therefore, comes 
from two sources in an open economy: (l)money of internal origin (z\l)C) and (2) money 
of external origin (z^FX).7 Symbolically, the money base identity can be written as:
Z\H =  ZiDC T Z\FX (4.23)
o
By substituting (4.23) into (4.22), changes in the stock of money can be expressed 
as follows:
A M  -- ( ^ I ) C  t  AVX)  A C C (4-24)
Since domestic credit creation by Bank (Z\1)C) is equivalent to the difference 
between the government’s domestic budget deficit (G - T) and net bond sales by the 
government (ZiB), ie.
A D C  = (G - T) - Z\B (4.25)
then, under fixed exchange rates we can express the nominal money supply (M) as 
the sum of last year’s money supply (M_j), plus changes in the foreign exchange reserves
7On the uses side, the change in the money base is equal to the sum of the change in currency in 
circulation and the change in the cash reserves of the domestic banks.
U  ^
Sec Appendix A, section 2 for the derivat ion of the money supply identity from the consolidated 
balance sheets o f  the economy.
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(Z\FX) times the nominal exchange rate (e). plus the government’s budget deficit (G - T) 
minus net bond sales by the government (Z\B), plus credit creation by the banks (Z\CC); 
ie,
M — M, +  Z\FX.e + (G - T) - A B  +  A C C  (4.26)
Under flexible exchange rates, the change in the foreign exchange reserves is zero.
The real demand for money (R“ ) is given as follows:
H'1 =  Rd(r, Q n , Qt  , Wh) (4.27)
- + + +
An increase in the interest rate, given Q, reduces the real demand for money. An 
increase in the real income derived from output, given r, increases the real demand for 
money. The r e a l  demand fo r  money i s  a lso  p o s i t iv e ly  r e la te d  w ith w ealth .
Equilibrium in the money market is obtained when the real demand for money is 
equal to the real money supply; ie.
R ( r ,Q N,QT ,Wh)=~ |m _, +  AFX . e  +  (G - T) - A B  +  4 C C ] /P (P T , P N) (4.28)
-  + + +
An increase in interest rate  reduces the real demand for money and therefore must, 
be accompanied by an increase in real income to maintain real demand for money equal to 
the given supply of real cash balances, M/P. M is deflated by P which is the aggregate 
price index. This reflects the idea that in an open economy, the real value of the money 
stock declines when the price of tradeables increases.
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4 .2 .7  B a lan ce  o f  P a y m e n ts  E quation
Equation (4.29) gives the balance of payments equation, or equivalently, the 
changes in foreign exchange reserves. In a fixed exchange rate system, the change in 
foreign exchange reserves is not zero. In the absence of capital mobility, the balance of 
payments is the current account balance which can be a deficit or a surplus. The balance 
of payments is the sum of the current account and capital account balances. In a flexible 
exchange rate system, the change in foreign reserves is zero so tha t  a current account 
deficit, (which is equivalent to an excess demand for tradeables in our model) must be 
financed by capital inflows. In the absence of capital flows, the current account balance 
must be zero.
A F X  = (Qt (P t / P n ) - n T (P T / P N, z) - C T |Ibr ! CAPS(r, r*) (4.29)
+  +  +  -
Following Sieper and Fane (1982),^ assuming zero capital mobility means that 
foreigners (non-residents) can neither directly lend to domestic residents nor borrow from 
them directly and hence domestic interest rates are not directly pressured to adjust to 
world interest r a t e s .^  It would be realistic to assume zero capital mobility if there arc
sufficiently Draconian exchange controls. It, would be somewhat unrealistic to assume 
perfect capital mobility even in the complete absence of exchange controls; however, in 
this latter situation there would be strong pressures to prevent domestic interest rates
from diverging widely froin foreign interest rates, after allowing for expected changes in
the exchange rate. Because exchange controls can o n t v  influence short-term capital flows,
it would be reasonable to assume a fairly high degree of capital mobility in the
Philippines. A. c o u n try  l i k e  th e  P h i l i p p in e s  i s  a n e t  borrow er of c a p i t a l
from th e  world market and must t h e r e f o r e  o f f e r  f o r e i g n e r s  th e  same 
expec ted  r a t e  of r e t u r n  which th e y  cou ld  ea rn  e lse w h e re .  This  rem ains  
t r u e  in  th e  p resence  of exchan.ee c o n t r o l s ;  i t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  r e a s o n a b le
^See Sieper and Fane, 1982, pages 237-238.
*''indirect borrowing and lending is possible by running balance of payments surplus or deficit 
under a fixed exchange rate regime. For instance, if the Philippines has a bad harvest in year I and 
a g o o d  harvest in year 2. it can borrow in period 1 and repay in period 2 by running a current 
account deficit which is equal to the balance of payments deficit in year i and a current account 
surplus which is equal to the balance of payments surplus in year 2.
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t o  assume a f a i r l y  h igh  d ec re e  of c a o i t a l  m o b i l i ty  in  th e  P h i l i p p in e s  
a t  l e a s t  in  th e  Ion" '- run ,
4 .2 .8  D ifferences B e tw e e n  M on ey-f in an c in g  and B on d -f in an c in g
Although our later analysis will be confined to a pure fiscal expansion and n pure 
money expansion, it will be interesting to analyze money-financed budget dein its, which 
can be thought of as the combination of monetary and fiscal expansion. The difference 
bet ween money-finance arid bond-finance11 is identical to pure money expansion.
Bond-financing keeps domestic credit (and hence the money supply) constant while 
money-financing increases i t .1  ^ Money financing can be thought of as arising from 
operations (1) and (2) combined into one: (1) the budget deficit, is financed by a sale of 
bonds by the government and th a t  (2) the Bank engages in open-market operations: it 
buys bonds, thus increasing the money supply to that extent , I f  ‘purchase  of bonds by
the Bank is matched by the government’s sale of bonds t h e n  the money supply remains
I  O
cons tan t .10 With money-financed deficits, therefore, the Bank simply finances the budget 
deficit by credit to the government and hence increases the money base and t he money 
supply. With a money-financed budget deficit, there is an automatic link between 
monetary and fiscal policy. With a bond-financed budget deficit, monetary policy takes 
the form of open-market operations; tha t  is, the Bank redeems or buys back the 
government bonds.
Bond-financing increases interest, rates. Wi th money-financed budget deficits,
1 1 For a discussion of the theoretical literal urc <>n lh< impact of fiscal and monetary policy arid 
focuses in the long-run effects of money-financed and bond-financed deficit spending, see 
N. N. Choudry, 1976, ” Integration of fiscal and monetary sectors in econometric models:a survey of 
theoretical issues and empirical findings” . IMF Staff Fapcrs. Volume 23. [rages 395-440.
^ T h c  implications of having a fixed exv hange rate with sterilization of the monetary effects of a 
balance of payments deficit is as follows. Money supply increases owing to money-financing of 
budget deficit, and money supply is reduced owing to a balance of payments deficit. The money­
financing of the budget deficit thus represents sterilization of t he monetary effects of the balance of 
payments deficit. Foreign assets of the banking system falls and domestic assets rise, and money 
supply stays constant .
13 Open-market purchase of bonds by the Bank is also referred to as ’ inside money creation” , 
and exogenous increase or expansion of credit (and hence money supply) as "outside money 
creation. It then follows ihat t he sale of bonds by the government plus "inside money creation" is 
equivalent to outside money creation” .
SI
inirrest, rates ran either rise or fall. Bond-financing therefore generates a smaller impact 
on aggregate demand than money-financing. This is so since the negative interest rate 
effect of bond-financing works opposite the positive effect of increased budget deficit. On 
the other hand, assuming tha t  the interest rate falls resulting from money-financed 
budget deficit, the positive interest rate effect of money-financing on absorption 
compounds the positive effect of a budget deficit on aggregate demand.
4 .3  S u m m a r y  o f  th e  B a s ic  M o d e l
We assume th a t  equations 4.30 through 4.36 present the general specifications of 
the model for a small open economy. Analysis of the basic model will be focused in the 
medium-run. We will proceed as follows: the basic medium-run model will be specified 
firstly assuming fixed exchange rates and then assuming flexible exchange rates.
4.3.1 T h e  B as ic  M e d iu m - r u n  M o d e l ,  F ix e d  E x c h a n g e  R a te s
*
P T =  e PT (4.30)
L =  Lt ( W / P t ) - LN( W / P N) (4.31)
Q(pt / pn) = cW pt / p0  + (^t/^ n^ t ^ t /^n) (4-32)
+  +
Q n ^ t / ^ n ) ^ N ^ T ' ^ N ’ z) ^ (4.33)
4 4
/  =  z(r, Q, W h ) (4.34)
4 4
RU( r ,Q N,QT ,Wh) = [M_, 4 AFX.e  -f (G-T) - AW 4 4 C C j / F ( P T , P N) (4.35)
- + + 4
AVX = IQt (Pt / P n ) - Dt (Pt / P n , ?.) - C T |lbr t  CapS(r, r*) (4.36)
4 4 4 -
where,
I bp -  domestic prices of tradeables
P.p — foreign price of t radeables
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Pjy! ~ domestic’prices of non-tradeables 
e = nominal exchange rate, pesos/US dollar 
L = total labor force
Lrp =. employment in the tradeable sector 
Ljyt = employment in the non-tradeable sector 
W = money wage 
Q =  total output 
Qrp =  tradeables output
-  non-tradeables output 
Gisj =  government demand for non-tradeables 
(bp government demand for tradeables 
D\t — private demand for non-tradeables 
l)rp — private demand for tradeables 
z — real private spending
r = domestic interest rate
*
r =  foreign interest rate 
Wh — wealth
~  real demand for money 
M = nominal money supply 
P aggregate price level
G - T Grp 4 Gj^ ; - T = government budget deficit 
changes in the stock of government bonds 
ACC  credit created by domestic banks 
Z\FX -  changes in the foreign exchange reserves, US dollars 
CapS = capital account surplus, US dollars
• T he  basic m edium-run mode] specified above assuming fixed exchange ra les consists
of a s im ultaneous system of seven equations. We, therefore, have seven endogenous
*  *
variables such as W, P ^ ,  P ^ ,  z, Q, r and ZiFX. The exogenous variables are L, e, Pr.,, r , 
Cin i  Grp, and Wh.
4 .3 .2  T h e  B asic  M ed iu m -run  M o d e l,  F lex ib le  E xch an ge  R ates
If we assume flexible exchange rates, equations 4.30 to 4.36 also hold true, with 
equation  4.30 now allowing for a  flexible nominal exchange rate , ie. the  exchange rate is 
now endogenous and changes in the foreign exchange reserves is zero. (Under fixed 
exchange rate system , e is exogenous and ^APX is not zero).
W ith  flexible exchange ra tes,  we also have a s im ultaneous system  of seven
equations. We, therefore, have seven endogenous variables such as W. P-p, P ^ ,  e, Q, r and
*  *z. T he  exogenous variables are L, M, P,.,, r . G ^ ,  (bp and Wh.
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C H A P T E R  5
THE MODEL W ITH FIXED A N D  FLEXIBLE 
E X C H A N G E  RATES
5.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
Assuming fixed exchange rates, we will analyze the effects on the current account, 
the real exchange rates, employment, and output, of the following: (i) a pure money
expansion (open market purchase of bonds by the Bank at a given budget, deficit) in 
which the money supply increases, zAM > 0, and bonds decrease, ZiB < 0 while 
government expenditures on non-tradeables remain constant, zAC^ ~ 0; and (ii) a pure
fiscal expansion in which the government increases its expenditures on non-tradeables ,
*
zAG ,^ > 0 via sale of bonds, zAB > 0 while ZAM =  0.
We will analyze the adjustment process of a pure money expansion and a pure fiscal
expansion in an economy which has Keynesian properties in the short-run and neoclassical
or monetarist properties in the long-run. In the short-run, money wage is rigid and full
employment is not guaranteed. In the medium run, money v\age adjusts to give full
employment but current account may not balance so that the country e i t h e r  b u i l d s
ups, or pays o f f ,  i t s  f o r e i g n  d e b t s , I n  th e  lo n g - ru n ,  th e  c u r r e n t  account 
te n d s  t o  b a la n c e .
*An in c r e a s e  in  government spend ing  on t r a d e a b l e s  would have no im pact in  
th e  s h o r t - r u n ,  excep t t o  worsen th e  c u r r e n t  accoun t d e f i c i t .  In  the  
medium-run and lo n g - ru n ,  i t  would lead  t o  r e d u c t io n s  in  p r i v a t e  spending 
and would presumably r e q u i r e  a f a l l  in  th e  r e l a t i v e  p r ic e  of n o n - tra d e d
g o o d s ,
s r >
5.2 F ix ed  E xch an ge  R ates
5.2.1 C ase o f P u re  M on ey  E xp an sion
Assume initially tha t  there is internal balance and external balance, a situation 
depicted by point Q„, Figure 5-1. Assume now an exogenous increase in the dmnesi u 
credit to the government by the Bank in order to finance the given budget deficit or 
equivalently, an open-market, purchase of bonds at. a  given budget deficit. In the presence 
of perfect capital mobility, pure monetary policy only affects the balance of payments and 
does not affect ou tpu t and employment in the short-run, medium-run or long-run.
In  th e  absence of p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  m o b i l i t y , and s t a r t i n g  from a 
p o s i t i o n  w ith  some Keynesian unemployment, pure monetary p o l ic y  does 
hnve e f f e c t s  in  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  (w ith  money wages f i x e d ) ,  i t  in c r e a s e s  
employment and o u tp u t  of t h e  n o n - t r a d e a b le  s e c to r  w h ile  le a v in g  o u tp u t  
and employment of th e  n o n - t r a d e a b le  s e c to r  unchanged. In th e  medium- 
ru n ,  money wage i n c r e a s e s .
Given imperfect capital mobility, the immediate effect of the consequent rise in the 
money supply is lowering of the domestic interest rate. This has an effect on the behavior 
of the beneficiaries of the increase in cash (credit). They will avoid budding up cash 
balances via increasing their expenditures. The lower interest rate induces absorption 
(expenditure line HH"), and hence spending exceeds income (line GCb) in Figure 5-1. At 
the original real exchange rate, spending would be at X. But at X there is an internal 
excess demand for non-tradeables which raises the prices of non-t radeables and therefore 
causes the real exchange rate to appreciate. In Figure 5-1. this is represented by the 
broken lines with slope pj, and Pj < Pq-
The demand and supply reactions to relative price changes are as follows. On t he 
supply side, increased prices of non-tradeables lead to an increase in their production at 
the expense of traded goods (a movement of resources away from production ol tradeables 
to non-tradeables). This is represented as a movement to the left around the 
transformation curve from Q0 to Q r  On the demand side, the higher price of non- 
tradeables reduces the demand for non-tradeables and adds to the demand lor tradeables
(a movement to the fight of the indifference curve from X to C<). Thus, equilibrium is 
restored a t  Qj (for production) and Cj (for consumption) with internal balance, external 
(current account) deficit, and increased out,put and consumption of non-tradeables.
The real appreciation of the exchange rate is presumably less in the model with 
capital mobility than without capital mobility. Consequently, the decline of production in 
the tradeables sector is less in the model with capital mobility than in the model without 
capital mobility. The increase in the production of non-tradeables is also presumably less 
in the model with capital mobility than in the model without capital mobility.
It then follows tha t ,  in the labor market, movement of labor out of tradeables into 
t he non-tradeables sector is larger in the model without capital mobility than with capital 
mobility since relative wages in terms of tradeables has increased more in the model with 
capital mobility than in the model without capital mobility.
In the long-run, the current account, deficit causes wealth to fall and this decreases 
spending until the current account balances. As spending falls during this transition the 
relative price of non-tradeables to tradeables must decline in order to attain equilibrium 
in the market for non-tradeables (ie, should equate Qryj); production of tradeables, 
therefore, rises while production of non-tradeables declines.
5 .2 .2  C ase o f P u re  F isca l E xp an sion
Assume initially a situation where there is both internal and external balance. The 
government decides to increase its expenditures on non-tradeables > 0. If unmatched
by revenues, this yields a budget deficit. In the absence of capital mobility, the 
government sells bonds (borrows) in the domestic capital market so that bonds increase 
.dB > 0 while money base remains constant zdll 0.
In the short-run with rigid money wages, the increased government spending on 
non-tradeables increases their prices, and hence employment and output of the non- 
tradeable sector increase. The real exchange rate appreciates.
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Figure 5-1: EFFECTS OF PURE MONEY EXPANSION UNDER FIXED RATES
A IEP Expenditure PathNON- Income
TRADEABLES
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* Assuming fixed exchange rates and less than full capital mobility, 
effects of domestic credit expansion via open-market purchase of 
bonds at given budget deficit.
Let us now ana lyze the  p ro d u c tio n  and e m p loym en t effects in the m ed iu m -run  w ith  
reference to  F igure 5-2. T o  restore  e q u ilib r iu m  in the  non-t radeable m a rk e t, given an 
increase in governm ent spending on non-tradeables. the re la tive  price  o f tradeables to  
non-tradeab les (p P rp /P j^) m u s t fa ll. W ith  p 1 < p0, p riv a te  co nsum p tion  o f non- 
tradeab les decreases w h ile  governm ent consum ption  o f non-tradeab les increases. 
C on sum p tion  o f non-tradeab les by the  p riv a te  and gove rnm ent sectors taken toge ther 
increases and the supp ly o f non-tradeab les there fore  increases. The  econom y (p r iv a te  plus 
g ove rn m e n t) produces a t Q j and consumes a t C j and there fore  runs a d e fic it on the
cu rren t account.
The relative wage in terms of the tradeables increases so tha t  demand for labor and 
hence employment in tha t  sector declines. The relative wage in terms o( the non- 
tradeables declines so that demand for labor and hence employment in tha t  sector 
increases. Consequently, production of tradeables declines while production of non- 
t rad cables increases.
Eventually the fall in wealth (due to a current account, deficit) reduces spending by 
the private sector. As spending falls, there is a real depreciation (p- > pj) and the final 
equilibrium will be between Q() and Q p  with p~ as the final long-run equilibrium relative 
price. With Pq > p~ > p p  the current account is in balance in the long-run.
If we introduce some but not perfect capital mobility, the budget deficit will then 
lead to an import of capital (private capital inflows)1 * because, the initial excess of 
planned domestic investment over planned domestic savings will draw in capital from 
overseas inst ead of driving up domestic interest rat.es. Total aggregate domestic spending 
will therefore be higher (and the current account deficit will be correspondingly higher) 
than in the absence of capital mobility. The current account deficit will have been 
balanced by in part by the capital account surplus.
1 We are given the identity that changes in the foreign assets of the private sector AKA* n phis 
changes in the foreign assets of the government sector A F A ( ,o v * plus changes in the foreign assets 
of the overseas sector A F A G  ^ is equal to zero; that is,
AFAPri + AFAGovt ' AFAOS 0 (5.1)
Equivalently, we can express (5 1) a''
jSI>ri - II>ri] - (G - T) t  CurrD 0 (5.2)
Therefore,
G - T = |SPri - I1>rl] + CurrD (5-1)
It follows, therefore, that if the budget deficit ((.' T) rises by I million pesos because 
government spending on non-tradeables increases (financed by bonds) the rise in output will 
stimulate private savings(S^ r*) and the rise in interest rate will reduce private investment (1* r*) 
Therefore current account deficit (CurrD) will worsen by less than the full I million pesos
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Figure 5-2: EFFECTS OF PURE FISCAL EXPANSION UNDER FIXED RATES
NON-
TRADEABLES
IEP at P i  <  P





Wo ran therefore say that, in the presence of capital mobility, the level of 
absorption and of aggregate demand will tend to be higher, following a fiscal expansion, 
than in the absence of capital mobility. The current account deficit will be higher in the 
case of bond-financed budget deficit with some capital mobility than without any capital 
mobility.













Current account Deficit Deficit Balances
Relative wage in 
terms of tradeables 
(W/PT)
0 Increases Increases
Relative wage in 
terms of non-trade 
ables (W/PN)
Decreases Decreases Decreases
Employment and output 
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0 Decreases Decreases
Employment and output 
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* The effects of an increase in government expenditures on non- 
tradeables financed by bonds assuming fixed exchange rates and 
some (but not perfect) capital mobility.
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5.3  F le x ib le  E xch an ge R ates
5.3 .1  C ase o f P u re  M oney  E xp an sion
Assume the government undertakes an open market purchase of bonds at a given 
budget deficit; tha t  is, a pure monetary expansion (money supply increases, bonds 
decrease). With zero capital mobility, monetary expansion increases employment and 
output of both the non-tradeablc and tradeable sectors in the short-run with rigid money 
wages. In the presence of perfect capital mobility, monetary expansion also increases 
employment and output in both sectors in the short-run. In the case of the model with no 
capital mobility, the channels through which monetary changes affect output are similar 
as in the case of a closed economy, ie, via reduced interest rates. Lower interest rates 
stim ulate investment expenditures which then leads to expansion of output. In the case of 
perfect capital mobility, interest rates remain unaffected and monetary policy works 
through its effects on the external balance.
A pure money expansion results in a lowering of the real interest rates in the short- 
run. given imperfect capital mobility and a rigid nominal wage. This leads to an increase 
in absorption, generating an excess demand for non-tradeables (internal imbalance) and 
excess demand for tradeables (external deficit). The excess demand for non-tradeables 
causes t he absolute price of non-tradeables to rise and therefore stimulates the product ion 
of non-tradeables. The excess demand for tradeables tends to depreciate the nominal 
exchange rate and stimulate the production of tradeables. Thus, in the short-run (the 
period before money wage adjusts), pure money expansion does have short-run effects.
Once the money wage adjusts in the medium-run, the effects of open-market 
expansion under flexible exchange rates are purely nominal. If M increases by 1%, bonds 
decrease; money wages increase by 1%, prices of non-tradeables also rise by 1%, prices of 
tradeables also increase by 1%, and nominal exchange rate depreciates by 1 percent. 
Output and employment in both sectors and the domestic interest rate remain unaffected 
by monetary expansion in the medium-run and in the long-run (even if there is not perfect 
capital mobility).
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* The effects of an open-market purchase of bonds at a given budget 
deficit, ie. Z\GN = 0, zlM > 0, and ziB < 0, assuming 
flexible exchange rates and some (but not perfect) capital 
mobility.
5.3.2 Case of Pure Fiscal Expansion
Assume the government undertakes fiscal expansion, u increases spending on non- 
tradeables. In the presence of capital mobility, the increased government spending on non- 
tradeables surely increases the prices of non-tradeablcs and hence its price relative to 
tradeables also increases in the short-run, ie. the real exchange rate appreciates and this 
results in an increased demand for tradeables giving rise to a current account deficit. 
Employment and output in the non-tradeable sector certainly increases since relative 
wages in terms of non-tradeables decline. Employment and output in the tradeable sector 
declines given high capital mobilit y since relative wage in terms of tradeables increases.
As money whges adjust in the medium-run, the relat ive wage in terms of tradeables 
increases so that employment, and output in the tradeable sector decline. The relative 
wage in terms of non-tradeables declines so that employment and output in the non- 
tradeable sector increases. In the long-run we expect the same qualitative effects as in the 
medium-run except that the current account balances, so that, in transition from medium- 
run to long-run, the tradeable sector expands a bit and the non-tradeable sector 
contracts.
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* The effects of a permanent rise in government spending on non- 
tradeables AG n > 0, AB > 0 and -AM = O, assuming
flexible exchange rates and high capital mobility. The impact on 
domestic price level (P is ambiguous, but probably small 
given high capital mobility.
**In the short-run and in the medium-run, the current account 
balances if there is zero capital mobility.
5,4, Summary
In this chapter, we distinguish the effects of pure money expansion 
and pure fiscal expansion under fixed and flexible exchange rates in the 
short-run, medium-run and the long-run. In the short-run, the money wage 
is rigid and full employment is not guaranteed; medium-run, money wages 
adjust to give full employment but the current account may not balance 
so that the country saves or dissaves; and the long-run, the current 
account balances.
Assuming fixed exchange rates and imperfect capital mobility, a 
pure money expansion increases employment and output in the non-tradeable 
sector (leaving employment and output in the tradeable sector unchanged) 
in the short-run; decreases employment and output in the tradeable sec­
tor in the medium-run; but it has neutral effects for tradeable and 
non-tradeable sectors in the long-run. Assuming flexible exchange rates 
and some but not perfect capital mobility, money expansion stimulates 
output and employment in both sectors and produces balance of payments 
deficits in the short-run; but it has neutral effects in the medium- 
run and in the long-run.
Assuming fixed exchange rates and some but not perfect capital 
mobility, pure fiscal expansion stimulates employment and output, in the 
non-tradeable sector (leaving those of the tradeable sector unchanged) 
in the short-run; decreases employment and output in the tradeable sector 
in the medium-run; and the current account tends to balance in the long- 
run, Assuming flexible exchange rates and high capital mobility, cure 
fiscal expansion stimulates employment and output in the non-tradeable 
sector and decreases those of the .tradeable sector in the short-run; 
decreases emoloyment and output in the tradeable sector and increases 
those of the non-tradeable sector in the medium-run; and enables the 
current account to balance in the 10ng-run,
C H A PT E R  6
REAL E X C H A N G E  RATES, C U R R E N T  A C C O U N T ,
6.1 In trod u ction
In this chapter, we will provide an analysis of alternative measures of the real 
exchange rates; the current account; sectoral employment; and sectoral output in the
non-tradeables and we follow the convention in the literature of referring to a fall in the 
relative price of non-traded or home goods as a real depreciation even though such a fall 
involves an increase in the real exchange rate. Similarly, a real appreciation corresponds 
to a fall in the real exchange rate.
The relevant da ta  input requirements such as domestic price of tradeables, domestic 
price of non-tradeables, sectoral output and employment are not directly available. 
Procedures for estimating/calculating these da ta  requirements are also discussed. An 
im portan t  part of this chapter is the grouping of the 12 sectors of the economy into two 
aggregates: the tradeable sector and the non-tradeable sector, which then enables us to 
come up with estimates for the domestic price of tradeables, the domestic price* e>f non- 
tradeables, the real exchange* rates (ratio of the former to the latter), sectoral 
employment and sectoral output.
EM PLOYM ENT AND O UTPUT
Philippines within the context of the theoretical framework developed in the fourth and
fifth chapters.
The real exchange rate is defined as the price of tradeables relative to the
6 .2  R ea l E x ch a n g e  R ates and th e  C urrent A ccount
In this section, we will discuss procedures for the estimation of the real exchange 
rate and analyze the movements of the current account balance and the real exchange 
rate.
6 .2 .1  R eal E x ch an ge  R ate  E stim a tio n
Following the theoretical framework, we disaggregate the economy into the two 
sectors under investigation: the tradeable sector and the non-tradeable sector, assuming 
that the terms of trade are exogenously given.1 The sectoral disaggregation of the 
economy is an important step toward the construction and estimation of the domestic 
price of tradeables, domestic price of non-tradeables, and hence, the real exchange rate (in 
which we use the ratio of the former to the latter as its indicator). The question which
arises is, which sectors should be classified as tradeables and which should be treated as
n o n - t r a d e a b l e s .  Because any c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  c o m p le x i t i e s  of a 
r e a l  economy i n t o  t h e  s t y l i z e d  framework of a t h e o r e t i c a l  t w o - s e c t o r  
model i s  i n e v i t a b l y  somewhat a r b i t r a r y ,  we have co n s id e re d  t h r e e  a l t e r ­
n a t i v e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s  which a re  s e t  out below; namely c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  I ,  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  I I ,  and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  I I I ,  Our c o n c lu s io n  i s  t h a t  the  
broad f e a t u r e s  of t h e  r e s u l t s  a re  not  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  
a d o o t e d ,
Classification ] provides a narrower definition of the tradeable sector and a broader 
definition of the non-tradeable sector. This classification follows that, of Lai (1983)'* which 
is based on the input-output table of the Philippines. Sectors 1-Agriculture . 2-Fisheries, 
5-Food Manufactures. 7-Construction, 8-Utilities, 9-Transportation, 10-Trade, 11- 
Building, Insurance *"d Real Estate, and 12-Other Services, were considered as sectors 
constituting the non-tradeable sector. The remaining sectors, namely 3-Forestry and 
Logging. 4-Mining and Quarrying, and 6-Other Manufactures, were treated as sectors 
comprising t he tradeable sector.
‘A small country assumption enables one to handle the analysis with convenience. Then in the 
latter part of section 6.2.2, we link the changes in the real exchange rates to the terms of trade
changes.
2
~1 am thankful to Drs. George Fane, Hal Hill, and Sisira Jayasuriya for their helpful suggestions 
in the improvement of the tradeable/non-tradeable sectoral classification.
’’See Lai, 1983, page 13
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Classifica tion ' 11 provides an intermediate definition of the tradeable sector and of 
the non-tradeable sector. If one considers that such food manufactures as rice milling and 
sugar refining must be tradeables, then an alternative definition of the tradeable sector 
would include food manufactures (and exclude it, from the non-tradeable sector ol 
classification 1).
Classification III provides a broader definition of the tradeable sector and a 
narrower definition of the non-tradeable sector than classifications I and II. We broaden 
the definition of the tradeable sector via disaggregating the agriculture sector in 
classification 1 into agricultural crops, livestock and poultry. We include the agricultural 
crops into the tradeable sector of classification II since most of them are tradeables and 
leave livestock and poultry in the non-tradeable sector. Thus under classification 111, the 
tradeable sector includes the sub-sectors as defined under classification II, including food 
manufactures, plus the agricultural crops.
Following three classifications, we then calculated the average domestic price of 
tradeables. denoted as Py., as the weighted sum of the prices of the sectors classified as 
tradeables, denoted as wt P (. Similarly, the average price of non-tradeables, P ^ ,  was 
estimated as the weighted sum of the prices of the sectors treated as non-tradeables, 
denoted as wnP n. Symbolically,
PT = ^  (wtPf) (*‘ 0
t
| ' n =  z  K 1’,)  (0-2)n
The sum of the weights wit hin each.sector is equal to one for each year, that is,
S  w( s: 1 
t
-  w n =  1 
n
T h e  on ly  a va ilab le  d a ta  series to  represent sectoral w e igh ts , w ., were the 
p ro p o rt io n s  or shares o f each tradeab le  sector's  o u tp u t, Q ( , to  to ta l tradeables o u tp u t, 
Qrp; and the sectoral w e igh ts , w n , were the p ro p o rt io n s  or shares o f each non-tradeab le  
se c to r ’s o u tp u t ,  Q n, to  to ta l non -tradeab le  o u tp u t,  S ym b o lica lly ,
(Qt/Qx)
(<V Q n ) ( M
w here
Q I £  Q,
t
Qn -  £  Qn
n
and
( I i )1 * — Q p T Qjvj
T he  a va ilab le  p rice  series d a ta  w ith  sub-sectora l c lass ifica tion  an* those o f the 
consum er price index (C P I)  and the  G D P  de fla to rs . T he  C P I series has six sub-sectors, 
n am e ly ; (a) food, beverages, and tobacco, (b) c lo th in g , (c) housing and repa ir, (d ) fue l, 
l ig h t  and w a te r, (e) service and (f)  m iscellaneous. T he  CDF* d e fla to r series has 12 sub­
sectors w h ich  are based on the  in p u t-o u tp u t, tab le  of the P h ilipp ines , w h ich  we 
enum era ted  a lready e a rlie r in  the  tra d e a b le / non-tradeab le  c lass ifica tion  (ie. see 
c la ss ifica tio n  I). The sub-sectora l c lass ifica tion  o f the C P I series is, there fore , to ta lly  
d if fe re n t from  th a t o f the G D P  d e fla to r  series.
W e pre fer the use o f the G D P  d e fla to r series since we could come up w ith  the 
e s tim a tio n  o f the dom estic prices o f tradeab les and non-tradeables (and hence the real 
exchange rates) based on the sub-sectora l c lass ifica tion  p rovided by the in p u t-o u tp u t
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table. Moreover, we also need to come up with estimates of the sub-sectoral output and 
sub-sectoral employment. Available data series on output and employment are also based 
on the 12 sub-sectoral classification. (We do not have data on output and employment 
using the sub-sectoral classification of the CPI series).
Given data constraints and for consistency purposes, we adopted the GJ)P deflators 
of the different sub-sectors instead of the CPI series. We recognize the fact that the 
sectoral GDP deflator which we denote as Vj is different from the price of the final output 
* which we denote as Pj. Consider the following equation:
i
where,
Vj — GDP deflator of sector j, j = t (for tradeable sector) 
and j = n (for non-tradeable sector).
Pj =  Price of the final output of sector j, j =  t, n.
Pj -  Price of the good i used as intermediate input, i — t, n.
«jj- Peso amount of the output of industry i that industry j 
must purchase to produce one peso’s worth of good j.
Thus, for j = t, and j =  n, we consider the following
Vt = Pt - O u  + fV n J ((i.(i)
( 6 -7 )
In the context of Corden’s (1971) style formulas,0 we can come up with an
') am particularly thankful to Dr. Fane for his kind assistance in clarifying this point
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expression showing.the relationship between G D P deflators and prices of final output, as 




n 1 a +n n a t n )




1 n t t t
( 6 . 9 )
On the left-hand side of equations (6.8) and (6.9) are the changes in GDP deflators 
of the non-tradeable sector (n) and of the tradeable sector (t). On the right-hand side are 
the changes in prices of the final output. The sum of the shares of the primary inputs,
, and the shares of the intermediate inputs ( o nn +  Q(n) in the cost of n is equal to 
one; and the sum of the shares of the primary inputs, o f)t, plus the shares of the 
intermediate inputs ( a (l a  t ) is also equal to one. Symbolically.
I (6. JO)
" o l  +  “ tt -t "nt ( 6 . 11)
where,
Q v V / P  on n' ii
a .  a, P, /P  tn tn t' n
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rvnn a nn
“ o t =  V P t
ftn t =  antPn / P t
“ t t  “
From the two equations (6.8) and (6.9), we can derive the relationship between the 
relative GD P deflators and the relative prices of final output. Hence we can obtain a 
relationship between the change in the GD P deflator of the tradeable sector relative to 
th a t  of non-tradeable sector [dVt / V t] - [dVn/ V n] and the change in the prices of the 













—  > ( 6 * 1 
n
On the left-hand side of equation (6.12) are the changes in the GDP
deflator of the tradeable sector relative to non-tradeable sector. On the right-hand side
are the changes in the prices of the goods produced by t he tradeable sector relative to the 
non-t radeable sector. From equation (6.12), we can conclude tha t  the smaller the shares 
of the intermediate inputs relative to primary inputs, the closer are the magnitudes of the 
changes in the relative GDP deflators to changes in the relative prices of the final goods.
After estimating the sub-sectoral weights jw( and w based on equations (6.3) and 
((>.i ) j, and given the sub-sectoral G D P  deflators (P { and P ), we estimated the domestic 
price indices of the different sub-sectors by multiplying w( by P and then sumniol up the 
products lie. w ^ .P j of the different sub-sectors to comprise the total tradeable sector and 
came up with an estimate of the domestic price of the total tradeable sector, (Pp). Then 
we also summed up the products [ie. wnP n] of the different sub-sectors to comprise the 
non-tradeable sector and came up with an estimate of the domestic price of the total non- 
tradeable sector (P^t). Then we estimated the real exchange rate as the domestic price of 
the total tradeable sector relative to the domestic price of the total non-tradeable sector, 
th a t  is, P rp /P^. This procedure for estimating the real exchange rate was done for each 
year over IS years (from 1967 to 1984). Since we have three tradeable/non-tradeable 
sectoral classifications (I, II, and 111), we painstakingly repeated the estimation procedure 
three times, and came up with the three series of estimates of the real exchange rates.(>
6 .2 .2  T rends and A n alys is
We obtained three alternative estimates of the real exchange rat.es based on t he 
three different classifications: classification I which is based on a narrower definition of 
t he tradeable sector; classification II which is based on an intermediate definition of the 
tradeable sector; and classification III which is based on a broader definition of the 
t radeable sector.
^See Appendix E for the relevant data: domestic prices of tradeables and non-tradeables for the 
three classifications (Table 10); real exchange rate estimates for the three classifications (Table 11); 
for the weights (w( ), price indices (P ( ) and the weighted prices (w( P( ) of the different sub-sectors 
comprising the tradeable sector ('fables 13 to 19 for Classification I, Tables 25 to 32 for 
Classification 11, and Tables 37 to 44 for Classification III): and for the weights (w ), price indices 
( l Jn ) and weighted prices (w n)P„ of  the different sub-sectors comrpising the non-tradeable sector 
(Tables 20 to 23 for Classification 1, Tables 33 to 35 for Classification II, and Tables 45 t<> 47 for 
Classification III)
Figure 6-1 shows the trends of the real exchange rate estimates based only on 
classification 1 and 111.  ^ (Recall tha t  in the present analysis, we are ignoring the terms of 
trade effects).^ Classification 1, however, reflects the huge rise in the prices of 
importables, particularly those of oil, while classification 111 reflects the fall in the prices 
of exportables particularly those of the traditional exports, namely, sugar, coconut oil, 
copra, lumber and copper. Classification III thus reflects a sustained appreciation of the 
real exchange rate during the pos t-1973 period until 1982. The classification 111 estimates 
are preferred to Classification 1 estimates for the purposes of analyzing'sectoral shifts in 
employment and output because the production of sugar, coconut oil, copra, lumber and 
copper are quantitatively im portant in the Philippines, whereas the production of oil is 
not.
7 t
Set* Appendix E, Table 10 for the three alternative estimates of the domestic prices of tradeable» 
and non-tradeables and Table 1 1 for the real exchange rate estimates.
8 • •We will introduce the terms of trade effects in the latter part of section 6.2.2.
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YEAR
( PT/PN) I 
(PT /PN ) III
(PT/PN) I = Real exchange rate estimate based on narrower definition of tradeables
(which treats agricultural crops and food manufactures as non-tradeables). 
(PT/PN) III = Real exchange rate estimate based on broader definition of tradeables 
(which treats agricultural crops and food manufacture s as tradeables).
Figure’ 6-2^ indicates a strong relationship between real exchange rates (based 
on the broader definition of the tradeable sector, ie. classification 111) and the current 
account balance. The real exchange rate depreciated during the final years of the fixed 
exchange rate regime (1967-1969), as the domestic price of tradeables increased relative to 
the domestic price of non-tradeables. During the first three years of the flexible exchange 
rate regime (1970-1972), movements in the domestic prices of tradeables and non- 
tradeables coincided with each other so that, we observed th a t  the real exchange rate 
remained constant over this period. This was followed by a depreciation of the real 
exchange rate in 1973. Broadly, we observed a real depreciation during the 1967-1973 
period.
The increase in the real exchange rate during the 1966-1973 period resulted in the 
narrowing down of the current account deficits and eventually towards generating 
surpluses. A significant depreciation of the real exchange rate in 1973 brought, about a 
marked increase in the current account surplus to 5.5% of CNF.
During the post-1973 period until 1982, we observed an opposite picture; that is,
a
domestic prices of tradeables fell relative to the domestic prices of non-tradeables, thereby 
indicating a sustained real appreciation. As a proportion of CN F, the current account 
deficit widened from 1.0% in 1974 to 7.5% in 1982.
. t
The real exchange rate depreciated during the 1983-1984 period and this was 
reflected in the improvement of the current account balance during this period. The 
current account deficit narrowed down to 2.8% as a proportion of GNF.
‘^ See Appendix TO, Table 10 for the domestic price of tradeables and non-tradeables and Table 11 
for the real exchange rate estimates and the current account surplus as a proportion of CNF.
Figure 6-2: THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE AND CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS
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DOMESTIC PRICES OFTRADEABLES AND NON-TRADEABLES (CLASSIFICATION III)
PRICE INDEX 








67  68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
LEGEND: PT = Domestic price of tradeables 
PN = Domestic price of non-tradeables
YEAR




(1972  = 100 )




PT = Domestic price of tradeables 
PN » Domestic price of non-tradeables
(PT/PN) = Real Depreciation 
(PT/PN) -  Real Appreciation
YEAR
CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS




67 68 69  70  71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
YEAR
107
T h u s , the  o ve r-a ll p a tte rn  was th a t the  dep rec ia tion  o f the real exchange rates 
d u r in g  the 19G7-1973 period and again d u rin g  19 8 3 -1984 was reflected in the 
im p ro v e m e n t o f the  c u rre n t account balance and the  real app rec ia tion  d u rin g  the 
p o s t-1973 period u n t i l  1982 was reflected in the  g ro w in g  c u rre n t account d e fic its . The 
increased gove rnm en t spending on non-tradeab les d u r in g  the p o s t-1973 period u n til 1982 
caused an a pp re c ia tio n  o f the  real exchange ra te : the h igher re la tive  dom estic prices o f 
non -tradeab les  sw itched  p riv a te  spending tow ards  tradeab les and sw itched  p roduction  
aw ay fro m  tradeab les. B o th  these sw itches tended to  worsen the  cu rre n t account.
T he  adverse fisca l-po licy  e ffect on the  c u rre n t account was accentuated by the 
increas ing  share o f g ove rnm en t spending  w h ich  was d e fic it financed. In a d d it io n , the 
d e te r io ra tio n  o f the  te rm s o f trad e  associated especia lly w ith  ris in g  o il prices and fa llin g  
prices o f the  tra d it io n a l expo rts  a fte r 1973/1974 also worsened the  c u rre n t account 
s itu a tio n .
A s im p le  regression o f the  c u rre n t account, balance as a p ro p o rtio n  o f gross n a tiona l 
p roduct (C u rrG N P ) on the real exchange ra te  index (R E R , w h ich  is the re la tive  price o f 
tradeab les  to  non-tradeab les, P<p/P j^), the lagged dependent va riab le  (C u rrG N P  ( ), and
f.
the tim e variable (T) yields the following results:
CurrCNP -30.92 -f 
(-3.87)
R2 -  0 .71, D.W .
0.32 HER - 0.38 CurrCNP - 0.(10 T 
(3.94) (-1 .89} (-3.91)
=  1.85, Durbin h-statistic -  0.53
Thus, bot h the casual observation of the m ovem ents between the current, account 
balance and the real exchange rate, and the results of the empirical estim ation support 
our theoretical contention that the Philippines’ current account balance is significant,ly 
influenced by the m ovements in the real exchange rate. This significant relationship 
between the current account deficit and the real exchange rate can be traced to the 
linkage between the changes in the real exchange rate and the exogenous changes in fiscal 
and monetary policy. Although there is no one-to-one causal link from the RER to the 
current account, keeping up governm ent spending on rion-tradeables and financing the 
current account deficit and government spending on non-tradeables by external 
borrowing, the Philippines has been able to prevent/postpone the lall in spending (and 
the associated fall in the dom estic price of non-tradeables relative to tradeables) which 
would otherwise have occurred.
'^Using the regression technique which considers the presence or absence of serial 
autocorrelation, the Durbin-W atson (D.W.) test statistic considerably improved (over that 
obtained using simple OLS) with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. In estimating 
distributed lag models in the autoregressive form, the D.W. test statistic is, however, not 
applicable. Durbin suggests an alternative statistic known as the ” h-statistic” which is computed 
based on the following formula:
h = ' V
I
where h is the standard  normal deviate to test the hypothesis tha t p  •= U. Here p  is the estimated 
first order serial correlation, n is the sample size and V(a) is the estimated variance of the 
estim ated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, a. See G. S. Madalla, 1977, Econometrics, 
McGraw Hill Book Co., pages 371-372.
T he  estimated first order serial correlation is very low (/v 0.07) for the estimated CurrCN P 
equation. The computed Durbin h-statistic lie in the interval (-1.045, -+1.045). In other words, with 
P r ( - 1.045 < h < +1.045) -  0.95, the null hypothesis that no autocorrelation exists is therefore not 
rejected. (The same observation holds true for the estimated equations for the non-tradeables 
output and for t lie tradeables output where pi -0.03 arid 0.23. respectively. These equations are 
presented in the following section.)
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We can also link the  changes in the  real exchange  rate (RICH) to te rm s  of t r a d e  
changes. We define the terms of trade as the ratio of domestic price of exportables to the 
domest ic price of importables.
Figure 6-3^* shows that the Philippine terms of trade gradually fell during the 
1967-1984 period. While the domestic price of exportables remained constant prior to 
1972, the domestic price of importables rose slightly so that the Philippine terms of trade 
fell during the 1967-1972 period. During the 1973-1974 period, both the domestic prices of 
('Xportables and importables rose sharply. This was the period when the world prices of 
Philippine traditional exports (for instance, sugar, copra, coconut oil, and lumber) rose 
markedly on the one hand, and the world price of oil also increased significantly (known 
as the first oil shock) on the other hand, with the former rising faster than the latter so 
that the terms of trade slightly improved during the 1973-1974 period.
While we observe mixed trends for the domestic price of exportables during the 
post-1974 period, the domestic price of importables continuously showed an uptrend with 
a marked increase during the 1979-1981 period as a result of the second oil shock. As a
ft
consequence, the terms of trade drastically declined over the 1974-1984 period.
We now have to explain the behavior of the domestic price of exportables and
import,ables in terms of changes in the nominal exchange rate and changes in the foreign
i .
currency prices of exportables and importables. Recall that the domestic price of 
exportables (importables) is the product of the nominal exchange rate and the foreign 
currency price of exportables (importables). Figure 0-3 shows fixed nominal peso-US 
dollar rate during the 1907-1969 period and some nominal depreciation during the 
post-1909 period until 1984. (Relative to 1907, the nominal exchange rate depreciated 
four times). The foreign currency price of exportables, which is proxied by the unit value 
of exports, showed a generally declining trend during the post-1973 period stemming
I ] See Appendix E, Table 57 for the data on t he terms of trade and its components.
mainly from the fall in the world prices of the t radit ional exports notably sugar, coconut, 
oil. copra, copper and lumber. The foreign currency price of importables, which is proxied 
by the unit value of imports, showed a continuous uptrend during the post-1973 period 
with marked increases during the first and second oil shocks: 1973-1971 and 1979-198 L 
respectively. We can therefore a tt r ibu te  the deterioration in the terms of trade essentially 
to the falling world prices of traditional exportables relative to the rising world price of
Figure 6-3: TERMS OF TR A D E  CHANCES AND ITS COMPONENTS
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How does the change in the terms of trade affect our analysis of t he real exchange 
rates? With terms of trade effects, we now have t wo estimates of the real exchange rates 
(a) F y / F y  which is the domestic price of exportables relative to the domestic price of 
non-tradeables and (b) which is the domestic price of importables relat.ive to the
domestic price of non-tradeables.
Figure G-41^  shows the trend of our estimated measures of the real exchange rates 
( P x / F y  and P j^ /P ^ ) .  Both measures reflected a real depreciation prior to 107/1 period. 
This observation is consistent with our earlier finding on the depreciation of the real 
exchange rate which ignores the terms of trade effects ( tha t is, the (!I)P  deflator of 
domestically produced tradeables increased relative to the GDP deflator of domestically 
produced non-tradeables).
During the post-1974 period until 1979, the relative price of importables to nori-
1 radeables fell and then broadly increased until 1984. The relative price of exportables to
non-tradeables registered h continuous downtrend until 1982. thereby indicating a
sustained appreciation of the real exchange rate. This observation is again consistent with
n
our earlier finding when we ignore the terms of trade effect, tha t  is, the GDP deflator of 
domestically produced tradeables fell relative to the GDP deflator of domestically 
produced non-tradeables. Then during the 1983-1984 period, the relative price of 
exportables to non-tradeables increased.
I V See Appendix 1C, Table 58 for the data on the alternative measures of the real exchange rate 
with terms of trade changes, ie the relative prices of exportables and importables to non- 
t radea hies.
F ig u r e  6-4: R ELA TIVE  PRICE OF IM P O R T A B L E  A N D  E X P O R T A B L E
T O  N O N -TR  A DBA BLK
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VW can illustrate further the effects of the terms of trade changes via its impact on 
the domestic prices of some selected commodifies relative to non-tradeables in Figures 6-5 
and
The relative price of oil to non-tradeables (P q / P ^ )  showed a slight uptrend during 
the 1967-1973 period, rose significantly during the 1973-1974 period, and then declined 
until 1978, and broadly increased until 1984 with a marked rise in 1979-1980. The relative 
price of sugar to non-tradeables (P^/P j^) behaved more or less the same as the relative 
price of copper to non-tradeable ( P ^ q / P ^  until 1978, which is consistent with the trend 
of the relative price of exportables to non-tradeable sector (P ^ /P jy )  in Figure 6-4). From 
1979 until 1984, P q/ P j^ j indicated an uptrend while P ^ o / ^ N  showed a downtrend.
While the relative price of lumber to non-tradeables (Pj /P]\j) showed a broadly 
increasing trend during the 1967-1984 period, the relative price of copra (P^p/Pjsj) 
showed mixed trends, with marked increase during 1972-1974 period and a drastic decline 
in 1975.
t
i  •> a
’’In appendix E, Figures 1 and 2, (also Tables 60-61) we have also shown the trends of the 
domestic prices of these selected commodities relative to construction (the latter as an example of a 
non-tradeable). Similar trends were observed whether we used the domestic price of the total 
non-tradeable sector or construction price as the numeraire.
Figure 6-5: R E LA T IV E  PRICE OF OIL AND SIJCAR TO NON-TRADEABLE
! 15
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Figure 6-6: R E LA TIV E  PRICE OF COPRA, LUMBER, AND COPPER
TO NON-TRADE ABLE
RELATIVE PRICE OF COPRA TO NON-TRADEABLES (1972-100)
(PCP/PN)
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RELATIVE PRICE OF LUMBER TO NON-TRADEABLES (1972-100)
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6 .3  E m p lo y m en t and O utp ut
In this section, we will discuss the procedure; for the estimation of the sect,oral 
employment and sectoral output and investigate the employment and outpu t effects of 
t h e  c h a n g es  i n  t h e  r e a l  exchange  r a t e .
6.3 .1  O u tp u t and E m p lo y m en t E stim a tio n
Production of the tradeable sector (Q-p) and of the non-tradeable sector (Q ^) for 
each year were obtained by taking the sum of the sectoral production shares to total 
production (Q) proxied by GD P, ie.
Qt  S  (Q ./G D P ) x 100 
t
( 6 . 1 3 )
QN =  £  (Qn/COP) X 100 ( 6 . 1 4 )
Employment in the tradeable sector (E-p) and in the non-tradeable sector (L^), 
were measured as the suir  ^ of the sectoral employment shares to total employment (L), ie.
Lt  =  E  ( L t / L )  x 100 ( 6 . 1 5 )
L n . =  E  ( L n b) x 100 ( 6 . 1 6 )
n
f
in the context of our theoretical formulation, the output of tradeablcs is 
positively related to the real exchange rate, P ^ /P j^ ;  ie. given flexible wages and fixed
f
labor, a depreciation of the real exchange rate increases the output of tradeablcs, while a 
real appreciation decreases its output. With real appreciation, ou tput of non-tradeables
increases.
6 .3 .2  T r e n d s  an d  A n a ly s is
In similar fashion as domestic prices of tradeables and non-tradoables, and the real 
exchange rates, we also came up with three estimates of the sectoral output and 
employment based on the three tradeable/non-tradeable sectoral classifications. 
Comparative estimates of the sectoral output and of the sectoral employment are 
presented in the append ix .^  Only the estimates based on the broader definition of the 
t radeable sector will be presented in this section to be consistent with the analysis on the 
real exchange rate.
We have observed from Figure 6-2 tha t  the domestic prices of tradeables increased 
relative to tin* domestic prices of non-tradeables throughout t he 1967-1973 period. During 
the post-J973 period, however, the relative price of tradeables to non-tradeables 
decreased. Casual observations of ou tpu t trend from Figure 6-71'* shows tha t  during 
1967-73, out put, of the tradeable sector was slightly rising and broadly declined thereafter. 
O u tpu t of the non-tradeable sector, on the other hand, was first, gradually declining until 
1973 and broadly rising afterwards.
R e g re s s io n  of th e  n o n - t r a d e a b le s  ou tpu t  (Q,.), and of th e  t r a d e a b le s  
ou tpu t  (Q,p),,on t h e * r e a l  exchange r a t e  (RER = P ^/P . ,) ,  on th e  lagged  
denenden t v a r i a b l e  (Q„t )  ^ , and (Q,-,)  ^ , r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and on th e  t im e  
v a r i a b l e  (? )  y i e l d s  th e  fo l lo w in g  e s t im a te d  r e s u l t s :
qn 5 5 . 0 9 0 .33  RER + 0 .39  (Qn )_ 1 + 0,15 T
(2 ,6 6 ) ( -2 .3 8 ) (1 .70 ) (1 .77 )
~R2 = 0 .5 0 ,  D.W. = 1 .9 9 ,  and Durbin h - s t a t i s t i c =
Qrp = 10.91 + 0 .03  RER + 0.71 (Qt )_ , 0,06 T
(1 .54) (1 .3 0 ) (4 .2 1 ) - (2 .0 7 )
R2 = 0 .6 2 ,  D.W, = 1 .5 3 ,  and Durbin h - s t a t i a t . n c  =
* *So<> Appendix 10, Table 50 for sectoral output and Table 50 for sectoral employment.
15 1' See Appendix E, fable 50 for tradeable and non-tradeable output share to total output.
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(QN/GDP) = NON-TRADEABLE OUTPUT SHARE TO GDP 
(QT/GDP) = TRADEABLE OUTPUT SHARE TO GDP
SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT
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(LT/L) = TRADEABLE EMPLOYMENT SHARE TO TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
(LN/L) = NON-TRADEABLE EMPLOYMENT SHARE TO TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
I t  c a n  be c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  c a s u a l  o b s e r v a t io n s  c o n f i rm  t h e  s i g n i f i ­
ca n ce  of t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  r e a l  exchange  r a t e  RER on th e  o u tp u t  of  bo th
t r a d e a b l e s  and n o n - t r a d e a b l e s . R e g r e s s io n  r e s u l t s  a l s o  seem t o  s u n n o r t
t h i s  o b se rv ed  r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  n o n - t r a d e a b l e s  bu t  no t  f o r  t r a d e a b l e s .
The sectoral employment trends are also shown in Figure 6-7.16 Although there 
seems to be an inconsistency with the output trends from 1967 until 1973, we observed 
tha t  the sectoral employment trends were consistent with the output trends during the 
post-1973 period, ie. tradeable employment share to total employment declined while non- 
tradeable employment share to total employment increased. The " in c o n s i s t e n c y "  of
t r e n d s  i n  employment and o u tp u t  s h a r e s  be tw een  1967 and 1973 p resum ab ly  
r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  l a b o r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n c r e a s e d  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  f a s t e r  
in  t h e  t r a d e a b l e  s e c t o r .
I ndtrlying the  changes in sectoral employment and output are changes in real
Ä
w ages .  No da ta  on sectoral wages were available, but presumably the real wages in terms 
of non-tradeables declined at least relative to real wages in terms of tradeables, given tha t  
non-tradeables prices rosd*as a result of increased government spending on non-tradeables. 
1 bus, employment and output of the non-tradeables sect or increased.
Sec Appendix E, Table 56 for the data on tradeable and non-tradeable share to total  
employment.
«•
A lthough  t h e  C e n t r a l  Bank o f  t h e  P h i l i p p i n e s  32nd S t a t i s t i c a l  B u l l e t i n  
(1 9 8 0 ) ,  page 267 , p r o v id e s  i n d e x e s  of a v e ra g e  m onth ly  e a r n i n g s  by ma.ior 
i n d u s t r y  d i v i s i o n ,  I  was u n a b le  t o  c o l l a t e  t h e  i n f o r m a t io n  in ,  a way t h a t  
would y i e l d  a c c e p t a b l e  s e p a r a t e  in d e x e s  f o r  t h e  t r a d e a b l e  and n o n - t r a d e -  
a b l e  s e c t o r s  f o r  t h e  whole p e r i o d  o f  s t u d y .  M oreover, t h e r e  was no 
breakdown of  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s e c t o r  i n t o  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  f i s h e r y ,  and 
f o r e s t r y ;  and t h e r e  i s  no breakdown o f  t h e  m a n u fa c tu r in g  s e c t o r  i n t o  
food  m a n u fa c tu re s  and o t h e r  m a n u f a c tu r e s .
C H A P T E R  7
D E B T , SAV IN G S, IN V E S T M E N T, A N D  W EALTH
7.1 In trod u ction
This chapter will provide a theoretical framework which will enable us to analyze 
the long-run effect of macroeconomic policy on each of the following economic variables: 
the country’s gross and net external debt, national and sectoral (public and private) 
investment and savings, and real wealth, and then we relate each of these framework to 
the case of the Philippines. Estimation procedures for relevant da ta  input requirements 
and other economic variables will also be discussed.
Faced with external current account deficits, the Philippines allowed the persistent 
rise in government spending, and the financing of the current, account deficit arid 
government spending on non-tradeables and tradeables by foreign borrowings. Cross 
external debt has risen; current account deficit grows, or equivalently, the national 
investment-savings gap has widened; and real wealth has increased.
Assume tha t  there is an internal imbalance (excess demand for non-tradeables) as a
result of increased government, expenditure on non-tradeables. The excess demand for
non-tradeables causes the real exchange rate to appreciate so that production of non-
tradeables increases and consumption of non-tradeables falls. Because of the rise in total
spend ing ,  a c u r r e n t  account  d e f i c i t  e x i s t s ,  i e ,  n a t i o n a l  spending ex ­
ceeds  n a t i o n a l  income. The c o u n t ry  i s  b u i l d i n g  up f o r e i g n  d e b t s  t o  
t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  th e  h ig h e r  government spending r a i s e s  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
and crowds out  investment t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  w ea l th  w i l l  be f a l l i n g  f o r  two 
r e a s o n s :  d e c l i n i n g  inves tment and growing d e b t .  Real  w ea l th  f a l l s  which 
in t u r n  r e d u c e s  spend ing ,  As spending f a l l s ,  (1) t h e r e  i s  a r e a l  d e p r e ­
c i a t i o n  t o  p r e s e r v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  in  t h e  n o n - t r a d e a b l e s  marke t ,  an I (2) 
th e  c u r r e n t  account  d e f i c i t  d i s a p p e a r s .  Thus,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  n a t u r a l  long- 
run  e n u i l i b r a t i n g  f o r c e s  which remove c u r r e n t  account  imbalances  in th e  
.absence of d e s t a b i l i z i n g  government p o l i c i e s .
Dornbusch (1984) explores the role of disequilibrium exchange rates and budget,
deficits in promoting external indebtedness and the current debt crisis in some countries.*
Instead of allowing the equilibrating processes to take place in the long-run, a
number of countries allowed their budget deficits to rise. The availability of external
borrowing encouraged these countries to finance their persistent budget deficits and to
allow their real exchange rates to appreciate thereby preventing or at least inhibiting the
natural depreciation of the real exchange rate in the long-run. As the real exchange rate
appreciates, the current account deficit grows. There is no one-to-one causal link from the
real exchange rate, Prp/Pp^, to the current account. Rather by keeping up government
spending on non-tradeables, G ^ ,  and financing current account deficit and G ^  bv
external borrowing a country prevents/postpones the fall in spending (and the associated
f a l l  in  P^/P^) which would o the rw ise  occu r .  Government spending on 
t r a d e a b l e s  could a l s o  be f i n a n c e d  by f o r e i g n  borrowing th e re b y  p o s tp o ­
ning domest ic  ad jus tm en t  and e x a c e r b a t i n g  t h e  e v e n t u a l  ad jus tment  
p r o c e s s .  Tan (1984) c i t e d  t h a t  f o r e i g n  borrowing should only be used 
t o  cover  t h e  ba lance  of payments d e f i c i t s  f o r  a ve ry  temporary  or in 
e x c e p t i o n a l  c a s e s ;  o th e rw ise  i t  t e n d s  t o  e x a c e r b a t e  t h e  BOP problem.
She f u r t h e r  c la im ed  t h a t . t h e  in f low  of f o r e i g n  exchange borrowing w i l l
A
s u n n re s s  th e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of  t h e  domestic  c u r re n c y  t h a t  may be exnected
2from a p e r s i s t e n t  ba lance  op payments d e f i c i t s .
Kdwards (1983) rioted th a t  during the 1970s, the developing countries underwent 
serious current account deficits in their balance of payments, which led, inter alia, to 
major increases in their foreign debt. The foreign public and publicly guaranteed debt of 
the middle income countries increased from 11.8% of GNP to 17.4% of GNP in 1980.
Dornbusch (1984) claimed th a t ,  although oil, interest rates and world recession are 
often isolated as the chief causes of the world debt crisis, these factors only have made
*See Dornbusch, 1984. These countries include Brazil, Chile and Argentina.
2
Sec K. A. I an, 1984, ’’Philippine external debt” . Paper presented to the University Colloquia 
on i he Nation in Crisis” , 9 March, University of the Philippines, page 4.
'‘See Edwards, 1983, page 143.
much more a p p a r e n t  and u n s u s t a i n a b l e  an u n d e r l y i n g  d i s e q u i l i b r i u m  in  
which  exchange  r a t e  o v e r v a l u a t i o n  a n d / o r  budge t  d e f i c i t s  were n e r n e t u n -  
t e d  by c o n t i n u i n g  and e x c e s s i v e  r e c o u r s e  t o  t h e  world  c a p i t a l  m a r k e t , "
7.2 R ise  in Gross E xternal D eb t
The most useful subdivision of the balance of payments for macroeconomic analysis 
is into the balance on the the current account and the balance on the capital account. 
Thus, in equation (7.1) the balance of payments (HOP) which is equivalent, to the 
changes in official reserves (zAFX) is equal to the current account surplus (CurrS) plus the 
capital account surplus (CapS).
A F X  -- CurrS -f CapS (7.1)
We can decompose the capital account surplus into three components: portfolio
investments and net direct investments (Z1DC1), gross foreign borrowing or external debt, 
(Z\D), and gross private capital outflows (z^PCO).^
A F X  =  CurrS +  Z1DC1 t  AD - Z1PCO (7.2)
A
Rearranging the terms of equation (7.2), we can identify the components or 
proximate surces of the increase in the country’s gross foreign borrowings or external 
debt.
AD  =  CurrD -f AF X  4 Z\PC() - ADCA (7.3)
I /C }
Equation (7.3) states tha t  an increase in a country's external debt can be a ttr ibu ted  
to current account deficits, and to increases m official reserves, and to private capital 
outflows, minus net onflow of portfolu» investments and direct investments, or a 
combination of these proximate sources.
48ee D ornbusch ,  1^84,  page 1,
' This decomposition follows Dornbusch, 198-1, pp. 4-.r>, and that of the IMF International 
Financial Stat istios which provides one of the sources of basic data.
We have to distinguish between two possible cases of an increase in external debt.
In the Hrst case, we may look at, a rising gross external debt to finance capital flight,, 
not current account deficits. The government or the Hank borrows abroad or runs down 
existing foreign exchange reserves and sells foreign exchange to domestic, residents so that 
they can acquire foreign assets. In this first case, there is no change in aggregate' net 
foreign assets. If there is a current account deficit, then it is almost entirely financed by 
direct investment and portfolio capital inflows or by falling foreign exchange reserves 
under a fixed exchange rate regime.
In the second case, we may look at an increased external debt reflecting current 
account deficits and not capital flight. We can probably assume here th a t  direct 
investments and portfolio investments finance ordy a part  of the current account deficits 
so that, external debt rises by the difference. In practice, the cumulative current account 
deficits are the more common counterpart of increased external indebtedness, which 
results in a decline in aggregate net foreign assets (or an increase in aggregate net foreign 
liabilities).
An interesting highlight'of this paper is that the Philippine gross external debt rose 
significantly during the 1971-1984 period, with two-thirds (2/3) of the cumulative 
increase in the gross external debt financing the current account deficits an.d one-third 
(1 /3) financing capital outflows.
#.
A more detailed analysis can be observed from Table 7-1 which provides us an 
estimate of the components of the increase in gross external debt from 1971 to 1984. Data 
were taken from different sources in our attempt to identify the proximate sources of the 
increase in gross foreign debt. The cumulative increase of gross external debt from 1971 to
f’ln the case of Argentina, Dornbusch (1984) concluded that the increase in debt during the 
1978-1982 period corresponded to a large extern to the financing of capital flight. The current 
account deficii was almost entirely financed by direct, investment and portfolio capital inflows. In 
the case of Brazil and Chile, the increased debt reflects the current account deficits, not capital 
flight. In both countries, direct investment and portfolio capital flows financed only part of the 
current account deficits and hence external debt increased by the difference.
1984 was US$23.0 b i l l i o n  w hile  th e  cu m u la tiv e  c u r r e n t  account d e f i c i t s  
over th e  same p e r io d  stood  a t  US$16,175 b i l l i o n ,  and th e  cu m ula tive  
in c r e a s e  in  f o r e ig n  exchange r e s e r v e s  and o r iv a t e  c a p i t a l  o u t f l o ’ws 
was e s t im a te d  a t  US$7,3 b i l l i o n .  We e s t im a te d  t h a t  p r iv a t e  c a p i t a l  
o u tf lo w s  was an a g g re g a te  of about US$7,7 b i l l i o n  and the  cum ula tive  
change in  f o r e ig n  exchange r e s e r v e s  ended up w ith  - 0 ,3  b i l l i o n  US 
d o l l a r s ,
In other words, we estimated th a t  Philippine residents had salted abroad about 
US$7.7 billion from 1071 to 1984, which was financed by a massive build-up of the 
country’s external debt, during the period. Our finding is consistent with Tiglao’s report 
(1985) on t he capital flight estimates of the Philippines: at US$2.1 billion from 1974-1977 
estimated by the US Federal Reserve System and that of the World Bank a t US$3.1 
billion from 1978 to 1982, or a total of US$5.2 billion from 1974 to 1982~ (which is within 
our estimated total of US$8 billion from 1971 to 1984).
A
i .
~See K. I iglao, 1985, ’Capital flight from HP totals $3.9B, US fe d  paper says' ,  in Business
Table 7-1: COMPONENTS OF CHANCES IN GROSS EXTERNAL DEPT
IN B I L L I 0 N U S D 0 L L A R S
Increase Current Net Direct Changes in Foreign Exchange
Year in Gross Account Investments Reserves (Z\FX) and Private
External Balance and Portfolio Capital Outflows (PCO)
Debt (^ 1D) (-CurrD) Investments
(4DCI) (ZiFX + PCO) (.AFX) (PCO)
( 1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1971 0.071 0.009 - 0.004 0.076 0.031 0.045
1972 0.295 0.011 - 0.022 0.284 0.038 0.246
1973 0.183 0.487 0.064 0.734 0.558 0 . 176
1974 0.692 - 0.176 0.028 0.544 0.290 0.163
1975 0.854 - 0.892 0 . 124 0.087 - 0.076 0.162
1976 1.953 - 1.050 - 0.144 0.759 0.066 0.693
1977 1.690 - 0.752 0.216 1.154 0.279 0.875
1978 2.573 - 1.102 0.100 1.571 - 0.003 1.574
1979 2.584 - 1.497 0.020 1. 107 - 0.089 1.196
1980 3.930 - 1.904 - O . 102 1.924 0.620 1.304
1981 3.169 - 2.061 0 . 175 1.283 - 0.240 1.523
1982 3.506 - 3.200 0.017 0.323 - 0.982 1.305
1983 1 .OOO - 2.750
A
O . 112 - 1.638 - 1.329 - O .309
1984 0.446 - 1.298 - 0.009 - 0.861 0.520 - 1.381
1971
1984 22.946 - 16.175 0.576 7.347 - 0.317 7.664
Sources: Basic data for gross external debt (column l) were obtained 
from Appendix F, Table 65. Data for columns (2) and (3) were from 
the Philippine .Statistical Yearbook: 1983 issue for 1971-73 data, 
Table 7-9, pages 400-01; and 1985 issue for 1974-84 data, Table 7-9, 
pages 388-89. The sum (column 4) of changes in foreign exchange 
reserves and capital outflows were taken as a residual, increase in 
external debt plus current account deficit plus direct investments. 
Data for column (5) were taken from the monetary movements data of 
the balance of payments in the Philippine Financial Statistics 
(Central Bank), several quarterly issues. Data for column (6) were 
obtained as residuals (column 4 less column 5) .
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7.3 Widening Investment-Savings Gap
The current account measures the extent of a country's net borrowing 
or lending vis-a-vis the rest of the world in a given period, and thus is 
the result of savings and investment decisions. Thus, an alternative and 
equivalent definition of the current account deficit is that it equals the 
increase in external debt, defined as the excess of national spending over 
national income. Thus,
CurrD = National Spending - National Income (7.4)
This means that external debt rises in order to finance the national 
investment-savings gap. The current account deficit (CurrD) is a national 
deficit, and is, therefore, the sum of financial deficits of the private 
sector (IPr* - SPr*) and of the public sector (G-T).®
It has to be emphasized that a current account deficit must have as
Q
its counterpart an excess of national investment over national saving. 
Thus,
CurrD = National Investment - National Savings (7.5)
CurrD = (private _ sPrivate) + (IPublic _ sPubliC) (7.6)
I n  an  o p e n  e c o n o m y ,  g r o s s  d o m e s t i c  p r o d u c t  Q , i s  t h e  s um o f  c o n s u m p t i o n  
( C ) ,  g o v e r n m e n t  s p e n d i n g  ( G ) ,  d o m e s t i c  i n v e s t m e n t  ( I ) ,  a n d  n e t  e x p o r t s  o f  
g o o d s  a n d  s e r v i c e s  ( X - M) .  T h u s ,  Q = C + I + G + X - M.  I n c o me  d e r i v e d  f r o m  
o u t p u t  c a n  be  u s e d  f o r  t h r e e  p u r p o s e s :  f o r  c o n s u m p t i o n  ( C ) ,  f o r  t a x  p a y m e n t s  
( T ) ,  a n d  s a v i n g  ( S ) .  T h u s ,  Q = C + S + T.  By m a n i p u l a t i o n ,  we c o me  up w i t h  
t h e  i d e n t i t y :  M - X =  I - S + G - T,  w h e r e  S d e n o t e s  t h e  s a v i n g s  o f  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  n o n - g o v e r n m e n t  s e c t o r  i n c l u d i n g  s a v i n g s  o u t  o f  n e t  f a c t o r  i n c o m e s  
p a i d  a b r o a d  a n d  T i s  g o v e r n m e n t  n e t  r e v e n u e .
9
F o r  d i s c u s s i o n  o t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  a n d  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  e c o n o m y ,  s e e  C o r d e n ,  W. M. ,  1 9 8 2 ,  " How t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a y m e n t s  
r e l a t e s  w i t h  t h e  d o m e s t i c  r e a l  a n d  m o n e t a r y  e c o n o m y " .  I n  t h e i r  s t u d y  " B u d g e t  
d e f i c i t s  a n d  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  c l a s s i c a l  u n e m p l o y m e n t " .  
W o r l d  B a n k ,  J . T .  C u d d i n g t o n  a n d  J . M.  V i n a l s ,  1 9 8 4 ,  c i t e s  t h a t  r e c e n t  m o d e l s  
on  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  ( s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  J .  S a c h s ,  1 9 8 1 ,  " T h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  i n  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s " ;  L.  S v e n s s o n ,  a n d  A.  R a z i n ,  
1 9 8 1 ,  " T h e  t e r m s  o f  t r a d e ,  s p e n d i n g ,  a n d  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t " )  h a v e  f o c u s e d  
on t h e  w e l l - k n o w n  a c c o u n t i n g  i d e n t i t y  t h a t  e x p r e s s e s  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  a s  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  d o m e s t i c  s a v i n g  a n d  d o m e s t i c  i n v e s t m e n t .  S e e  a l s o  
R . N .  C o o p e r  a n d  J . D .  S a c h s ,  1 9 8 4 ,  " B o r r o w i n g  a b r o a d :  t h e  d e b t o r ’ s 
p e r s p e c t i v e " ,  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  No .  1 4 2 7 ,  N a t i o n a l  B u r e a u  o f  E c o n o m i c  R e s e a r c h ;  
E.  H e l p m a n  a n d  A.  R a z i n g  1 9 8 1 ,  " T h e  r o l e  o f  s a v i n g  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  i n  
e x c h a n g e  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  u n d e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  m o n e t a r y  m e c h a n i s m s " ,  S e m i n a r  
P a p e r  No .  1 8 1 ,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  E c o n o m i c  S t u d i e s ,  S w e d e n ;  a n d  M.  
F e l d s t e i n ,  1 9 8 2 ,  " D o m e s t i c  s a v i n g s  a n d  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  c a p i t a l  m o v e m e n t s  i n  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  a n d  t h e  s h o r t - r u n " ,  W o r k i n g  P a p e r  No.  9 4 7 ,  NBER.
The private sector investment-savings gap reflects the net total borrowing of the 
privat«* sector while the government I-S  gap indicates the net total borrowings of 
1 he government sector. If the current, account deficit reflects a decrease in private or 
government saving, then the country is borrowing abroad or (running down its foreign 
exchange reserves) in order to sustain or increase consumption; this is a cause for concern 
about the country’s long-term prospects. On the other hand, if the current account deficit 
reflects an increase in investment, then the country is building up its capital stock and 
hence increases its future income. Thus, the country will be able to repay its borrowings 
or rebuild its stock of foreign exchange reserves, provided, of course, that the investments 
turn out to be profitable. To the extent that the current account deficit used to finance 
rising investments creates a ’’problem”, it is one of short-run liquidity rather than of 
mortgaging the country’s long-term future.
bet us discuss t he procedure in estimating national investment and savings data in 
the Philippines and the sectoral breakdown (ie. public and private sectors). Data for 
investment-savings gap as a proportion of GNP are equivalent to the proportions of the 
current account deficit to GNP.
Gross national investment data were taken from the estimates of the National 
Accounts Staff of the National Economic and Development Authority and published in 
the Philippine Statistical Yearbook as gross domestic capital formation (which is the sum 
of the investment of the public and private sectors). Public sector investment is the sum 
ol public fixed investment and changes in inventory of the public sector. Private sector 
investment is the sum of private fixed investment and changes in inventory of the private
se c to r . The sec to ra l data on fix ed  investment ( i e . public and private  
fixed  investm ent) were e x p l ic i t ly  a v a ila b le , but not the sectora l 
changes in inventory. From the Flow-of-Funds C apital Accounts Matrix 
(published in the NEDA P h ilipp ine S t a t i s t ic a l  Yearbook), however, we
#  \The expression (G-T) should be redefined to  include in addition to  G 
other government outlays in the form of property income payments 
( in te r e s t  on n ation al debt ) ,  tra n sfer  payments and su b s id ie s , and 
a lso  to  include in  add ition  to  T other government revenue in the form 
of current tran sfer  r e c e ip ts  and property income r e c e ip ts ,  We then 
have in place of (G-T) an expression for:
Governmetit Investment - (Government current r e c e ip ts -  Govt, Current
Outlays)
which can be w ritten  a lte r n a tiv e ly  as: 
Government Investment - Government Saving.
computed th e  s e c t o r a l  s h a r e s  of th e  chances  in  in v e n to r y .  Then, we used 
t h e s e  s e c t o r a l  s h a re s  as  p ro x ie s  t o  compute f o r  the s e c t o r a l  breakdown, 
c iven  t o t a l  changes  in  i n v e n t o r y .
Gross national savings were taken as 1 he difference between the current account 
surplus and the gross national investment. There are some reasons lor adopting this 
residual approach; namely, (a) to provide consistency with the framework developed 
earlier on the basis th a t  t he current, account surplus is the excess of gross national savings 
over gross national investment, and (b) due to constraints on da ta  availability and the 
time element involved in doing the research.*^
Then, we compute the savings of both the public sector and the private sector. 
Public sector savings were taken as the savings of the general government (central plus 
local plus city) which were obtained from the combined capital reconciliation account 
published in the NEDA Philippine Statistical Yearbook. These data, however, do not 
include the savings of the government corporations so tha t  total public sector savings are 
underestimated. Private sector savings were taken as the residual between gross national 
savings and public sector savings.
An interesting higldight. of this paper is the observation that savings in the 
Philippines of both the private sector and the public sector remained positive during the* 
1970-1984 period which, therefore, indicates that the country's real wealth has in fact 
increased. Wealth was rising during the eighties even if more slowly than iti the 1970s. w
*^For studies which deals with savings estimation or which provides some criticism on savings 
estim ation, see E. A. Tan, 1980, "Savings in the Philippines and in the rural sector” , in Survey of  
Philippine Development Research, pages 235-240, and M. L. Treadgold, 1969, ’’Economic growth 
and the price level in the Philippines, 1946-65” , Ph.D. Thesis, Volume II, The Australian National 
University, pages 278-297. Tan (1980, pages 235) cited that llooley (1963) undertook a major 
estimation work leading to his monograph, Savings m the Philippines: 1951-1960. Among others, 
Treadgold (1969) undertakes an examination of Philippine saving data which includes a critical 
discussion of some deficiences in measuring techniques.
f
Wealth e s t i m a t e s  a re  p r e s e n te d  in  s e c t i o n  7 .4  based on th e  conce p t  
d eve loped .  An a l t e r n a t i v e  s e r i e s  f o r  w ea l th  e s t i m a t e s  i s  beyond th e  
scone of  t h i s  t h e s i s  but  which may become a p o s s i b l e  e x t e n s i o n  f o r  
f u r t h e r  r e s e a r c h .
I .'»U
Total national savings (sum of the savings of public and private sectors) was 
constant at 21.0% of CNF during the 1970-1972 period and increased sharply to 27.1% in 
1973 (Table 7-2). It dropped to 26.0% in 1974 and stayed constant at 25.6% during the 
1974-1981 period before atta in ing its 1970 proportion and finally declined to 16.0%> in 
1984. Hill arid Jayasuriya (1985) reported that gross domestic savings did not increase 
sufficiently and this could be a ttr ibu ted  partly to government policies in the tightly 
regulated domestic financial system. Real interest rates were either negative or very low 
and hence provided little incentive for increased savings.* *
Private savings as a proportion of C N F was generally constant during the 
1970-1981 period and declined sharply afterwards reaching 12.1% in 1984 (far below the 
18.8% proportion in 1970). On the other hand, public sector savings to C N F showed an 
increasing pattern (and remained above the 1970-72 proportions in most years except in 
1976).
Total national investment (sum of investments of public and private sectors) was 
constant at around 21% of C N P during the 1970-1973 period. Subsequently it rose 
sharply to 31.2% of GNP*in 1975 and remained a t  high proportions of C N F through 1983 
before dropping to 18.6% in 1984. While the private sector investment posted a generally 
declining trend during the post-1974 regime (after a rising trend), the public sector on the 
other hand, posted a persistent rise in investment. As a proportion of CN F, public sector 
investment rose from 1:8% during 1970-1971 to 5.8% in 1975 to 7.5% in 1979 arid hovered 
around 7.0% through 1982. Subsequently, it declined to 1.0% in 1984 (which was still 
more than twice tin 1970 proportion).
As a proportion of CN P, national savings exceeded national investment during the
/
first two years of the 1970s reaching its peak of 5.5% in 1973. Subsequently until 1984, 
the reverse picture emerged, ie. national savings lagged behind national investment. The
11 Sec Mill and Jayasuriya, 1985, page l(j
widening of the J-S gap during the post-1973 regime stemmed from the combined effects 
of the private sector deficit and the public sector deficit with the latter accounting lor a 
larger share until 1982, which had been mainly financed by foreign borrowings. (No 
available da ta  for savings of the government corporations were available so that the 
public sect or savings were underestimated and private sector savings were overestimated).
. Leviste (1985) reported tha t  the consolidated government budget, 
deficit, rose sharply from about 3% in 1978 to about 6% in 1982 and that foreign 
borrowings, which financed about 60% of the total budget, deficit during 1978-82 period, 
also financed over half of the investment programs of the public corporations. Tan 
(1984) also claimed that foreign borrowing seemed to have been another facet of the 
established pattern of high finance for government corporations and privileged business, 
and further argued tha t  debts are seen to fill deficits in the BOP or in the government
I 9
budget or in the national investment-savings gap.
^ S e e  Leviste, 1985, pages 50-51 
'■’See Tan, 1984. page 5.
Table 7-2: SA VINGS-INVESTMENT GAP AND ITS COMPONENTS
As percent of GNP



















1970 -0.3 21.2 21.5 0.6 2.4 1.8 -0.9 18.8 19.7
1971 0.1 21.2 21.1 0.9 2.7 1.8 -0.8 18.5 19.3
1972 0.4 21.3 20.9 -0.9 1.6 2.5 1.3 19*7 18.4
1973 5.5 27.1 21.6 2.9 5.7 2.8 2.6 21.4 18.8
1974 -0.9 25.9 26.8 -0.7 4.9 5.6 -0.2 21.0 21.2
1975 -5.1 26.1 31.2 -1.8 4.0 5.8 -3.3 22.1 25.4
1976 -5.9 25.0 30.9 -3.4 1.9 5.3 -2.5 23.1 25.6
1977 -3.1 25.6 28.7 -3.8 3.2 7.0 0.7 22.4 21.7
1978 -4.7 24.3 29.0 -2.8 4.0 6.8 -1.9 20.3 22.2
1979 -4.4 26.8 31.2 -2.2 5.3 7.5 -2.2 21.5 23.7
1980 -5.1 25.5 30.6 -1.5 5.0 6.5 -3.6 20.5 24.1
1981 -5.0 25.7 30.7 -3.3 3.8 7.1 -1.7 21.9 23.6
1982 -7.6 21.2 28.8 -4.2 3.0 7.2 -3.4 18.2 21.6
1983 -7.0 20.6 27.6 -1.7 3.7 5.4 -5.2 16.9 22.1
1984 -2.7 15.9 18.6 0.1 3.8 3.7 -2.8 12.1 14.9
Column (1) = (2) - (3); (4) = (5) - (6); and (7) = (8) - (9). 
Sources of basic data: Appendix F, Tables 62 and 63.
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7.4 Increas ing  Real  W e a l th
Since gross external debt has grown steeply, we are then interested in evaluating or 
considering two things: (a) the purpose for which the proceeds of the loans have been user! 
- whether to increase domestic consumption or investment, and (b) the economic 
effectiveness of the investments undertaken.
Whether or not the proceeds of the loans have been used to finance investment can 
be measured directly by looking at what happens to the stock of rapitaj. If the stock of 
capital has been increasing, then the external borrowings have been financing the 
accumulation of physical capital. Consequently, the country’s real wealth is increasing 
and the country’s debt problem is a liquidity problem. If the investment, however, has 
been in low-ret urn activities, there is still a fall in national wealth: liabilities have gone up 
more titan assets. There will be a net wealth effect if the present value of the liabilities is 
different from tha t  of the assets. There will be no net change in national wealth; 
provided, that the present value of the higher capital stock is equal to the present value of 
the extra debt, given tha t  the debt goes up and a t  the same time there lias been a rise in 
the domestic capital stock.
I t  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  know what has  happened t o  nominal  
w ea l th  (W\) and t o  r e a l  w ea l th  (W ) .  S y m b o l i c a l ly ,  we e x p re s s  g r o s s  nomi
n  q  ~  j.T <
n a l  w ea l th  (W ) and ne t  nominal  w ea l th  ( kT )  , r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  as  f o l l o w s :
WG = P.K + FX + DFAn
M
v r = P.K D + FXn
Gross nominal w ea l th  i s t h e sum of
DFA
( 7 . 7 )
( 7 . 8 )
s to c k  (P .K ) ,  p lu s  f o r e i g n  exchange r e s e r v e s  (T?X) p lu s  domestic  h o ld i n g s  
of f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  (DFA), Net nominal  w ea l th  i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
P.K and ne t  e x t e r n a l  deb t  (which in t u r n  i s  the  d i f f e r e n c e  between '"ross 
nominal  deb t  (D) l e s s  FX l e s s  DFA.
Heal wealth (W ) is obtained as the difference between the capital stock (K) and 
real net external debt (ND)  which in turn is obtained as the difference between real gross
external debt (D /P )  and the sum of foreign exchange reserves of the Central Pauk 
(P X /P )  and of the domestic holdings of foreign assets (DI' A /P ).
Wr =  K - D /P  4 (FXUS$/ P  + D FA lJS$/P |e  (7.9)
Then the change in real wealth is given by
d W r =  dK - (D /P ) |(d D /D )  - (dP /P )]  -f (e /P )[F X US$ (7.10)
4 D FA US$)|(de/e) - (dP /P )j  4 (e /P )[dF X US$ 4 dD F A US$|
It is but essential that we discuss the procedure for estimating the da ta  input 
requirements for analyzing gross and real wealth of the Philippines.
Capital stock da ta  were estimated following the procedure suggested by Roemcr and 
Stern (1981).*4 If investment and depreciation da ta  are available for say 10 years or 
more, then an acceptable approximation may be to cumulate for as many years as 
possible. Let capital stock be equal to the cumulated gross investment less cumulated
H
depreciation. Investment da ta  (gross domestic capital formation at. constant 1972 prices) 
were obtained from the NEDA Philippine Statistical Yearbook while depreciation da ta  
were estimated assuming a depreciation rate of 2.56 % per annum over 39 years (with 
1916 as the initial year and 1984 as the final year). With the given investment da ta  and 
estimated depreciation data, capital stock were estimated as the cumulated gross 
investment less cumulated depreciation. The obtained estimates of the capital stock using 
this procedure as suggested by Roemer and Stern, were 5% to 30?4) less than the estimates 
arrived at by Sanchez (1984).^  If we use Sanchez estimates, capital stock would,
* *See M. Roomer and J. Stern, 1981, Cases LL1 Economic Development: Projects, Policies, and
Strategies, London, pages 198-200
'' See A. Sanchez, 1983, "Capital stock measurement, and total factor productivity analysis” , 
Ph D I hesis. University of the Philippines School of Economics. Also see Appendix F, Table 64 for 
the estimation of capital stock.
therefore, be even much larger and tha t  real wealth would be even much larger loo. 
Sanchez used the perpetual inventory method as the basic method of capital estimation, 
ie. by summing up post-investments over a suitable period of years.
Data on nominal gross external debt, on foreign exchange reserves, and on domestic 
holding of foreign assets wert' expressed in US dollars and hence were converted to 
Philippine pesos by multiplying with the peso-US dollar exchange rate. Only reserve 
holdings of the Central Bank were taken as foreign exchange reserves. Foreign assets of 
the banking sector were assumed to represent the domestic holding of foreign assets since 
no other da ta  series are available. Moreover, it is indeed dif- ficult to estimate the 
domestic holding of foreign assets by the non- bank sector.
An interesting highlight is tha t  real wealth of the Philippine economy increased in 
the period 1970-1984 (Table 7-3), ie. savings are positive which indicated tha t  the growth 
of capital stock has indeed outgrowoi the growt h of net external debt. As a m atter  of fact, 
the real value of net external debt, declined during the 1970-1974 period. During the 
pos t-1974 period, net external debt increased but a t  a slower growth than the early 1970s. 
Thus, we cart conclude that external debt was matched by the accumulation of physical 
capital, ie. much of the foreign borrowings were kept in physical investments. The real 
wealth of the Philippines has probably been increasing although the real value of the large 
fraction of domestic gross investment which has gone into somewhat dubious public sector 
projects is a cause for concern. Hopefully, however, the debt problem is largely a liquidity 
problem which will be self-financing if the investments undertaken turn out to have been 
profitable.
Table 7-3: REAL WEALTH ANI) LI'S COMPONENTS
Year






























1970 124035 137938 13903 16650 1819 928
1971 136191 148876 12685 16280 2578 1017
1972 147281 160152 12871 17775 3663 1241
1973 164211 172371 8160 16239 5917 2162
1974 180828 187620 6792 15393 6535 2066
1975 196162 206118 9956 18896 5851 3089
1976 208828 225824 16996 26054 6742 2316
1977 224527 246118 21591 30057 5705 2761
1978 243010 268615 25605 36641 6504 4532
1979 265694 294175 28481 39713 7294 3938
1980 287774 320203 32429 46028 8481 5118
1981 307059 346725 39666 52192 6618 5908
1982 322163 372319 50156 61065 4391 6518
1983 329285 396705 67420 74721 2585 4716
1984 343982 411863 67881 76246 2658 5707
Column (l) = (2) - (3). Column (3) = (4) - [(5) + (6)]. Sources of 
basic data: For the capital stock data (column 2), see Appendix F, 
Table 64. For columns (4), (5) and (6), see Appendix F, Table 65.
If the level of the marginal product of capital is low and constant, then the 
incurring of debt for investment is still a problem. The marginal product of capital is not 
the same as the incremental-capital-output-ratio (JCORs). The inverse of the latter 
measure, however, can be regarded as an index of the productivity of the investments 
undertaken.
Consider the case of the Philippines. Table 7-1 shows that, during the 1970-1979 
period, ICORs remained broadly stable.**’ During the eighties (except in 198d), these 
ratios increased considerably (particularly in 1983) due to the declining growth in GDP. 
The increasing ICORs during the pos t-1979 period may well support the widespread 
suspicion tha t  most of the investments were not very productive. Our observation was 
consistent with the findings of Canlas and others (1984) th a t  expenditures on highways, 
waterworks, flood controls, large public buildings and enormous participation in the hotel 
industry yielded little or no cash returns to the government, if they ever contributed to 
current output at all, while the returns on other projects like irrigation, harbors, rural 
electrification, railroads and others were meagre in the immediate post-construction
1 * 7years .1
Even if the investment efficiency had been higher, the Philippine economy could still 
run into serious difficulty^ owing to its failure to respond appropriately to the rising real 
interest rat.es during the late 1970s and the eighties (when foreign nominal rates increased 
and inflation rates declined), ie. when the cost of foreign borrowings rose. The widening 
investment-savings gap persisted and was financed b\ the more expensive foreign funds. 
Thus, the Philippines could no longer avail itself of the eroding real burden of foreign 
debt, (as in the early 1970s when real interest rat.es were low). Moreover, the Philippines 
had to rely increasingly on short-term commercial loans. Thus, the total burden of debt 
servicing increased markedly. Q u a n t i t a t i v e  e v id e n c e  i s  shown i n  a b l e  *~,1,
While deb t s e r v ic e  payments as  a p ro p o r t io n  of GNP remained a t  5"' .in 1°75 
(as  in  1965), i t  in c re a s e d  t o  10 ,8?  of GNP in  1980 and t o  20? in  1984.
l6 The inverse of the ICOR is only an index t,o measure the productivity of investments. The  
broadly stable ratios during the 1975-1979 period, however, did not reflect, the fact that many of 
the suspect investments were in place in 1975.
* 'See Canlas and others, 1984, pages 25-26.
Rising ICORs also indicated that the invest,merit pat,tern was not especially directed 
to increase the debt-servicing capacity; that is, the direct effect of these investments on 
savings and foreign exchange earnings is so small that the debt-servicing capacity  
expanded insufficiently, and hence contributed to the payments crisis.
Table 7-4: INCREMENTAL-CAPITAL-OUTPUT-RATIOS (ICORS)
In Million Pesos 








1970 50868 11222 4.25
1971 53689 11966 4 .48
1972 55556 11982 3.86
1973 57405 14387 3.74
1974 61825 15360 3.56
1975 69974 17347 3 .60
1976 78973 19436 3 .60
1977 88228 21915 4.03
1978 98777 21866 4 .08
1979 109462 24207 4.50
1980 115846 24346 4.98
1981 122238 23245 5.82
1982 125416 21009 7,26
1983 124109 17271 17.37
1984 113056 7144 -
Annual e s t im a te s of t h e  ICORs (which a re  c a l c u l a t e d as  th e  r a t i o
inves tm en t in  y e a r  t  t o  th e  in c re a s e  in  o u tp u t  between y e a rs  t - 1  and t )  
a r e  iu n d a m e n ta l ly  f la w e d .  Given t h a t  th e  in c re a s e  in  o u tp u t  i s  a conse- 
quence of p r i o r  in v e s tm e n t ,  th e  measured in c r e a s e  in  o u tp u t  should come 
a f t e r  yea r  t ,  say  between y e a r s  t  and t+ 1 ,  To smooth out s h o r t - te rm  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  in  th e  ICOR, r e f l e c t i n g  i n t e r  a l i a ,  v a r i a t i o n s  in  th e  
degree  of u t i l i z a t i o n  of p ro d u c t iv e  c a p a c i t y ,  longer  p e r io d s  of m easure­
ment cou ld  be u sed .  Using 1946 as  th e  r e f e r e n c e  y e a r ,  we c a l c u la te d  
t o t a l  in v e s tm en ts  column (1) and change in  GDP, column ( 2 ) ,  i e .  by 
r e l a t i n g  t o t a l  in v es tm en t over y e a r s  t  t o  t+4  in c lu s iv e  t o  th e  inc rease  
in  a n n u a l  o u tp u t  between y e a rs  t  and t+ 5 .  Column (3) i s  o b ta ined  by 
d iv i d in g  column (1) of y ea r  t  by column (2) of y ea r  t+ 1 .
Source: 1979 and 1985 KEDA P h i l i p p in e  S t a t i s t i c a l  Yearbook f o r  1946-84 
d a t a ,  S as ic  annua] d a t a  f o r  1967-1984 a r e  p re s e n te d  in  Appendix F, 
f a b le  64 r or column ( 1 ) ,  and Apnendix Table 50 fo r  column ( 2) .
(Sven the deterioration in the terms of trade since the 1970s, the Philippines could
have adjusted its domestic macroeconomic policy, ie. reduce absorption and devalue. The 
Philippines, however, failed to adjust to the external shock. A b so rp tio n  had a c t u a l l y
r i s e n  due t o  t h e  e xpans iona ry  demand p o l i c y  v i e  p e r s i s t e n t  budget  d e f i c i t s  
( th rough  p e r s i s t e n t  government spending on n o n - t r a d e a b l e s  and t r a d e a b l e s  
unmatched by r e v e n u e s )  and g e n e r a l l y  e s s i e r  monetary p o l i e v  v i a  subs ta r  - 
t . i a l  c r e d i t  c r e a t i o n  by t h e  Rank in  o rder  t o  h e l p  f inanced  th e  budget 
d e f i c i t s .  Thus th e  macroeconomic p o l i c y  d u r i n -r 1966 t o  1984 p e r io d  was 
a d e p a r t u r e  from t h e  c o n s e r v a t i v e  economic p o l i c y  d u r in g  th e  1950s and
th e  e a r l y  1960s,
I l l ;
C H A P T E R  8
S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S I O N
We have been able to achieve the desired objective of the thesis. We have been able 
to formulate a general theoretical framework for analyzing a country’s macroeconomic 
policy and its impact on the domestic economy and we have been able to relate this 
analytical framework to the case of the Philippines.
W,7o have also been able to answer t he three central questions of the thesis. The first 
central question, which is concerned with the conduct or determination of the fiscal, 
monetary, and exchange rate policy in the Philippines, has been answered via an 
historical and analytical review of the domestic fiscal and monetary policy and experience 
in the second chapter, and of the domestic exchange rate policy and experience in the 
t hird chapter.
The second central question, which is concerned with an analysis of the impact of 
domestic fiscal and monetary expansion on the real exchange rate, the current account, 
sectoral employment and output, has been answered via formulating a theoretical 
framework in the context of the Salter-Swan tradeable and non-t radeable model as 
discussed in the fourth and fifth chapters in which we were able to analyze* the impact of 
pure money and pure fiscal expansion under fixed and floating exchange rates. In the 
sixth chapter, we have been able to apply the formulated analytical framework and lienee 
we can conclude tha t  the model has been relevant to the case of the Philippines.
The third central question, which is concerned with an analysis of the long-run 
effects of the domestic macroeconomic policy on the country's external debt, investment,
1 41
savings, and wealth, has been answered in the seventh chapter via formulating the 
relevant framework for each of these variables, and then relating to the case ol the
Philippines.
In the historical and analytical review of the Philippine macroeconomic policy 
during the 1966-1984 period presented in the second chapter, we come up with the 
following observations.
Firstly, the Philippine government embarked on a generally expansionary fiscal 
policy during the period of investigation. With the government budget deficit as the 
indicator of fiscal policy, the persistent deficits had stemmed from persistently high levels 
of government spending on non-tradeables and tradeables (unmatched by government 
revenues). There was a dominant shift of government expenditure away from spending on 
social services (education, manpower, training, housing, population, public health and 
other social welfare services) tow'ards spending on utilities and infrastructure projects and 
services, this particular sector being the most-heavily favored sector by the government so 
th a t  a spending cut in this sector would be politically undesirable. There was also a 
significant shift in the spending allocations away from current expenditures towards 
spending on capital outlays, particularly those of the government corporate sector which 
has grown very rapidly since the 1970s. Capital outlays were financed mostly by the 
domestic and foreign borrowings by the government.
Secondly, the Philipping government had also embarked on a generally 
expansionary m onetan  policy. With the annual changes in the narrow money supply as 
indicator of monetary policy, the money supply grew' at rates of growth which were as 
high as 20 per cent per annum in some years. The expansion of the narrow money supply 
was a ttr ibu ted  mainly to the expansionary monetary impact of increases in the money 
base, which in turn stemmed from the expansionary effect of the Central Hank's credit to 
the government, mostly used to finance government expenditures. These increases more 
t han offset the contractionary monetary effects of the reduction in the foreign exchange
reserves due t,o the balance of payments deficits. In regulating monetary policy, the Hank 
has relied mainly on the use of open market operations and the Hank’s rediscounting 
policy.
Thirdly, monetary policy in the Philippines, which has been vested in the Hank via 
the Monetary Hoard lias been instigated by the Philippine President via his appointed 
officers and members of the Board. Because the Bank is not an independent financial 
institution, monetary policy has been influenced by the Philippine. President., the 
Philippine government and the Treasury, via the different, components of the money base, 
particularly via the government, budget deficit. As a consequence, a direct link exists 
between monetary and fiscal policy. The Bank has had supervisory authority over the 
commercial banks, and since 1972 its supervision has been expanded over the entire 
financial sector, ie. covering also non-bank financial institutions such as investment 
houses, finance companies and others. The Bank’s supervision and control over the entire 
financial sector reflects the fact th a t  the country’s financial system has been highly 
regulated.
In the historical and analytical review of the Philippine exchange rate policy and 
experience presented in the third chapter, we come up with the following four 
observations.
f i r s t l y ,  th e  P h i l i p p in e s  had f ix e d  exchange r a t e s  s in c e  t h e  end 
of '.‘/o rId  VJar IT u n t i l  1969 (w ith  a tem porary  f l o a t  of th e  peso in  1962), 
Faced w ith  th e  ba lan ce  of payments c r i s i s  which was ag g rav a ted  by th e  
r i s i n g  l e v e l  of m aturing  e x t e r n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s  and th e  u n a v a i l a b i l i t y  
or s h o r ta g e  of f o r e ig n  exchange r e s e r v e s ,  th e  Bank adopted a f l o a t i n g  
r a t e  system in  e a r l y  1970, The f l o a t i n g  r a t e  system had l a s t e d  u n t i l  
1934 (even u n t i l  now) s u b je c t  t o  th e  Bank’ s i n t e r v e n t i o n .
Secondly, the nominal peso-US dollar rates remained stable during the 1967-1969 
period and depreciated during the post, 1969 period, particularly during 1983-1984 when 
the exchange rate depreciated markedly.
Thirdly, although the Bank has adopted the flexible exchange rate system during 
t he post-1970 period, the Bank lias allowed less flexibility in the peso-US dollar rate. This 
observation was a ttributed to the following: (a) the extent of capital mobility, ie. with 
imperfect capital mobility in the Philippines, the Bank has some control in the domestic 
monetary policy in the short-run; (b) the low level of development of the capital and 
financial markets so tha t  the foreign exchange market has functioned mainly via t he Bank 
and some foreign exchange dealers; and (c) the geographic concentration of trade, ie. 
Philippine trade is heavily concentrated in the US so th a t  the peso has been historically 
pegged to the US dollar.
Fourthly, the monetary authorities have also relied on the use of trade and foreign 
exchange controls which, however, have been less stringent during the post-1970 regime 
(a period of flexible exchange rates) than those during the 1950s and the 1960s (a period 
of fixed exchange rates) during which time speculative activities were more important 
than during the post-1970 period (ie. incentives for speculation might have been 
decreased).
From the historical and analytical review of the Philippine fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policy, the question which has arisen is, why did the Philippine government 
opt for a generally expansionary macroeconomic policy? Firstly, it was presumably 
extremely difficult to reduce government expenditures due to political reasons. 
Infrastructure and utilities wen 'lie most-heavi I \ favored sectors since the 1970s so that 
government, expenditures in these sectors rose considerably during the post-1970 period. 
Since these sectors were managed or controlled mostly by a select group of presidential 
appointees and friends, a cut in government spending in this sector would therefore hurt 
this favored group, and hence would be politically undesirable.
Secondly, the Philippine economic policy-makers opted to maintain economic 
growth (rather than allow growth reductions). The factual evidence revealed the stability 
of economic growth, with real G D P growing at an average of 5.5% during the 1966-1975 
period, and a t  an average of 6.2% during the 1974-1980 period.
Thirdly, the perpetuation of increased government spending and current, account 
deficits also stemmed from the availability of foreign funds with which to finance them. 
While the Philippine reliance on external financing could have been economically justified 
prior to 1980, when the real cost of borrowing was low, its continued dependence on 
foreign funds during the post-1980 regime (when real interest rates rose) proved to be a 
major contributory factor in the economic crisis of the Philippines.
After the historical and analytical review of the domestic fiscal, monetary and 
exchange rate policies, we developed in the fourth and fifth chapters a theoretical 
framework which enabled us to analyze the impact of monetary and fiscal policy under 
fixed and flexible exchange rates. The central assumptions of the medium-run model are 
(a) a small country assumption in which the terms of trade are exogenously given so tha t  
the relevant measure of the real exchange rate is the relative price of tradeables to non- 
tradeables, (b) flexibility of nominal wages in order to guarantee full employment, and (c) 
flexibility of the non-tradeables prices in order to guarantee equilibrium in the non- 
tradeables market.
The measure of pure fiscal expansion tha t  we used is the amount of any bond- 
financed rise in the government’s domestic budget deficit. An increase in the domestic 
budget deficit results from an increase in government expenditures on non-tradeables 
unmatched by tax revenues. Pure monetary policy refers to domestic credit creation via 
open market operations. A budget, deficit financed by domestic credit creation therefore 
involves both f isca l  and monetary expansion.
Then, we dis t inguish  i he effects of pure money expansion and pure fiscal expansion 
under fixed and flexible exchange rates in an economy which has Keynesian properties in 
the short-run and neoclassical or monetarist properties in the long-run. In the short-run, 
the money wage is rigid and full employment is not guaranteed. In the medium run, as 
defined above, money wages adjust to give full employment but the current account may 
not balance so tha t  the country saves or dissaves. In the long run, the current account
tends to balance.
An important assumption of the model is 1111* existence of imperfect capital
mobility; ie, because exchange controls can only influence short-term capital flows, we
assume that the country (the Philippines, for instance) has a fairly high degree of capital
m o b il i ty .  A country l ik e  the P h il ipp inen  in n net borrower of cnrvital 
Prora th e  world market and must th e r e fo r -  o f f e r  fo r e ig n e r s  the sarv ex-  
’-'ected ra te  of* return  which they could earn e lsew here . This remains 
true in  the presence of exchange c o n tr o ls ;  i t  i s  th ere fo re  reasonable  
t o  assume a f a i r l y  high degree of c a p i t a l  m o b il i ty  in the  P h il ip p in es  
at l e a s t  in  th e  long-run.
Under fixed exchange rates and given imperfect capital mobility, a pure money 
expansion stimulates employment and output in the non-tradeable sector (while leaving 
employment and output in the tradeable sector unchanged) in the short-run; decreases 
employment and output in the tradeable sector in the medium-run; but, it h as  neutral 
effects for both the tradeable and non-tradeable sectors in the long-run. Under flexible 
exchange rates and given some (but not perfect) capital mobility, a pure money expansion  
stimulates employment, and output in both sectors and produces balance of payments 
deficits in the short-run; but, it has neutral effects in the medium-run and in the long-run.
Under fixed exchange rates and given some (but not perfect) capital mobility, a 
pure fiscal expansion increases employment and output in the non-tradeable sector (while 
leaving employment and output of the tradeable sector unchanged) in the short-run: 
decreases employment and output in the tradeable sector in the medium-run: and the 
current account tends to balance in the long run-
flexible exchange rat.es and given high <apila! mobility, a pure fiscal expansion  
increase* employment, and output in the non-tradeable sector and decreases employment 
and output in the tradeable sector in the short-run; decreases employment and output in 
the t radeable sector and increases those of the non-tradeable sector in the medium-run; 
and enables the current account to balance in the long-run.
Then in the sixth chapter, we related the formulated theoretical framework of  
analysis in the case of the Philippines. An important contribution of t.he thesis is the 
estimation of alternative measures of the real exchange rate (the relative price of
tradeables to non-tradeables) and the estimation of sectoral (t radeable and non-tradeable) 
employment and sectoral output. Based on tiie three sectoral classifications (I, IJ and 111 
as defined below), we were able to come up with alternative estimates of the domestic 
prices of tradeables, of the domestic prices on non-tradeables, of the real exchange rates, 
sectoral employment and sectoral output. In this chapter, we come up with the following 
conclusions: Firstly, the factual evidence, in the form of observations and some 
econometric work, enabled us to confirm and conclude the relevance of the Salter-Swan 
theoretical framework in analyzing the effects of fiscal and monetary policy in the 
Philippines under fixed and flexible exchange rates.
Secondly, our theoretical contention th a t  there exists a significant relationship 
between the current account balance and the real exchange rates was supported by both 
the casual observation of the movements between these two variables and the results of 
the empirical estimation. The significant relationship can be traced to two factors: (a) 
there is a linkage between changes in the real exchange rate and the exogenous changes in 
fiscal and monetary policy: by keeping up government spending on non-tradeables and 
financing the current account deficit and government spending on non-tradeables by 
foreign borrowing, the Philippines has been able to prevent/postpone the fall in spending 
(and the associated fall in the domestic price of non-tradeables relative to tradeables) 
which would otherwise have occurred, (b) There is a linkage between changes in real 
exchange rate  and changes in the terms of trade: given the terms of trade effects and some 
nominal depreciation'- ol the peso-US dollar rate during the post-1970 regime, the 
domestic price of importables increased markedly relative to the domestic price of non- 
tradeables while the domestic price of exportables declined generally relative to the 
domestic price of non-tradeables.
Thirdly, employment and output increased in the non-tradeable sector and 
decreased in the tradeable sector presumably stemming from the lower product wage in 
the non-tradeable sector relative to the product wage of the tradeable sector.
From U h* analysis of the impact of macroeconomic policy on external debt, 
investment, savings, and wealth in the seventh chapter, we come up with the following 
conclusions:
Firstly, the increase in the gross external debt of the Philippines during the 
1971-1984 period was attributed to the financing of t he current account deficits to a large 
extent, and to the financing of capital outflows to a lesser extent, ie. with the former 
accounting for two-thirds, and the latter, for one-third of the cumulative foreign 
borrowings during the period.
Secondly, the Philippine investment-savings gap has widened during the post-19711 
period stemming from the combined effects of the private sector deficit and the public 
sector deficit, with the latter accounting for a larger share th a n  t h e  former i n  some
• 'ears  ( i e .  1974,  1976-78,  and 1981-82) .  However, f o r  t h e  p o s t -1973 
per iod  as  a  whole ( i e .  1974-84) t h e  cum ula t ive  p u b l i c  s e c t o r  d e f i c i t  
formed s l i g h t l y  l e s s  t h a n  h a l f  t h e  cum ula t ive  n a t i o n a l  in v e s tm en t -  
s a v ings  gap .
Thirdly, tfie real wealth of the Philippine economy increased in the period 
1970-1984, ie. real savings were positive. This reflects the fact that the growth of capital 
stock exceeded the growth of net external debt. Although the real wealth of the 
Philippines appears to have been increasing, the real value of the large fraction of 
domestic gross investment which has gone into somewhat dubious public sector projects is 
a cause for concern Hopefully, however, the debt problem is a liquidity problem which 
will be self-finain mg if l he investments undertaken t urn out to have been profitable.
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APPENDIX A: NOTES TO CHAPTER. 4
1 D E R I V E D  R E L A T IO N S H IP B E T W E E N  W A G E S  A N D  GOODS PRICES
Equilibrium in the labor market is given as
1> l-T(W /PT) + Ln (W /P n ) (I)
Taking t.he logarithm of both sides and differentiating, 
with dL/L = 0.
LTPTd\V - LTWdPT + LNPNdW - LNWdpN = 0. (2)
|hTPT + LNPN)dW =  W|LTdPT 4 LNdPN| (3)
(dW/W) = |LTdPT + Ln dPN]/[LTPT 4 ),n Pn | (1)
By manipulation, we get,
(dW/W) |(6rpf.p)(dPrp/P-p) t ( j^vj^ ]vj)(dPjsj/ P]\j)J/ [ ( -p) + (^n €n )I O'*)
where <*>T = L j / L , share of labor in tradeables sector
^  = Ln/L, share of labor in non-tradeables sector
?T = (dLT/LT)(Pj/dPj), elasticity of
labor demand in tradeables sector
<N = (dLN/LN)(PN/dpN), elasticity of
labor demand in non-tradeables sector.
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Expressing in terms of percent age changes ( ' ) ,  we get
W-- [(6rpCrp)(B]-.) + (<‘>]\sTfN)(i>N)|/j(^pfrj,) 4 (<*)Nf N)i ( 0 )
Equivalently, we can express equation (6) as follows
W (i\'N -1 ( ] - /3 ) l \ ( ' )
where,
IV nJ/KVt + V nI (8)
2 DERIVATION OF THE MONEY SUPPLY IDENTITY
Consider the consolidated balance sheet of the whole economy.
Table 1: BALANCE SHEET OF THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE TREASURY
A S S E T S  L I A B I L I T I E S
(7) Foreign Exchange Reserves, (FX) (l) Base held by the private
sector (currency), (C1)
Physical Capital (KG) (2) Base held by banks, (C15)
(3) Bonds held by non-bank public, 
(BP)
(4) Ronds held by banks, (B®)
(5) Bonds held by foreign sector, 
(BF)
Networth or Wealth of the 
Government, (WG)
Table 2: BALANCE SHEET OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKS
A S S E T S  L I A B I L I T I E S
(2) Base held by banks, (C®) (6) Deposits, (D)
(Currency in banks’ vaults 
+ Deposits at the Central 
Bank)
(8) Loans, (L)
(4) Government Bonds, (BG)
Table 3: BALANCE SHEET OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
A S S E T S L I A B I L I T I E S
(l) B a s e  h e l d  b y  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r  ( c u r r e n c y ) , (CP )
(8) L o a n s  f r o m  b a n k s ,  (L)
(3) B o n d s  h e l d  b y  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r ,  (BP )
(6) D e p o s i t s  in  t h e  b a n k s ,  (D)
P h y s i c a l  C a p i t a l ,  (Kp ) 
(e.g. h o u s e s ,  f a c t o r i e s )
W e a l t h  of t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r ,  (WP )
Table 4: BALANCE SHEET OF THE FOREIGN SECTOR
A S S E T S L I A B I L I T I E S
(5) G o v e r n m e n t  b o n d s  h e l d
b y  t h e  f o r e i g n  s e c t o r ,  (BF )
(7) F o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s  
(FX)
P h y s i c a l  c a p i t a l ,  (Kp ) W e a l t h  of t h e  f o r e i g n  
s e c t o r ,  W F
k ; < )
If we consolidate all the balance sheets from 'Table 1 to 'Table 5, we get the 
following:
KC: + KP + K F =  WG -f W P + W p ( 9 )
But since money supply, M " 1) 4- C 
M =  |L 4 C B + BB] +  C P
M =  |C B 4- C P] 4- (BB 4- L]
Money supply = Base 4- Net Lending by banks 
(ie. credit created by banks)
M =  C P + |CB 4- BB 4- L]
M -  C P 4- I)
Since M 4- D, if C B — I), then M 4- C B, which is equal to the base; ie.
there is no credit, created by banks.
Also since the change in the wealth of the government, Z\W , is equal to the
increase in capital stock of the government zAK , minus the budget deficit (G - T) and
since the balance of payments (BOPS) is equivalent to the changes in foreign exchange 
reserves (/AFX), then we can get the following equation:
A F X  4 zAKG =  A C  4- A B  f  Z\WG (10)
A F X  4 zAKG -  A B  4- A B  I J*W<; (11)
where, zAH — A C  — 1 zAOB, which is the changes in the money base, and zAB
— zAB* 4- zABB 4- zAB^  , refers bond sales.
'Therefore, the increase in the base, zAll, is given by 
AW A F X  4- jzAKG - zA W G] - zAB ( 12)
Equivalently, the increase in the base is stated as
.dll =  ziFX - BuD - Net bond sales ( 13)
or
AU A F X  T A D C
where,
A \}C  Increase in the domestic credit — |(G-T) - Net bond sales) 
Net bond sales =  Total net borrowing of the Philippine* government.
Therefore, the money supply identity can be expressed as:
A M  -  j /\FX -4- ^1)C | + A C C  (14)
Or simply, the increase in the money supply is the sum of the increase in the base
_AI'X - .M)C] plus the increase in credit created by banks, ACC'.
APPENDIX B: NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
3 THE RELA TIONSHIP BETW EEN GDP DEFLATORS AND PRICES OF 
FINAL OUTPUT
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Let us consider the following:
Xn













V , V - GDP deflators of the tradeable (t) and the non-tradeable n t
(n) sectors.
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atn U - a t ^
zz p p n t (4)
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-a
U- a tt>
-1 (1-a )nn ant
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(5)






V X n n
Value added 
in sector n
P X n n P X a + P X a^ n n nn t n tn
Gross Output - Expenditure in n on 
k intermediate inputs
(8)
Dividing eq(8) thrrough by X^ and consider small increases in
(P + dP ) n n
V P , and V t n with a..'s constant.
Vn + dV n P +n dPn ann
~atn <pt + dPt>





dVn dPn a dPnn n - a dPtn t
dVn (1 - a ) dP nn n a dPtn t
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Divide through by Pn,
V an nn
Pn Pn
+ + 1 (14)
!(>(>






Shares of primary and 
intermediate inputs in 
the cost of non-tradeables.
% n ann
V + a P + a_^  P.t nt n tt t1________ _ ______ IY
Primary Intermediate
factor inputs
Unit cost in the production (16)
of tradeables.
Divide through by P^ ,
v a Pt __nt__n
P “ Pt t
+ a * tt (17)
a +ot + a (18)
where
a P nt n Shares of primary and intermediate inputs in 
the cost of tradeables
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We can therefore, re-express equations (ll) and (12)
dVn P (1 - a ) dPn nn n atn pt P dPn t
Vn V Pn n Pn vn t
dVn (1 - a ) dP nn n a.tn dPt





a  ^ P P dPnt n t n
P V, Pt t n
+ (1 - att>
P dt
Vt
dvt a dP (1nt n - a ) tt dPt
Vt
i
s 0 r+ 3
1
aot Pt
We can relate equations (19a) and (19b) in the context of Corden's 
(1971, pages 35-40) effective protection formulas as follows:
9j
where
- lal ij t.l
gj effective protective rate for activity j ; in other words, the proportional increase 
in the effective price resulting from tariffs
t. = nominal tariff rate on il










PW (1 + t.)
3 3
world price of a unit of j
(21)











The change in the price of j is equal to the tariff itself. We substitute 











Consider now the following:
Value added in n in year 0 P° a n nn P a t tn
Value added in n 
in year 1, current 
prices
P1 a n nn P1 a t tn
Value added in n 
in year 1, base year 
prices
P° - P° a - P° a n n nn t tn
Let us define g as GDP deflator in n n
0 0g Xn n
1 1g X n n
0 1g X n n
0 0P - P a  n n nn
[<
1P a n nn
P° a n nn
- P a  t tn
P1 a t tn
t tn
( = g )n










( =  gt )
where and V + dV = g t t t
(33)
We have already obtained equations for___n
Vn
equations (19a) and (19b).
and for as in
In terms of the shares of primary and internediate inputs in the cost 
of non-tradeables, n, and in the cost of treadeables, t, we then come 
up with a relationship between GDP deflators and prices of final output 
as follows:
Similarly,
- ( a nn P tn P
(34)
1  - ( a  + a )nn tn
( ant P tt P.
(35)
1  - ( a + a )nt tt
On the left hand side of equations (34) and (35) are GDP deflators; 
and on the right hand side are the changes in prices of final outputs.
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Therefore, the change in GDP deflators of the tradeable sector relative
dVt dVnto non-tradeable sector , ( — ——  - — —--- ) is related to the change
t n
in the price of the final output of tradeables relative to non-tradeables, 
dP dP
( — ~ ~  - --- ---  ) as follows:
t n
dv (1 - a - a ) (1 - ot ) + a. (1 - a . - a ) dp^n nn tn tt tn nt tt t
(1 - a - a ) (1 - ann tn nt “tt5
a . (l - a nt nn a ) + (1-ot ) (1 - 06 - a )tn nn nt tt
(1 - a - a. ) (1 - a .nn tn nt 06 ) tt
dP (1 - a ) (1 - a ) -t nn tt a. atn nt
a cl  ^on ot
dP (1 - a ) (1 - a, ) -n nn tt 06 06 tn nt
a a Aon ot
(36)
3 ( 06 _n  ^ aon ) ( ) - ltn unt
a a .on ot
ip ( a + a + a a_n . on____ot______ on nt
p a an on ot
06 06 ) ot tn










On the left hand side of equations (37) and (38) are the changes in 
GDP deflators of the tradeable sector relative to the non-tradeable 
sector. On the right hand side are the changes in the prices of the 
final output of the tradeable sector relative to the non-tradeab.Lo 
sector. When the value of k approaches 1, the GDP deflator approxi­
mately equals the prices of final output.





















Table 5: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET BALANCE
17 1
(1) (2) (3)
SURPLUS/ GROSS NATIONAL AS PERCENT
DEFICIT(-) PRODUCT OF GNP
In Million Pesos (At Current Prices)
- 153 25740 - 0.59
- 236 28730 - 0.82
- 262 31790 - 0.82
- 996 35010 - 2.84
59 41751 0.14
- 183 49600 - 0.37
- 1011 55530 - 1.82
2090 71620 2.92
2442 99950 2.44
- 948 114265 - 0.83
- 2229 132710 - 1.68
- 2852 154280 - 1.85
- 2167 178067 - 1.22
- 342 220957 - 0.15
- 3387 265078 - 1.28
-12146 303644 - 4.00
-14405 335423 - 4.29
- 6626 379170 - 1.75
- 8345 537363 - 1.55
For both columns (l) and (2), data for 1966-1976 were obtained 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics, 1981 issue, 
pages 352-353. Data for 1977-1984 were obtained from the 
Philippine Statistical Yearbook published by the National 
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), 1985 issue, Table 
15.1, page 591 for colum (l) and Table 3.6, pages 176-177 for 
column (2).
Table 6: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING BY SECTORAL
CLASSIFICATION
1965 " 1970 * 1975 1980 1984
In Million Pesos
1. Total Government Spending
-iHI-1894 4053 19049 36935 60403
2 . Economic Services 317 1283 8672 15721 16160
2.1. Agriculture.fishery k 
forestry 134 260 1022 2475 3958
2.2. Industry, trade,
labor k tourism 122 782 1478 1424 1227
2.3. Utilities k infra­
structure 61 241 6172 11822 10975
3 . Social Services 838 1413 3615 7577 16169
3.1. Education k Manpower 692 1133 2212 4204 9880
3.2. Housing, Population 
and Public Health 117 226 785 2664 4163
3.3. Social Welfare k Other 
Community Services 29 54 618 709 2126
4 . National Defense 317 615 3982 4760 5586
5 . General Public Services 422 742 2780 8877 22488
5.1 Debt Service Payments 104 243 955 3991 12081
6. Gross National Product 23382 41751 114265 265078 537363
Source of Data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1985 issue: for rows 1 
to 5, Table 15.3, pages 594-595; for row 5.1, Table 15.4, pages 596-597 
and for row 6, Table 3.6, pages 176-177.
Data, for 1965 and 1970 are for fiscal years ending June ,30 while 
figures for 1975 to 1985 refer to calendar years.
It has to be noted that there is an inconsistency between the £'igure 
for total government spending in 1965 shown in this table and that which 
can be obtained from Table 7 by adding current and capital outlays. An 
inquiry with the Office of Pudpet and Management was done on 78 March 
1988, and I was told that the person(s) who prepared those tables were 
no longer there. Some possible explanations, however, were offered: 
(l)that the 1965 figure for Table 7 was for another ending period (not 
June 30), (2) that there might be two separate departments which prepared 
those tables in 1965 in which case some of the items/accounts were not 
considered by another party (these accounts which were excluded were 
not identified), and (3) that the 1965 figure in Table 6 was computed 
on cash basis while in Table 7 , the 1965 figure was computed on 
obligation basis.
T a b le  7: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING PY ECONOMIC
CLASS IF 1C A'lnoN
1965 1970 1975 1980 1983
In Million Pesos
1. CURRENT EXPENDITURES 1775 3277 11685 24327 40665
1.1 Personal Services 1159 1895 4486 9687 14282
1.2 Maintenance and other 
Operating Costs 348 681 4219 6955 10136
1.3 Debt Service Payments 104 244 955 3991 11249
1.4 Transfer Payments 164 457 2025 3694 4998
2. CAPITAL OUTLAYS 303 777 7364 12608 15483
Expenditures on personal services include salaries and wages of 
government employees, life and retirement benefits provided by the 
Government Service Insurance System, contractual services, overtime 
pay and other benefits. Maintenance and other operating costs include 
expenditures on travelling, communications, repairs and maintenance 
of government facilities, transportation services, supplies and mate­
rials. Debt service payments include interest payments and loan repay­
ments. Transfer payments include grants, subsidies and contributions 
awards and indemnities, benefits provided by the Social Security 
System and other claims. Capital outlays include land and land 
improvement, building and structure outlay, furniture and equipment 
outlay, investment outlay and loans outlay.
Source of data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1985 issue, Table 
15.4, pages 596-597.
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Table 8: NARROW MONEY SUPPLY CHANCES AND ITS COMPONENTS, in %
YEAR A Ml/Ml 
(1)








1966 9.90 48.03 48.05 - 0.02 51.95
1967 12.19 48.71 53.38 - 4.67 51.28
1968 5.37 53.30 65.55 - 12.25 46.70
1969 19.38 59.19 76.64 - 17.45 40.82
1970 4.55 58.39 71.70 - 13.31 41.60
1971 10.27 52.75 62.02 - 9.27 47.24
1972 24.91 29.47 41.50 - 12.03 70.53
1973 12.33 67.48 24.92 42.56 32.52
1974 23.95 43.14 0.10 43.04 56.85
1975 14.51 41.74 43.55 - 1.81 58.25
1976 17.06 54.82 66.78 - 11.96 45.18
1977 23.71 75.62 76.19 - 0.57 24.37
1978 13.43 66.13 69.65 - 3.52 33.87
1979 11.20 30.06 56.96 - 26.90 69.94
1980 19.60 21.77 53.34 - 31.57 78.23
1981 3.52 22.76 70.10 - 47.34 77.24
1982 0.82 20.44 129.75 -109.31 79.56
1983 38.11 -21.64 207.64 -229.29 121.64
1984 3.52 47.18 344.57 -297.39 52.82
Column (1) denotes percentage changes in narrow money, 4M1/M1 =
columns (2) + (5). Column (2) denotes share of changes in money base 
to changes in total money, (3) + (4). Column (3) denotes share of 
domestic credit by the Central Bank to changes in the money base, 
JlDC/^ lH. Column (4) denotes share of changes in foreign exchange 
reserves to changes in the money base, ZiFX/zlH. Column (5) 
denotes share of credit creation by by banks to changes in total money, 
_ACC/A\M1. All ratios are multiplied by 100.
Source of basic data: Central Bank of the Philippines.































5.9946 6.0689 6.0246 -
6.3995 6.4799 6.4317 6.75
6.6414 6.7249 6.6748 3.78
6.7224 6.8068 6.7562 1.22
6.7540 6.8388 6.7879 0.47
7.2117 7.3022 7.2479 6.78
7.4029 7.4960 7.4402 2.65
7.3658 7.4583 7.4028 - 0.50
7.3290 7.4210 7.3658 - 0.50
7.3406 7.4329 7.3776 0.16
7.4738 7.5677 7.5114 1.81
7.8601 7.9589 7.8997 5.17
8.4973 8.6041 8.5400 8.23
L I .0795 11.1895 11.1127 30.12
L 6.6412 16-. 8482 16.6984 50.26
Department of Economic Research, Central Bank of the 
Philippines.
APPENDIX E: DATA INPUT REQUIREMENTS FOR CHAPTER G
I 8 I
Table 10. DOMESTIC PRICES OF TRADEABLES AND NON-TRADEABLES
PRICE INDICES (1972=100)
YEAR CLASSIFICATION I CLASSIFICATION II CLASSIFICATION III
PT PN PT PN PT PN
1967 66.06 65.67 63.80 66.52 60.20 70.02
1968 68.74 69.00 66.23 70.03 64.10 72.71
1969 72.36 72.27 69.11 73.25 68.95 74.83
1970 85.71 82.37 82.79 83.14 83.11 83.11
1971 92.66 95.11 91.61 94.37 93.84 93.27
1972 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1973 118.29 118.18 119.71 118.17 125.00 111.82
1974 161.91 153.09 161.53 152.57 164.50 147.55
1975 174.18 165.66 173.34 165.36 177.00 159.93
1976 185.69 178.75 184.53 178.87 187.70 174.68
1977 204.47 195.43 202.41 195.52 202.02 193.76
1978 237.49 199.28 220.03 211.29 216.42 210.09
1979 272.73 237.61 252.62 241.51 248.79 241.35
1980 330.56 266.82 301.35 270.52 279.95 278.89
1981 345.89 298.94 317.23 302.72 299.62 314.63
1982 373.50 325.18 348.79 328.50 322.35 343.25
1983 418.74 361.46 390.03 365.35 365.27 377.51
1984 653.53 531.16 612.64 531.09 590.31 523.03
We will denote PT and PN simply as PT and PN, respectively.
Domestic prices of tradeables (PT) are obtained by multiplying the 
weights (wf denoted as wt) and the price indices (Pt denoted 
as Pt) of the different sub-sectors comprising the tradeable sector. 
Domestic prices of non-tradeables (PN) axe obtained by multiplying 
the weights (wfi denoted as wn) and the price indices (Pn 
denoted as Pn) comprising the non-tradeable sector. We have three 
sets of estimates based on the three classifications.
Source of basic data: For classification I, see Tables 12-23; for clas­
sification II, see Tables 24-35; and for classification III, sec Tables 
36-47.
TABLE 11. REAL EXCHANGE RATE ESTIMATES AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT
Year






CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
As V, of 
GNP
(I) (II) (HI) In Million Pesos
1967 100.59 95.91 85.97 26962 - 141 -0.52
1968 99.62 94.57 88.16 29902 - 1033 -3.45
1969 lOO.12 94.35 92.14 33505 - 966 -2.88
1970 104.05 99.58 100.00 41751 - 136 -0.32
1971 97.42 97.08 100.61 49599 49 0.10
1972 100.00 100.00 100.00 55526 244 0.44
1973 100.01 101.30 111.78 71616 3950 5.51
1974 105.76 105.87 111.49 99948 - 957 -0.96
1975 105.14 104.82 110.67 114265 - 5836 -5.10
1976 103.88 103.16 107.45 132712 - 7820 -5.89
1977 104.62 103.52 104.26 154280 - 4810 -3.12
1978 119.17 104.13 103.01 178067 - 8375 -4.70
1979 114.78 104.60 103.08 220957 - 9760 -4.42
1980 123.89 111.40 100.38 265078 -13533 -5. lO
1981 115.70 104.79 95.23 303644 -15338 -5.05
1982 114.86 106.18 93.91 335423 -25339 -7.55
1983 115.84 106.75 96.75 379170 -26394 -6.96
1984 123.04 115.35 112.86 537363 -14756 -2.75
Real exchange rate estimates are obtained by getting the ratios 
of the domestic price of tradeables to non-tradeables (PT/PN) and 
multiplied by lOO. We have three alternative estimates which are 
based on the narrower definition of the tradeable sector (Classi­
fication I), on the intermediate definition (Classification II) 
and on the broader definition (Classification III) .
Source of basic data: For the real exchange rate estimates, see
Table 10. The current account surplus/deficit(-) in million pesos 
are taken from the external transactions account of the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1976 issue, Table 4-5, page 113 for the 1966- 
69 data; 1981 issue, Table 3-4, pages 150-151 for 1970-74; and 1985 
issue, Table 3-4, pages 172-73 for 1975-84 data.




















The domestic price of tradeables (PT) for each year is obtained as the 
sum of the weighted prices (wtPt); ie. summing up columns 3, 6, and 9 
from Table 13. The domestic price of non-tradeables (PN) for each year 
is obtained as the sum of the weighted prices (wnPn); summing up 
columns 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27 and 30 from Tables 20 to 23.
1 8-1
TABLE 13. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF TRADEABLES
T R A D E A B L E S E C T 0 R
FORESTRY MINING AND QUARRYING OTHER MANUFACTURES
YEAR
wt Pt WtPt wt Pt wt Pt wt Pt WtPt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1967 . 1950 70.7 13.79 .0705 65.7 4.63 .7345 47.64
1968 . 1954 77.7 15.18 .0794 67.2 5.33 .7252 48.23
1969 . 2028 80.2 16.26 .0867 78.7 6.82 .7105 49.28
1970 . 1748 82.6 14.44 .0964 108.1 10.42 .7288 60.85
1971 . 1600 97.9 15.66 . 1055 92.6 9.77 .7347 67.23
1972 . 1533 100.0 15.33 . 1026 100.0 10.26 .7441 74.34
1973 . 1578 110.0 17.36 .0922 171.9 15.85 .7501 85.08
1974 . 1172 185.1 21.69 .0934 220.7 20.61 .7893 119.61
1975 . 0843 224.0 18.88 .0963 138.4 13.33 . 8195 141.97
1976 .0996 207.3 20.64 .0932 142.7 13.30 .8077 151.75
1977 .0883 236.3 20.86 .0971 142.8 13.85 .8148 169.76
1978 . 0986 302.9 29.86 . 1140 184.2 21.00 . 7874 186.63
1979 .0800 356.7 28.54 . 1190 272.3 32.40 .8015 211.79
1980 . 0754 486.5 36.68 . 1216 362.0 44.00 .8026 249.88
1981 . 0635 523.5 33.24 . 1175 314.9 37.00 .8190 275.65
1982 .0533 748.8 39.91 . 1093 302.9 33.17 .8369 300.42
1983 . 0439 920.8 40.42 . 1054 358.2 37.75 . 8508 340.57
1984 . 0409 1690.8 69.15 . 1070 553.5 59.22 . 8523 525.16
Column 9 is obtained by summing up the weighted prices of the different 
sub-sectors comprising other manufactures,ie. by adding columns 12, 15, 
18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60 and 63 from 
Tables 14 to 19.
Sources of basic data: The weights wt are computed from Tables 48, 49,
and 50, using the weighting procedure discussed in chapter 6, section 
6.2.1. The data for Pt were taken from the Philippine Statistical Year 
book: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-18, pages 188-89 for column 
2 and Table 4-11, pages 162-63 for column 5; and 1985 issue for 1975-84 
data. Table 3-15, pages 194-95 for column 2, and Table 3-11, pages ISO- 
ST for column 5. Data for column 8 are listed for each of the 18 sub­
sectors comprising other manufactures from Tables 14 to 19. See 
columns 11, 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 
59, and 62.
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TABLE 14.CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES








wt Pt WtPt wt Pt wtPt wt Pt WtPt
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
1967 . 0469 76.0 3.56 .0725 70.9 5.14 .0635 60.7 3.85
1968 .0468 75.3 3.52 .0710 77.5 5.50 .0631 68.0 4.29
1969 .0501 76.3 3.82 .0703 83.0 5.83 .0552 70.3 3.88
1970 .0537 84.7 4.54 .0691 91.1 6.29 .0613 79.6 4.87
1971 .0545 92.0 5.01 .0673 87.3 5.87 .0618 89.6 5.53
1972 .0551 100.0 5.51 .0724 100.0 7.24 .0608 100.0 6.08
1973 .0499 105.0 5.23 .0851 111. 1 9.45 .0561 122.9 6.89
1974 .0524 141.2 7.39 .0970 118.3 11.47 .0599 163.5 9.79
1975 .0539 156.4 8.42 . 1028 121.6 12.50 .0615 182.8 11.24
1976 .0536 166.4 8.91 .0972 133.9 13.01 .0685 196.4 13.45
1977 .0646 194.6 12.57 .0887 194.6 17.26 .0752 238.6 17.94
1978 .0432 270.1 11.66 .0276 270.1 7.45 .0764 356.8 27.25
1979 .0394 320.3 12.61 .0579 320.3 18.54 .0597 398.5 23.79
1980 .0398 366.7 14.59 .0565 366.7 20.71 .0570 440.6 25.11
1981 .0394 386.0 15.20 .0594 386.0 22.92 .0592 471.3 27.90
1982 . 0405 412 7 16.71 0604 412.7 24.92 .0571 499.6 28.52
1983 .0409 454 9 18.60 .0599 454.9 27.24 .0563 551.8 31.06
1984 .0491 564 5 27.71 .0542 564.5 30.59 .0792 799.4 63.31
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s, Table 4-24, pages 196-97; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data for Pt’s, Table 3-21, pages 206-07.
186
TABLE 15. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
O T H E R  M A N U F A C T U R E S
WOOD AND CORK FURNITURE AND PAPER AND PAPER



















1967 .0571 80.5 4.59 .0076 80.6 0.61 .0282 47.4 1.33
1968 .0540 78.0 4.21 .0077 80.8 0.62 .0284 58.9 1.67
1969 .0453 81.8 3.70 .0076 84.0 0.63 .0256 62.0 1.58
1970 .0438 92.6 4.05 .0078 87.5 0.68 .0300 76.5 2.29
1971 . 0468 89.8 4.20 .0081 94.9 0.76 .0238 91.7 2.18
1972 .0443 100.0 4.43 .0065 100.0 0.65 .0262 100.0 2.62
1973 .0413 123.8 5.11 .0059 110.0 0.64 .0277 105.2 2.91
1974 .0424 169.0 7.16 .0058 159.1 0.92 .0319 151.9 4.84
1975 .0314 184.9 5.80 .0049 177.0 0.86 .0324 170.0 5.50
1976 .0349 205.7 7.17 .0049 197.5 0.96 .0336 187.5 6.30
1977 .0328 194.6 6.38 .0050 247.8 1.24 .0290 198.1 5.74
1978 .0327 301.4 9.85 .0099 207.0 2.04 .0123 321.5 3.95
1979 .0382 373.2 14.25 .0063 221.0 1.39 .0112 388.1 4.34
1980 .0362 364.8 13.20 .0072 247.7 1.78 .0104 481.2 5.00
1981 . 0382 407.6 15.57 .0075 269.8 2.02 .OlOl 514.4 5.19
1982 .0381 432.1 16.46 .0076 288.6 2.19 .0093 535.5 4.98
1983 .0384 479.2 18 40 .0076 306.3 2.32 .0151 568.9 8.59
1984 .0358 667.2 23.88 .0086 421.8 3.62 .0111 1024.7 11.37
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
19G7-74 data for Pt’s, Table 4-24, pages 196-97; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data for Pt’s, Table 3-21, pages 206-07.
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TABLE 16. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES

























1967 .0228 74.4 1.69 .0041 43.6 0.17 .0141 63.9 0.90
1968 .0228 70.4 1.60 .0042 41.9 0.17 .0141 59.4 0.83
1969 .0223 75.2 1.67 .0045 37.5 0.16 .0119 66.4 0.79
1970 .0231 77.1 1.78 .0026 56.7 0.14 .0142 77.0 1.09
1971 .0212 93.4 1.98 .0020 83.3 0.16 .0172 93.3 1.60
1972 .0202 100.0 2.02 .0016 100.0 0.16 .0167 100.0 1.67
1973 .0223 104.7 2.33 .0016 104.0 0.16 .0157 112.2 1.76
1974 .0286 110.0 3.14 .0017 138.5 0.23 .0171 143.6 2.45
1975 .0298 124.6 3.71 .0020 140.0 0.28 .0175 152.1 2.66
1976 .0284 133.6 3.79 .0019 161.3 0.30 .0145 171.6 2.48
1977 .0265 145.5 3.85 .0019 179.4 0.34 .0162 197.9 3.20
1978 .0178 159.0 2.83 .0016 196.2 0.31 .0184 191.1 3.51
1979 .0168 178.5 2.99 .0027 241.4 0.65 .0174 220.4 3.83
1980 .0176 195.1 3.43 .0037 252.9 0.93 .0164 258.3 4.23
1981 .0186 217.2 4.03 .0038 272.9 1.03 .0168 289.4 4.86
1982 .0194 230.4 4.46 .0038 283.1 1.07 .0175 317.6 5.55
1983 .0197 254.4 5.01 .0035 315.2 1.10 .0170 356.0 6.05
1984 .0225 406.8 9.15 .0038 533.2 2.02 .0203 528.7 10.73
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for P t ’s, Table 4-24, pages 196-97; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data for P t ’s, Table 3-21, pages 206-07.
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TABLE 17. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
YEAR

























1967 .0727 60.0 4.36 .0790 52.7 4.16 .0477 65.9 3.14
1968 .0729 68.5 4.99 .0764 48.4 3.69 .0464 67.0 3.10
1969 .0805 63.8 5.13 .0776 64.1 4.97 .0433 69.8 3.02
1970 .0824 87.0 7.16 .0757 86.0 6.51 .0436 78.4 3.41
1971 . 1116 91.2 10.17 .0773 97.9 7.56 .0374 91.0 3.40
1972 . 1381 100.0 13.81 .0798 100.0 7.98 .0339 100.0 3.39
1973 . 1314 111.5 14.65 .0895 126.1. 11.28 .0393 105.9 4.16
1974 . 1382 147.2 20.34 .0812 223.4 18.14 .0360 140.8 5.06
1975 . 1443 163.0 23.52 .0820 286.7 23.50 .0398 159.8 6.36
1976 . 1539 172.8 26.59 .0709 319.7 22.66 .0383 177.3 6.79
1977 . 1554 187.4 29.12 .0637 364.8 23.23 .0364 195.0 7.09
1978 . 1363 196.1 26.72 . 1045 354.3 37.02 .0328 222.9 7.31
1979 . 1294 229.5 29.69 .0779 443.7 34.56 .0298 265.4 7.90
1980 . 1286 250.2 32.17 .0747 694.5 51.87 .0312 318.5 9.93
1981 . 1252 258.2 32.32 .0695 827.6 57.51 .0292 366.3 10.69
1982 . 1232 268.6 33.09 .0712 884.8 62.99 .0308 402.3 12.39
1983 . 1242 312.2 38.77 .0724 962.3 69.67 .0315 426.9 13.44
1984 . 1095 575.1 62.97 .0768 1523.8 117.02 .0293 614.6 18.00
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s, Table 4-24, pages 196-97; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data for Pt’s, Table 3-21, pages 206-07.
TABLE 18. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
























1967 .0271 65.9 1.78 .0344 63.3 2.17 .0153 74.5 1.13
1968 .0283 69.2 1.95 .0336 63.2 2.12 .0181 61.7 1.11
1969 .0328 76.6 2.51 .0333 60.4 2.01 .0131 81.4 1.06
1970 .0441 93.0 4.10 .0328 82.0 2.68 .0157 86.5 1.35
1971 .0322 94.1 3.03 .0323 91.6 2.95 .0139 91.7 1.27
1972 .0311 100.0 3.11 .0308 100.0 3.05 .0140 100.0 1.40
1973 .0346 123.4 4.26 .0273 115.0 3.13 .0136 106.3 1.44
1974 .0336 174.8 5.87 .0282 154.7 4.36 .0128 144.6 1.85
1975 .0391 233.9 9.14 .0265 170.4 4.51 .0127 159.5 2.02
1976 .0394 258.2 10.17 .0243 187.4 4.55 .0122 172.3 2.10
1977 .0439 207.2 9.09 .0259 230.3 5.96 .0130 278.6 3.62
1978 .0468 194.6 9.10 .0588 136.5 8.02 .0390 149.2 5.81
1979 .0482 239.6 11.54 .0580 160.4 9.30 .0373 169.2 6.31
1980 .0464 262.3 12.17 .0566 184.3 10.43 .0395 189.7 7.49
1981 .0427 280.3 11.96 .0528 199.1 10.51 .0413 210.7 8.70
1982 .0464 305.4 14.17 .0570 217.4 12.36 .0427 231.8 9.89
1983 .0507 330.1 16.73 .0585 241.9 14.15 .0427 256.3 10.94
1984 .0683 452.1 30.87 .0451 374.1 16.87 .0269 433.5 11.66
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s , Table 4-24, pages 196-97; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data for Pt’s, Table 3-21, pages 206-07.
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TABLE 19. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
O T H E R  M A N U F A C T U R E S
ELECTRICAL TRANSPORT MISCELLANEOUS
MACHINERY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURES



















1967 .0285 68.0 1.93 .0532 51.3 2.72 .0127 55.0 0.69
1968 .0285 63.5 1.80 .0511 51.9 2.65 .0132 53.0 0.69
1969 .0287 60.9 1.74 .0509 47.6 2.42 .0133 54.9 0.73
1970 .0316 74.9 2.36 .0434 70.9 3.07 .0148 67.9 1.00
1971 .0304 94.6 2.87 .0426 87.1 3.71 .0135 79.3 1.07
1972 .0270 100.0 2.70 .0393 100.0 3.93 .0131 100.0 1.31
1973 .0248 114.6 2.84 .0370 106.1 3.92 .0116 117.6 1.36
1974 .0272 160.0 4.35 .0458 125.6 5.75 .0128 132.6 1.69
1975 .0395 169.5 5.00 .0561 171.9 9.64 .0137 128.8 1.76
1976 .0246 184.5 4.53 .0534 185.7 9.91 .0136 143.6 1.95
1977 .0337 226.0 7.61 .0519 159.7 8.28 .0128 150.7 1.92
1978 .0518 141.4 7.32 .0489 144.5 7.06 .0069 211.0 1.45
1979 .0560 150.9 8.45 .0500 154.0 7.70 .0128 232.6 2.97
1980 .0627 174.0 10.90 .0481 172.9 8.31 .0144 322.3 4.64
1981 .0757 203.0 15.36 .0492 193.1 9.50 .0160 357.4 5.71
1982 .0800 229.4 18.35 .0479 208.5 9.98 .0173 395.0 6.83
1983 .0921 260 4 23.98 .0398 224.7 8.94 .0173 437.4 7.56
1984 . 1198 326 1 39.06 .0075 372.6 2.79 .0259 758.4 19.64
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s, Table 4-24, pages 196-97; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data for Pt’s, Table 3-21, pages 206-07.
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TABLE 20. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES
YEAR
N O N - T R A D E A B L E S E C T Ü R



















1967 . 1984 54.0 10.71 .0511 61.4 3.13 .0181 63.9 1.15
1968 . 1981 60.5 11.98 .0475 67.8 3.22 .0172 70.3 1.20
1969 . 1922 67.5 12.97 .0461 75.8 3.49 .0182 72.6 1.32
1970 . 1962 83.4 16.36 .0444 75.9 3.36 .0154 72.5 1.11
1971 . 2141 98.5 21.08 .0425 86.1 3.65 .0175 93.0 1.62
1972 .2062 100.0 20.62 .0410 100.0 4.10 .0168 100.0 1.68
1973 . 1969 137.2 27.01 .0435 109.4 4.75 .0164 111.6 1.83
1974 . 2000 170.6 34.12 .0419 153.2 6.41 .0155 137.9 2.13
1975 .2098 183.7 38.54 .0319 160.1 5. lO .0162 149.7 2.42
1976 .2119 193.3 40.96 .0305 164.4 5.01 .0152 153.0 2.32
1977 . 2115 201.6 42.63 .0301 168.8 5.08 .0176 168.4 2.96
1978 . 1984 215.3 42.71 .0285 177.6 5.06 .0180 176.8 3.18
1979 .2009 242.2 48.65 .0278 197.1 5.47 .0197 197.0 3.88
1980 .2018 242.3 48.89 .0248 208.5 5.17 .0220 223.5 4.91
1981 . 1984 261.9 51.96 .0248 217.9 5.40 .0252 247.1 6.22
1982 . 1978 277.4 54.86 .0250 228.9 5.72 .0272 263.6 7.16
1983 . 1838 319.2 58.66 .0266 245.6 6.53 .0304 286.5 8.70
1984 . 1971 558.9 110.15 .0273 436.4 11.91 .0327 441.9 14.45
We denote weights of the sub-sectors comprising the non-tradeable 
sector (wn) as wn, sub-sectoral price indices (Pn) as Pn and 
sub-sectoral products (wnP ) as wnPn.
Source of basic data: The weights (wn) are computed from Tables 48, 49 
and 50, based on the weighting procedure discussed in chapter 6, sec­
tion 6.2.1. Data for Pn’s were taken from the Philippine Statistical 
Yearbook, 1979 issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-18, pages 188-89 for 
columns 2, 5, and 8; and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data, Table 3-15,
pages 194-95.
TABLE 21. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES
YEAR
N O N T R A D E A R L E S E C T 0 R



















1967 .0558 53.6 2.99 .0843 56.6 4.77 .0570 68.0 3.87
1968 . 0665 60.4 4.01 . 0865 58.3 5.04 .0493 75.2 3.70
1969 .0648 63.6 4.12 .0868 62.0 5.38 .0509 78.8 4.01
1970 .0652 72.0 4.69 .0895 74.9 6.70 .0438 87.2 3.81
1971 .0652 92.4 6.02 .0891 87.8 7.82 .0456 94.3 4.30
1972 .0624 100.0 6.24 .0843 100.0 8.43 .0521 100.0 5.21
1973 .0628 106.4 6.68 .0845 123.7 10.45 .0531 113.2 6.01
1974 .0615 168.8 10.38 .0840 160.5 13.48 .0559 171.5 9.58
1975 .0597 175.0 10.44 .0795 170.3 13.53 .0768 172.2 13.22
1976 .0579 193.0 11.17 .0800 180.8 14.46 .0922 186.2 17.16
1977 .0581 214.1 12.43 .0819 195.1 15.97 .0927 204.0 18.91
1978 .0546 231.8 12.65 . 1289 180.1 23.21 .0883 211.8 18.70
1979 .0521 260.2 13.55 . 1117 206.8 23.09 . ion 249.6 25.23
1980 .0521 288.9 15.05 . 1132 237.9 26.93 .0960 298.5 28.65
1981 .0531 334.5 17.76 . 1132 269.2 30.47 . 1008 335.5 33.81
1982 .0528 347.4 18.34 . 1129 298.8 33.73 . 1003 362.7 36.37
1983 .0541 381.0 20.61 . 1135 339.5 37.62 .0944 399.7 37.73
1984 .0509 499.9 25.44 . 1181 532.4 62.87 .0742 532.0 39.47
Data for Pn’s were taken from the Philippine Statistical Yeaxbook: 1979 
issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-18, pages 188-89 for column 11; Table 
4-24, pages 196-97 for column 14; and Table 4-14, pages 180-81 for 
column 17; and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data, Table 3-15, pages 194-95 
for column 11; Table 3-21, pages 206-07 for column 14; and Table 3-11, 
pages 186-87 for column 17.
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TABLE 22. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES
























1967 .0080 84.9 0.67 .0485 72.6 3.52 .3131 71.8 22.48
1968 .0088 84.7 0.74 .0490 78.2 3.83 .3085 72.6 22.39
1969 .0092 86.6 0.79 .0511 76.3 3.89 .3104 73.7 22.87
1970 .0099 78.9 0.78 .0518 86.7 4.49 . 3099 85.5 26.49
1971 .0106 85.2 0.90 .0528 99.5 5.25 .3016 93.2 28.10
1972 .0109 100.0 1.09 .0563 100.0 5.63 .2953 100.0 29.53
1973 .0109 112.6 1.22 .0580 109.6 6.35 .3028 116.1 35.15
1974 .0118 161.1 1.90 .0597 124.9 7.45 .2921 156.5 45.71
1975 .0113 179.2 2.02 .0614 145.6 8.93 .2821 168.1 47.42
1976 .0119 181.6 2.16 .0680 156.7 10.65 .2617 182.8 47.83
1977 .0118 198.7 2.34 .0705 202.7 14.29 . 2637 200.4 52.84
1978 .0115 221.2 2.54 .0672 219.8 14.77 .2519 220.3 55.49
1979 .0120 250.2 3.00 .0655 268.3 17.57 .2568 253.1 64.99
1980 .0124 300.0 3.72 .0649 340.7 22.11 .2603 288.0 74.96
1981 .0129 334.8 4.31 .0648 389.2 25.22 .2534 324.7 82.27
1982 .0134 371.8 4.98 .0641 413.9 26.53 .2526 360.5 91.06
1983 .0146 425.2 6.20 .0646 462.9 29.90 .2659 396.0 105.29
1984 .0153 516.7 7.90 .0635 672.5 42.70 .2716 568.8 154.48
Data for Pn’s were taken from the Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1979 
issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-14, pages 180-81; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data, Table 3-11, pages 186-87 for columns 20, 21, and 22.
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TABLE 23. CLASSIFICATION I: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES
YEAR




E R  S E R V I C E S
Pn wnPn
(29) (30)
1967 . 1653 74.9 12.38
1968 . 1683 76.6 12.89
1969 . 1700 79.0 13.43
1970 . 1734 84.1 14.58
1971 . 1735 94.4 16.37
1972 . 1743 100.0 17.43
1973 . 1764 106.2 18.73
1974 . 1766 124.2 21.93
1975 . 17z9 140.7 24.04
1976 . 1670 161.9 27.03
1977 . 1617 173.1 27.99
1978 . 1526 189.9 28.97
1979 . 1521 211.6 32.18
1980 . 1524 239.1 36.43
1981 . 1531 271.2 41.52
1982 . 1537 302.1 46.43
1983 . 1516 331.3 50.22
1984 . 1490 414.7 61.79
Data for Pn were taken from the Philippine !Statistical Yearbook, 1
issue for 1967 -74 data, Table 4-14, pages 180 -81 for and 1985 issue
1975-84 issue, Table 3-11, pages 186-87 for column 29.
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The domestic price of tradeables (PT) for each year is obtained as the 
sum of the weighted prices (wtPt); ie. summing up columns 3, 6, 9 and 
12 from Tables 25 and 26. The domestic price of non-tradeables (PN) for 
each yeax is obtained as the sum of the weighted prices (wnPn); ie. 
summing up columns 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, and 27 from Tables 33 
to 35.
TABLE 25. CLASSIFICATION II: DOMESTIC PRICE OF TRADEABLES





























1967 . 1488 70.7 10.52 .0538 65.7 3.53 .2370 56.6 13.41
1968 . 1489 77.7 11.56 .0605 67.2 4.06 .2378 58.3 13.86
1969 . 1549 80.2 12.42 . 0662 78.7 5.20 .2364 62.0 14.65
1970 . 1330 82.6 10.98 .0734 108.1 7.93 .2385 74.9 17.86
1971 . 1229 97.9 12.03 .0811 92.6 7.50 .2332 87.8 20.47
1972 . 1201 100.0 12.01 .0803 100.0 8.03 .2163 100.0 21.63
1973 . 1258 110.0 13.83 .0735 171.9 12.63 .2033 123.7 25.14
1974 . 0909 185.1 17.01 .0732 220.7 16.15 .2157 160.5 34.61
1975 .0657 224.0 14.71 .0750 138.4 10.38 .2206 170.3 37.56
1976 .0775 207.3 16.06 .0725 142.7 10.34 .2217 180.8 40.08
1977 .0693 236.3 16.37 .0763 142.8 10.89 .2154 195.1 42.02
1978 .0639 302.9 19.35 .0739 184.2 13.61 .3522 180.1 63.43
1979 .0556 356.7 19.83 .0827 272.3 22.51 .3048 206.8 63.03
1980 .0517 486.5 25.15 .0834 362.0 30.19 .3141 237.9 74.72
1981 .0430 523.5 22.51 .0796 314.9 25.06 .3224 269.2 86.79
1982 . 0357 748 8 26.73 .0732 302.9 22.17 .3303 298.8 98.69
1983 .0293 920.8 26.97 .0705 358.2 25.25 .3315 339.5 111.88
1984 .0260 1690.8 43.96 .0682 553.5 37.74 .3630 532.4 193.26
Source of basic data: The weights (wt) axe computed from Tables 48, 49, 
and 50 using the weighting procedure discussed in chapter 6, section 
6.2.1 with the tradeable sector expanded to include food manufactures. 
Data for Pt’s were obtained from the Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 
1979 issue for 1967-74 data; Table 4-18, pages 188-89 for column 2; 
Table 4-14, pages 180-81 for column 5; and Table 4-24, pages 196-97 for 
column 8; and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data; Table 3-15, pages 194-95 for 
column 2; Table 3-11, pages 186-87 for column 5; and Table 3-20, pages 
204-05 for column 8.
TABLE 26. CLASSIFICATION II:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
0 T H E R M A N U F A C T U R E S


















1967 .5606 36.34 .0358 76.0 2.72 .0553 70.9 3.92
1968 .5529 36.75 .0357 75.3 2.68 .0541 77.5 4.19
1969 .5424 36.84 .0382 76.3 2.91 .0536 83.0 4.44
1970 .5554 46.02 .0406 84.7 3.43 .0523 91.1 4.76
1971 .5642 51.61 .0418 92.0 3.84 .0517 87.3 4.51
1972 .5831 58.25 .0432 100.0 4.32 .0567 100.0 5.67
1973 .5976 68.11 .0398 105.0 4.17 .0678 111.1 7.53
1974 .6191 93.76 .0411 141.2 5.80 .0761 118.3 9.00
1975 .6388 110.69 .0420 156.4 6.56 .0801 121.6 9.74
1976 .6286 118.05 .0418 166.4 6.95 .0757 133.9 10.13
1977 .6393 133.13 .0507 194.6 9.86 .0696 194.6 13.54
1978 .5101 123.64 .0280 270.1 7.56 .0179 270.1 4.83
1979 .5571 147.25 .0274 320.3 8.77 .0402 320.3 12.87
1980 .5505 171.29 .0273 366.7 10.01 .0387 366.7 14.19
1981 .5551 182.87 .0267 386.0 10.30 .0403 386.0 15.55
1982 .5604 201.20 .0271 412.7 11.18 .0404 412.7 16.67
1983 . 5688 225.93 .0273 454.9 12.41 .0400 454.9 18.19
1984 .5429 337.68 .0312 564.5 17.61 .0345 564.5 19.47
Column (12) is obtained by summing up the weighted prices of the diffe­
rent sub-sectors comprising other manufactures, ie. by adding columns 
15, 18, 21, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 
and 69 from Tables 26 to 32.
Source of basic data: Pt for other manufactures, column 11, axe 
listed for each of the different sub-sectors comprising other manufac­
tures. See columns 14, 17, 20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 
53, 56, 59, 62, 65, and 68 (ie. from beverage industries of Table 26 
to miscellaneous manufactures of Table 32).
198
TABLE 27. CLASSIFICATION II:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
0 T H E R M A N U F A C T U R E S
YEAR
TEXTILE MANUFACTURES FOOTWEAR, WEARING 
APPAREL




















1967 .0484 60.7 2.94 .0358 79.4 2.84 .0436 80.5 3.50
1968 . 0481 68.0 3.27 .0339 84.0 2.84 .0412 78.0 3.21
1969 . 0421 70.3 2.95 .0334 82.9 2.76 .0346 81.8 2.83
1970 .0464 79.6 3.69 .0298 88.4 2.63 .0332 92.6 3.07
1971 .0475 89.6 4.25 .0310 96.9 3.00 .0359 89.8 3.22
J 972 .0476 100.0 4.76 0257 100.0 2.57 .0347 100.0 3.47
1973 . 0447 122.9 5.85 .0280 101.5 2.84 .0329 123.8 4.07
1974 .0469 163.5 7.67 .0284 132.9 3.77 .0333 169.0 5.62
1975 .0479 182.8 8.76 .0307 141.1 4.33 .0245 184.9 4.53
1976 .0533 196.4 10.47 .0305 156.4 4.77 .0271 205.7 5.57
1977 .0590 238.6 14.07 .0257 162.3 4.17 .0257 194.6 5.00
1978 .0495 356.8 17.66 .0211 244.5 5.15 .0211 301.4 6.35
1979 .0415 398.5 16.54 .0266 287.5 7.64 .0266 373.2 9.92
1980 .0391 440.6 17.23 .0248 358.9 8.90 .0248 364.8 9.04
1981 .0401 471.3 18.90 .0259 384.1 9.94 .0251 407.6 10.23
1982 .0382 499.6 19.08 .0256 407.1 10.42 .0256 432.1 11.06
1983 .0376 551.8 20.75 .0256 469.3 12.01 .0257 479.2 12.31
1984 .0544 799.4 43.49 .0228 667.6 15.22 .0228 667.2 15.21
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s ; Table 4-22, pages 192-93; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data; Table 3-20, pages 204-05.
TABLE 28. CLASSIFICATION II:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES



























1967 . 0058 80.6 0.46 .0215 47.4 1.01 .0174 74.4 1.29
1968 .0059 80.8 0.47 .0217 58.9 1.27 .0173 70.4 1.21
1969 . 0058 84.0 0.48 .0195 62.0 1.20 .0170 75.2 1.27
1970 .0059 87.5 0.51 .0028 76.5 1.74 .0175 77.1 1.34
1971 .0062 94.9 0.58 .0183 91.7 1.67 .0163 93.4 1.52
1972 .0051 100.0 0.51 .0206 100.0 2.06 .0158 100.0 1.58
1973 .0047 110.0 0.51 .0220 105.2 2.31 .0178 104.7 1.86
1974 .0045 159.1 0.71 .0250 151.9 3.79 .0224 110.0 2.46
1975 .0038 177.0 0.67 .0252 170.0 4.35 .0232 124.6 2.89
1976 .0038 197.5 0.75 .0261 187.5 4.89 .0221 133.6 2.95
1977 . 0039 247.8 0.96 .0227 198.1 4.49 .0208 145.5 3.02
1978 . 0064 207.0 1.32 .0080 321.5 2.57 .0115 159.0 1.82
1979 .0044 221.0 0.97 .0078 388.1 3.02 .0117 178.5 2.08
1980 .0049 247.7 1.21 .0071 481.2 3.41 .0121 195.1 2.36
1981 .0042 269.8 1.16 .0074 514.4 3.80 .0110 217.2 2.38
1982 .0051 288.6 1.47 .0062 535.5 3.32 .0130 230.4 2.99
1983 .0051 306.3 1.56 .0070 568.9 3.98 .0132 254.4 3.35
1984 .0055 421.8 2.31 .0071 1024.7 7.27 .0143 406.8 5.81
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt ’ s; Table 4-22, pages 192-93; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data; Table 3-20, pages 204-05.
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TABLE 29. CLASSIFICATION II:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
O T H E R  M A N U F A C T U R E S
LEATHER AND RUBBER PRODUCTS CHEMICAL ANI)
LEATHER PRODUCTS CHEMICAL PRODUCTS



















1967 .0031 43.6 0.13 .0108 63.9 0.69 .0054 60.0 3.32
1968 .0032 41.9 0.13 .0108 59.4 0.64 .0555 68.5 3.80
1969 .0034 37.5 0.12 .0091 66.4 0.60 .0615 63.8 3.92
1970 .0020 56.7 0.11 .0107 77.0 0.82 .0624 87.0 5.42
1971 .0015 83.3 0.12 .0132 93.3 1.23 .0857 91.2 7.81
1972 .0013 100.0 0.13 .0131 100.0 1.31 . 1082 100.0 10.82
1973 .0013 104.0 0.13 .0125 112.2 1.40 . 1047 111.5 11.67
1974 .0013 138.5 O. 18 .0134 143.6 1.92 . 1083 147.2 15.94
1975 .0015 140.0 0.21 .0136 152.1 ' 2.06 .1125 163.0 18.33
1976 .0015 161.3 0.24 .0113 171.6 1.93 .1197 172.8 20.68
1977 .0015 179,4 0.26 .0127 197.9 2.51 . 1219 187.4 22.84
1978 .OOIO 196.2 O. 19 .0119 191.1 2.27 .0883 196.1 17.31
1979 .0019 241.4 0.45 .0121 220.4 2.66 .0900 229.5 20.65
1980 .0025 252.9 0.63 .0112 258.3 2.89 .0882 250.2 22.06
1981 .0025 272.9 0.68 .0114 289.4 3.29 .0848 258.2 21.89
1982 .0026 283.1 0.73 .0117 317.6 3.71 .0825 268.6 22.15
1983 .0023 315.2 0.72 .0113 356.0 4.02 .0830 312.2 25.91
1984 0024 533.2 1.27 .0130 528.7 6.87 .0698 575.1 40 14
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s; Table 4-22, pages 192-93; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data; Table 3-20, pages 204-05.
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TABLE 30. CLASSIFICATION II.DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES








wt Pt wt Pt wt Pt wtPt wt Pt WtPt
(46) (47) (48) (49) (so) (si) (52) (53) (54) .
1967 .0602 52.7 3.17 .0364 65.9 2.39 .0207 65.9 1.36
1968 .0582 48.4 2.81 .0354 67.0 2.37 .0216 69.2 1.49
1969 .0592 64.1 3.79 .0331 69.8 2.31 .0250 76.6 1.91
1970 .0572 86.0 4.91 .0330 78.4 2.58 .0333 93.0 3.09
1971 .0594 97.9 5.81 .0288 91.0 2.62 .0247 94.1 2.32
1972 .0625 100.0 6.25 .0265 100.0 2.65 .0244 100.0 2.44
1973 .0713 126.1 8.99 .0313 105.9 3.31 .0276 123.4 3.40
1974 .0637 223.4 14.23 .0282 140.8 3.97 .0264 174.8 4.61
1975 .0639 286.7 18.32 .0310 159.8 * 4.95 .0305 233.9 7.13
1976 .0551 319.7 17.61 .0298 177.3 5.28 .0307 258.2 7.92
1977 .0500 364.8 18.24 .0286 195.0 5.57 .0344 207.2 7.12
1978 .0677 354.3 23.98 .0212 222.9 4.72 .0303 194.6 5.89
1979 .0542 443.7 24.04 .0207 265.4 5.49 .0335 239.6 8.02
1980 .0512 694.5 35.55 .0214 318.5 6.81 .0318 262.3 8.34
1981 .0471 827.6 38.97 .0198 366.3 7.25 .0290 280.3 8.12
1982 .0477 884.8 42.20 .0206 402.3 8.28 .0310 305.4 9.46
1983 .0484 962.3 46.57 .0210 426.9 8.96 .0339 330.1 11.19
1984 .0489 1523.8 74.51 0187 614.6 11.49 .0435 452.1 19.66
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s; Table 4-22, pages 192-93; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data; Table 3-20, pages 204-05.
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TABLE 31. CLASSIFICATION II:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES


























1967 .0262 63.3 1.65 .0117 74.5 0.87 .0218 68.0 1.48
1968 .0256 63.2 1.61 .0138 61.7 0.85 .0217 63.5 1.37
1969 .0254 60.4 1.53 .OlOO 81.4 0.81 .0219 60.9 1.33
1970 .0248 82.0 2.03 .0119 86.5 1.02 .0239 74.9 1.79
1971 .0248 91.6 2.27 .0107 91.7 0.98 .0233 94.6 2.20
1972 .0239 100.0 2.39 .0110 100.0 1.10 .0212 100.0 2.12
1973 .0217 115.0 2.49 .0108 106.3 1.14 .0197 114.6 2.25
1974 .0221 154.7 3.41 .0101 144.6 1.46 .0213 160.0 3.40
1975 .0207 170.4 3.52 .0099 159.5 1.57 .0230 169.5 3.89
1976 .0189 187.4 3.54 .0095 172.3 1.63 .0191 184.5 3.52
1977 .0203 230.3 4.67 .0102 278.6 2.84 .0265 226.0 5.98
1978 .0381 136.5 5.20 .0252 149.2 3.75 .0410 141.4 5.79
1979 .0403 160.4 6.46 .0259 169.2 4.38 .0389 150.9 5.87
1980 .0388 184.3 7.15 .0271 189.7 5.14 .0430 174.0 7.48
1981 .0358 199.1 7.12 .0280 210.7 5.89 .0513 203.0 10.41
1982 . 0382 217.0 8.28 .0286 231.8 6.62 .0535 229.4 12.27
1983 .0391 241.9 9.45 .0286 256.3 7.33 .0615 260.4 16.01
1984 .0287 374.1 10.73 .0172 433.5 7.45 .0763 326.1 24.88
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt’s; Table 4-22, pages 192-93; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data; Table 3-20, pages 204-05.
TABLE 32. CLASSIFICATION II :DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
0 T H E R M A N U F A C T U R E S
YEAR













1967 .0405 51.3 2.07 .0097 55.0 0.53
1968 .0389 51.9 2.01 .0101 53.0 0.53
1969 .0389 47.6 1.85 .0101 54.9 0.55
1970 .0328 70.9 2.32 .0112 67.9 0.76
1971 .0327 87.1 2.84 .0104 79.3 0.82
1972 .0308 100.0 3.08 .0102 100.0 1.02
1973 .0294 106.1 3.11 .0092 117.6 1.08
1974 .0359 125.6 4.50 .0101 132.6 1.33
1975 .0438 171.9 7.52 .0106 128.8 1.36
1976 .0415 185.7 7.70 .0106 143.6 1.52
1977 .0407 159.7 6.49 .0100 150.7 1.50
1978 .0367 144.5 5.30 .0094 211.0 1.98
1979 .0348 154.0 5.35 .0089 232.6 2.07
1980 .0330 172.9 5.70 .0099 322.3 3.19
1981 .0333 193.1 6.43 .0108 357.4 3.85
1982 .0320 208.5 6.67 .0116 395.0 4.58
1983 .0266 224.7 5.97 .0120 437.4 5.24
1984 .0048 372.6 1.78 .0165 758.4 12.51
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data for Pt ’ s; Table 4-22, pages 192-93; and 1985 issue for 
1975-84 data; Table 3-20, pages 204-05.
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TABLE 33. CLASSIFICATION II: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES
YEAR
N 0 N - T R A D E ,A B L E S E C T 0 R



















1967 .2167 54.0 11.70 .0558 61.4 3.42 .0198 63.9 1.26
1968 .2169 60.5 13.12 .0520 67.8 3.52 .0189 70.3 1.32
1969 .2105 67.5 14.20 .0505 75.8 3.82 .0200 72.6 1.45
1970 .2155 83.4 17.97 .0488 75.9 3.70 .0170 72.5 1.23
1971 .2174 98.5 21.41 .0499 86.1 4.29 .0194 93.0 1.80
1972 .2252 100.0 22.52 .0448 100.0 4.48 .0184 100.0 1.84
1973 .2151 137.2 29.51 .0475 109.4 5.19 .0180 111.6 2.00
1974 .2194 170.6 37.37 .0457 153.2 7.00 .0170 137.9 2.34
1975 .2280 183.7 41.88 .0347 160.1 5.55 .0176 149.7 2.63
1976 .2303 193.3 44.51 .0332 164.4 5.45 .0165 153.0 2.52
1977 .2304 201.6 46.44 .0328 168.8 5.53 .0192 168.4 3.23
1978 .2277 215.3 49.02 .0327 177.6 5.80 .0207 176.8 3.65
1979 .2262 242.2 54.78 .0313 197.1 6.16 .0222 197.0 4.37
1980 .2275 242.3 55.12 .0279 208.5 5.81 .0248 223.5 5.54
1981 .2237 261.9 58.58 .0279 217.9 6.07 .0284 247.1 7.01
1982 .2229 277.4 61.83 .0282 228.9 6.45 .0306 263.6 8.06
1983 .2073 319.2 66.17 .0300 245.6 7.36 .0343 286.5 9.82
1984 .2235 558.9 124.91 .0310 436.4 13.52 .0371 441.9 16.39
Source of basic data: The weights (wn) axe computed from Tables 48, 49, 
and 50 using the weighting procedure discussed in chapter 6, section 
6.2.1 where we exclude food manufactures from the non-tradeable sector. 
Data for Pn’s were obtained from the Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 
1979 issue for 1967-74 data; Table 4-18, pages 188-89; and 1985 issue 
for 1975-84 data, Table 3-15, pages 194-95.
TABLE 34. CLASSIFICATION II: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES





















1967 .0609 53.6 3.26 .0623 68.0 4.23 .0087 84.9 0.73
1968 .0728 60.4 4.39 .0540 75.2 4.06 .0096 84.7 0.81
1969 .0710 63.6 4.51 .0558 78.8 4.39 .0101 86.6 0.87
1970 .0717 72.0 5.16 .0481 87.2 4.19 .0109 78.9 0.86
1971 .0715 92.4 6.60 .0501 94.3 4.72 .0117 85.2 0.99
1972 .0682 100.0 6.82 .0569 100.0 5.69 .0119 100.0 1. 19
1973 .0721 106.4 7.67 .0655 113.2 7.41 .0119 112.6 1.33
1974 .0672 168.8 11.34 .0610 171.5 10.46 .0129 161.1 2.07
1975 .0648 175.0 11.34 .0835 172.2 14.37 .0123 179.2 2.20
1976 .0629 193.0 12.13 . 1002 186.2 18.65 .0129 181.6 2.34
1977 .0633 214.1 13.55 . 1010 204.0 20.60 .0129 198.7 2.56
1978 .0627 231.8 14.53 . 1014 211.8 21.47 .0132 221.2 2.91
1979 .0586 260.2 15.24 . 1138 249.6 28.40 .0136 250.2 3.40
1980 .0588 288.9 16.98 . 1083 298.5 32.32 .0140 300.0 4.20
1981 .0599 334.5 20.03 . 1136 335.5 38.11 .0145 334.8 4.85
1982 .0595 347.4 20.67 . 1130 362.7 40.98 .0151 371.8 5.61
1983 .0610 381.0 23.24 . 1065 399.7 42.56 .0165 425.2 7.01
1984 .0578 499.9 28.89 .0841 532.0 44.74 .0173 516.7 8.93
Source of basic data: Data for Pn’s were obtained from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data; Table 4-18, pages 
188-89 for column 11 and Table 4-14, pages 180-81 for columns 14 and 
17; and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data, Table 3-15, pages 194-95 for 
column 11, and Table 3-11, pages 186-87 for columns 14 and 17.
TABLE 35. CLASSIFICATION II: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES
N 0 N - T R A D E A B L E S E C T O R
























1967 .0530 72.6 3.84 .3420 71.8 24.55 . 1805 74.9 13.51
1968 .0536 78.2 4.19 .3378 72.6 24.52 . 1842 76.6 14.10
1969 .0559 76.3 4.26 .3400 73.7 25.05 . 1861 79.0 14.70
1970 .0569 86.7 4.93 .3403 85.5 29.09 . 1904 84.1 16.01
1971 .0579 99.5 5.76 .3310 93.2 30.84 . 1903 94.4 17.96
1972 .0615 100.0 6.15 .3226 100.0 32.26 . 1903 100.0 19.03
1973 .0634 109.6 6.94 .3244 116.1 37.66 . 1927 106.2 20.46
1974 .0652 124.9 8.14 .3189 156.5 49.90 . 1929 124.2 23.95
1975 .0671 145.6 9.76 .3065 168.1 51.52 . 1856 140.7 26.11
1976 .0739 156.7 11.58 .2862 182.8 52.31 . 1815 161.9 29.38
1977 .0768 202.2 15.56 .2872 200.4 57.55 . 1762 173.1 30.50
1978 .0772 219.8 16.96 .2891 220.3 63.68 . 1752 189.9 33.27
1979 .0737 268.3 19.77 . 2891 253.1 73.17 . 1712 211.6 36.22
1980 .0732 340.7 24.93 . 2935 288.0 84.52 . 1719 239. 1 41.10
1981 .0731 389.2 28.45 .2858 324.7 92.79 . 1727 271.2 46.83
1982 .0722 413.9 29.88 .2848 360.5 102.67 . 1733 302.1 52.35
1983 .0729 462.9 33.74 .3000 396.0 118.80 . 1710 331.3 56.65
1984 .0721 672.5 48.48 .3080 568.8 175.19 . 1689 414.7 70.04
Source of basic data: Data for Pn ’s were obtained from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data; Table 4-14, pages
180-81, and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data, Table 3-11, pages 186-87 for 
columns 20, 23, and 26.
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The domestic price of tradeables (PT) for each year is obtained as the 
sum of the weighted prices (wtPt); ie. summing up columns 3, 6, 9, 12 
and 15 from Tables 37 and 38. The domestic price of non-tradeables (PN) 
for each year is obtained as the sum of the weighted prices (wnPn); ie. 
summing up columns 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, and 24 from Tables 45 to 47
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TABLE :37. CLASSIFICATION III: DOMESTIC PRICE OF TRADEABLES
YEAR
T R A D ] E A B L E S E C T C) R



















1967 . 3579 54.0 19.32 .0955 70.7 6.75 .0345 65.7 2.26
1968 .3527 60.5 21.33 .0964 77.7 7.49 .0392 67.2 2.63
1969 . 3435 67.5 23.18 . 1016 80.2 8.14 .0434 78.7 3.41
1970 . 3433 83.4 28.63 .0874 82.6 7.21 .0482 108.1 5.21
1971 . 3414 98.5 33.62 .0809 97.9 7.92 .0533 92.6 4.93
1972 . 3460 100.0 34.60 .0786 100.0 7.86 .0525 100.0 5.25
1973 . 3212 137.2 44.06 .0853 110.0 9.38 .0499 171.9 8.57
1974 . 3399 170.6 57.98 .0607 185.1 11.23 .0484 220.7 10.68
1975 . 3678 183.7 67.56 .0415 224.0 9.29 .0475 138.4 6.57
1976 . 3699 193.3 71.50 .0488 207.3 10.11 .0457 142.7 6.52
1977 . 3573 201.6 72.03 .0445 236.3 10.51 .0490 142.8 6.99
1978 . 3517 215.3 75.72 .0414 302.9 12.54 .0479 184.2 8.82
1979 . 3542 242.2 85.78 .0359 356.7 12.80 .0534 272.3 14.54
1980 . 3588 242.3 86.93 .0331 486.5 16.10 .0534 362.0 19.33
1981 . 3609 261.9 94.51 .0275 523.5 14.39 .0509 314.9 16.02
1982 . 3664 277.4 101.63 .0226 748.8 16.92 .0464 302.9 14.05
1983 . 3492 319.2 111.46 .0191 920.8 17.58 .0458 358.2 16.40
1984 .3772 558.9 210.80 .0162 1690.8 27.39 .0424 553.5 23.46
Source of basic data: The weights (wt) are computed from Tables 48, 49, 
and 50 based on the weighting procedure discussed in chapter 6, section 
6.2.1 with tradeable sector of classification II expanded to include 
agricultural crops. Data for Pt’s were obtained from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-18, pages 
188-89 for columns 2 and 5, and Table 4-14, pages 180-81 for column 8; 
and 1985 issue, Table 3-13, pages 190-91 for columns 2 and 5, and 
Table 3-11, pages 186-87 for column 8.
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TABLE 38. CLASSIFICATION III: DOMESTIC PRICE OF TRADEABLES
T R A D E A B L E  S E C T O R  : OTHER MANUFACTURES




















1967 . 1522 56.6 8.61 . 3599 23.26 .0229 76.0 1.74
1968 . 1539 58.3 8.97 .3679 23.72 .0231 75.3 1.73
1969 . 1552 62.0 9.62 .3560 24.60 .0251 76.3 1.91
1970 . 1566 74.9 11.72 .3647 30.34 .0268 84.7 2.26
1971 . 1536 87.8 13.48 .3716 33.89 .0275 92.0 2.53
1972 . 1415 100.0 14.15 .3813 38.09 .0283 100.0 2.83
1973 . 1380 123.7 17.07 .4056 45.96 .0270 105.0 2.83
1974 . 1423 160.5 22.83 .4087 61.81 .0271 141.2 3.82
1975 . 1394 170.3 23.73 .4038 69.88 .0265 156.4 4.14
1976 . 1397 180.8 25.25 .3960 74.34 .0263 166.4 4.37
1977 . 1384 195.1 27.00 .4108 85.49 .0325 194.6 6.32
1978 . 2283 180.1 41.11 . 3307 78.23 .0181 270.1 4.88
1979 . 1969 206.8 40.71 .3598 94.96 .0177 320.3 5.66
1980 . 2014 237.9 47.91 .3530 109.68 .0175 366.7 6.41
1981 . 2060 269.2 55.45 .3547 119.25 .0171 386.0 6.60
1982 .2093 298.8 62.53 .3550 127.22 .0171 412.7 7.05
1983 .2157 339.5 72.79 .3701 147.04 .0178 454.9 8.09
1984 . 2261 532.4 120.37 .3381 208.28 .0195 564.9 1 1 . 0 0
Column (15) is obtained as the sum of the weighted prices of the diffe­
rent sub-sectors comprising this sectoi, namely, columns 18, 21, 24, 
27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42, 45, 48, 51, 54, 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, and 72 
(from Tables 38 to 44). Pt data (column 14) are listed for the 
different sub-sectors comprising other manufactures; see columns 17,
20, 23, 26, 29, 32, 35, 38, 41, 44, 47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 
and 71 (from Tables 38 to 44). For columns (ll) and (17), data were
taken from the Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 
data. Table 4-24, pages 196-97 and 1985 issue, Table 3-21,pages 206-07.
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TABLE 39. CLASSIFICATION III:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
YEAR














1967 .0355 70.9 2.51 .0311 60.7 1.88 .0230 79.4 1.82
1968 .0350 77.5 2.71 .0311 68.0 2.11 .0219 84.0 1.83
1969 .0351 83.0 2.91 .0276 70.3 1.94 .0219 82.9 1.81
1970 .0345 91.1 3.14 .0306 79.6 2.43 .0197 88.4 1.74
1971 .0340 87.3 2.96 .0312 89.6 2.79 .0204 96.9 1.97
1972 .0371 100.0 3.71 .0311 100.0 3.11 .0168 100.0 1.68
1973 .0460 111.1 5.11 .0303 122.9 3.72 .0190 101.5 1.92
1974 .0502 118.3 5.93 .0310 163.5 5.06 .0187 132.9 2.48
1975 .0506 121.6 6.15 .0303 182.8 5.53 .0194 141.1 2.73
1976 .0477 133.9 6.38 .0336 196.4 6.59 .0192 156.4 3.00
1977 .0447 194.6 8.69 .0379 238.6 9.04 .0165 162.3 2.67
1978 .0116 270.1 3.13 .0321 356.8 11.45 .0137 244.5 3.34
1979 .0260 320.3 8.32 .0268 398.5 10.67 .0172 287.5 4.94
1980 .0248 366.7 9.09 .0251 440.6 11.05 .0159 358.9 5.70
1981 .0257 386.0 9.92 .0256 471.3 12.06 .0165 384.1 6.33
1982 .0256 412.7 10.56 .0242 499.6 12.09 .0161 407.1 6.55
1983 .0261 454.9 11.87 .0245 551.8 13.51 .0167 469.3 7.83
1984 .0215 564.5 12.13 .0314 799.4 25.10 .0142 667.6 9.47
Source of basic data: Data for Pt’s were taken from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-24, pages 
196-97 and 1985 issue, Table 3-21,pages 206-07.
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TABLE 40. CLASSIFICATION III:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
0 T H E R  M A N U F A C T U R E S
YEAR




PAPER AND PAPER 
PRODUCTS
wt Pt wtPt wt Pt wtPt wt Pt WtPt
(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36)
1967 .0280 80.5 2.25 .0037 80.6 0.29 .0138 47.4 0.65
1968 .0267 78.0 2.08 .0038 80.8 0.30 .0140 58.9 0.82
1969 .0227 81.8 1.85 .0038 84.0 0.31 .0128 62.0 0.79
1970 .0219 92.6 2.02 .0038 87.5 0.33 .0150 76.5 1.14
1971 .0236 89.8 2.11 .0040 94.9 0.37 .0121 91.7 1.10
1972 .0227 100.0 2.27 .0033 100.0 0.33 .0134 100.0 1.34
1973 .0223 123.8 2.76 .0032 110.0 0.35 .0150 105.2 1.57
1974 .0220 169.0 3.71 .0030 159.1 0.47 .0165 151.9 2.50
1975 .0154 184.9 2.84 .0024 177.9 0.42 .0160 170.0 2.72
1976 .0171 205.7 3.51 .0024 197.5 0.47 .0165 187.5 3.09
1977 .0165 194.6 3.21 .0025 247.8 0.61 .0146 198.1 2.89
1978 .0137 301.4 4.12 .0041 207.0 0.85 .0051 321.5 1.63
1979 .0171 373.2 6.38 .0028 221.0 0.61 .0050 388.1 1.94
1980 .0159 364.8 5.80 .0031 247.7 0.76 .0045 481.2 2.16
1981 .0165 407.6 6.72 .0032 269.8 0.86 .0044 514.4 2.26
1982 .0161 432.1 6.95 .0032 288.6 0.92 .0039 535.5 2.08
1983 .0167 479.2 8.00 .0033 306.3 1.01 .0045 568.9 2.56
1984 .0142 667.2 9.47 .0034 421.8 1.43 .0044 1024.7 4.50
Source of basic data: Data for Pt’s were taken from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-24, pages 
196-97 and 1985 issue, Table 3-21,pages 206-07.
TABLE 41. CLASSIFICATION III:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES

























1967 .0111 74.4 0.82 .0020 43.6 0.08 .0069 63.9 0.44
1968 .0112 70.4 0.78 .0021 41.9 0.08 .0070 59.4 0.41
1969 .0111 75.2 0.83 .0022 37.5 0.08 .0060 66.4 0.39
1970 .0115 77.1 0.88 .0013 56.7 0.07 .0071 77.0 0.54
1971 .0107 93.4 0.99 .0009 83.3 0.07 .0087 93.3 0.81
1972 .0103 100.0 1.03 .0008 100.0 0.08 .0085 100.0 0.85
1973 .0121 104.7 1.26 .0009 104.0 0.09 .0084 112.2 0.94
1974 .0148 110.0 1.62 .0009 138.5 0.12 .0089 143.6 1.27
1975 .0147 124.6 1.83 .0010 140.0 0.14 .0086 152.1 1.30
1976 .0139 133.6 1.85 .0009 161.3 0.14 .0071 171.6 1.21
1977 .0133 145.5 1.93 .0009 179.4 0. 16 .0081 197.9 1.60
1978 .0075 159.0 1.19 .0007 196.2 O. 13 .0077 191.1 1.47
1979 .0075 178.5 1.33 .0012 241.4 0.28 .0078 220.4 1.71
1980 .0077 195.1 1.50 .0016 252.9 0.40 .0072 258.3 1.85
1981 .0080 217.2 1.73 .0016 272.9 0.43 .0073 289.4 2.11
1982 .0082 230.4 1.88 .0016 283.1 0.45 .0074 317.6 2.35
1983 .0086 254.4 2.18 .0015 315.2 0.47 .0074 356.0 2.63
1984 .0089 406.8 3.63 .0015 533.2 0.79 .0081 528.7 4.28
Source of basic data: Data for Pt’s were taken from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data. Table 4-24, pages 
196-97 and 1985 issue, Table 3-21,pages 206-07.
TABLE 42. CLASSIFICATION III:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
O T H E R  M A N U F A C T U R E S
CHEMICALS k CHEMICAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS NON-METALLIC MINERAL 




















1967 .0356 60.0 2.13 .0387 52.7 2.03 .0233 65.9 1.53
1968 .0359 68.5 2.45 .0377 48.4 1.82 .0229 67.0 1.53
1969 .0403 63.8 2.57 .0389 64.1 2.49 .0217 69.8 1.51
1970 .0412 87.0 3.58 .0378 86.0 3.25 .0218 78.4 1.70
1971 .0564 91.2 5.14 .0391 97.9 3.82 .0189 91.0 1.71
1972 .0707 100.0 7.07 .0491 100.0 4.09 .0174 100.0 1.74
1973 .0710 111.5 7.91 .0484 126.1 6.10 .0213 105.9 2.25
1974 .0715 147.2 10.52 .0420 223.4 9.38 .0186 140.8 2.61
1975 .0711 163.0 11.58 .0404 286.7 11.58 .0196 159.8 3.13
1976 .0754 172.8 13.02 .0347 319.7 11.09 .0188 177.3 3.33
1977 .0784 187.4 14.69 .0321 364.8 11.71 .0184 195.0 3.58
1978 .0572 196.1 11.21 .0438 354.3 15.51 .0138 222.9 3.07
1979 .0581 229.5 13.33 .0350 443.7 15.52 .0134 265.4 3.55
1980 .0565 250.2 14.13 .0328 694.5 22.77 .0137 318.5 4.36
1981 .0542 258.2 13.99 .0301 827.6 24.91 .0126 366.3 4.61
1982 .0522 268.6 14.02 .0302 884.8 26.72 .0131 402.3 5.27
1983 .0540 312.2 16.85 .0315 962.3 30.31 .0137 426.9 5.84
1984 .0435 575.1 25.01 .0305 1523.8 46.47 .0116 614.6 7.12
Source of basic data: Data for Pt’s were taken from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data. Table 4-24, pages 
196-97 and 1985 issue, Table 3-21,pages 206-07.
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TABLE 43. CLASSIFICATION III:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES
























1967 .0132 65.9 0.86 .0168 63.3 1.06 .0075 74.5 0.55
1968 .0140 69.2 0.96 .0166 63.2 1.04 .0089 61.7 0.54
1969 .0164 76.6 1.25 .0167 60.4 1.00 .0065 81.4 0.52
1970 .0220 93.0 2.04 .0164 82.0 1.34 .0078 86.5 0.67
1971 .0163 94.1 1.53 .0164 91.6 1.50 .0070 91.7 0.64
1972 .0160 100.0 1.60 .0157 100.0 1.57 .0072 100.0 0.72
1973 . 1087 123.4 2.30 .0147 115.0 1.69 .0073 106.3 0.77
1974 .0174 174.8 3.04 .0146 154.7 2.25 .0066 144.6 0.95
1975 .0193 233.9 4.51 .0131 170.4 2.23 .0062 159.5 0.98
1976 .0193 258.2 4.98 .0119 187.4 2.23 .0060 172.3 1.03
1977 .0221 207.2 4.57 .0131 230.3 3.01 .0066 278.6 1.83
1978 .0196 194.6 3.81 .0247 136.5 3.37 .0164 149.2 2.44
1979 .0216 239.6 5.17 .0260 160.4 4.17 .0168 169.2 2.84
1980 .0204 262.3 5.35 .0249 184.3 4.58 .0174 189.7 3.30
1981 .0185 280.3 5.18 .0229 199.1 4.55 .0179 210.7 3.77
1982 .0197 305.4 6.01 .0242 217.0 5.25 .0181 231.8 4.19
1983 .0221 330.1 7.29 .0254 241.9 6.14 .0186 256.3 4.76
1984 .0271 452.1 12.25 .0179 374.1 6.69 .0107 433.5 4.63
Source of basic data: Data for Pt’s were taken from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-24, pages 
196-97 and 1985 issue, Table 3-21,pages 206-07.
TABLE 44. CLASSIFICATION III:DOMESTIC PRICE OF OTHER MANUFACTURES


























1967 .0140 68.0 0.95 .0260 51.3 1.33 .0062 55.0 0.34
1968 .0141 63.5 0.89 .0252 51.9 1.30 .0065 53.0 0.34
1969 .0144 60.9 0.87 .0255 47.6 1.21 .0066 54.9 0.36
1970 .0158 74.9 1.18 ,0217 70.9 1.53 .0074 67.9 0.50
1971 .0153 94.6 1.44 .0216 87.1 1.88 .0068 79.3 0.53
1972 . 0139 100.0 1.39 .0201 100.0 2.01 .0067 100.0 0.67
1973 . 0134 114.6 1.53 .0200 106.1 2.12 .0063 117.6 0.74
1974 .0140 160.0 2.24 .0237 125.6 2.97 .0066 132.6 0.87
1975 .0145 169.5 2.45 .0277 171.9 4.76 .0067 128.8 0.86
1976 .0121 184.5 2.23 .0262 185.7 4.86 .0067 143.6 0.96
1977 .0170 226.0 3.84 .0262 159.7 4.18 .0064 150.7 0.96
1978 .0217 141.4 3.06 .0205 144.5 2.96 .0029 211.0 0.61
1979 .0251 150.9 3.78 .0224 154.0 3.44 .0057 232.6 1.32
1980 .0275 174.0 4.78 .0212 172.9 3.66 .0063 322.3 2.03
1981 .0328 203.0 6.65 .0213 193.1 4.11 .0069 357.4 2.46
1982 .0339 229.4 7.77 .0203 208.5 4.23 .0073 395.0 2.88
1983 .0400 260.4 10.41 .0173 224.7 3.88 .0078 437.4 3.41
1984 .0475 326.1 15.48 .0030 372.6 1.11 .0102 758.4 7 73
Source of basic data: Data for Pt’s were taken from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data, Table 4-24, pages 
196-97 and 1985 issue, Table 3-21,pages 206-07.
TABLE 45. CLASSIFICATION III: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES





















1967 .0712 61.4 4.37 .0252 63.9 1.61 .0778 53.6 4.17
1968 . 0664 67.8 4.50 .0241 70.3 1.69 .0930 60.4 5.62
1969 .0639 75.8 4.84 .0253 72.6 1.84 .0899 63.6 5.72
1970 .0621 75.9 4.71 .0217 72.5 1.57 .0914 72.0 6.58
1971 .0638 86.1 5.49 .0248 93.0 2.30 .0914 92.4 8.44
1972 .0578 100.0 5.78 .0238 100.0 2.38 .0880 100.0 8.80
1973 .0605 109.4 6.62 .0229 111.6 2.55 .0874 106.4 9.30
1974 .0586 153.2 8.98 .0218 137.9 3.00 .0860 168.8 14.52
1975 . 0449 160.1 7.19 .0228 149.7 3.41 .0840 175.0 14.70
1976 .0431 164.4 7.09 .0215 153.0 3.29 .0818 193.0 15.79
1977 .0426 168.8 7.19 .0249 168.4 4.19 .0823 214.1 17.62
1978 .0424 177.6 7.53 .0268 176.8 4.74 .0811 231.8 18.80
1979 .0404 197.1 7.96 .0286 197.0 5.63 .0757 260.2 19.70
1980 .0361 208.5 7.52 .0321 223.5 7.17 .0761 288.9 21.98
1981 .0360 217.9 7.84 .0366 247.1 19.04 .0772 334.5 25.82
1982 .0363 228.9 8.31 .0395 263.6 10.41 .0766 347.4 26.61
1983 . 0379 245.6 9.31 .0433 286.5 12.40 .0770 381.0 29.34
1984 .0399 436.4 17.41 .0478 441.9 21.12 .0744 499.9 37.19
Source of basic data: The weights (wn) axe computed from Tables 48, 49 
and 50 based on the weighting procedure discussed in chapter 6, section 
6.2.1 with the agricultural crops excluded from the non-tradeable 
sector of classification II. Data for Pn’s were obtained from the 
Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data; Table 
4-18, pages 188-89; and 1985 issue, Table 3-15, pages 194-95.
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TABLE 46. CLASSIFICATION III: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES





















1967 .0795 68.0 5.40 .0112 84.9 0.95 .0677 72.6 4.91
1968 .0689 75.2 5.18 .0123 84.7 1.04 .0684 78.2 5.35
1969 .0707 78.8 5.57 .0128 86.6 1.11 .0708 76.3 5.40
1970 .0613 87.2 5.34 .0139 78.9 1.10 .0725 86.7 6.29
1971 .0640 94.3 6.03 .0149 85.2 1.27 .0740 99.5 7.36
1972 .0735 100.0 7.35 .0153 100.0 1.53 .0793 100.0 7.93
1973 .0740 113.2 8.37 .0152 112.6 1.71 .0808 109.6 8.85
1974 .0781 171.5 13.39 .0165 161.1 2.66 .0834 124.9 10.41
1975 . 1081 172.2 18.61 .0160 179.2 2.87 .0864 145.6 12.58
1976 . 1302 186.2 24.24 .0168 181.6 3.05 .0961 156.7 15.05
1977 . 1312 204.0 26.76 .0168 198.7 3.34 .0998 202.7 20.23
1978 . 1312 211.8 27.78 .0170 221.2 3.76 .0999 219.8 21.95
1979 . 1471 249.6 36.72 .0175 250.2 4.38 .0953 268.3 25.57
1980 . 1402 298.5 41.85 .0181 300.0 5.43 .0948 340.7 32.30
1981 . 1464 335.5 49.12 .0187 334.8 6.26 .0942 389.2 36.66
1982 . 1455 362.7 52.77 .0195 371.8 7.25 .0930 413.9 38.49
1983 . 1343 399.7 53.68 .0208 425.2 8.84 .0920 462.9 42.59
1984 . 1083 532.0 57.61 .0223 516.7 11.52 .0928 672.5 62.41
Sourer of basic data: Data for Pn ’ s were obtained from the Philippine 
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data; Table 4-14, pages 
180-81; and 1985 issue, Table 3-11, pages 186-87.
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TABLE 47. CLASSIFICATION III: DOMESTIC PRICE OF NON-TRADEABLES
]V O N - ' r R A D E A B :L E S E C T 0 ]R
VTT A P
TRADE, BUILDING, INSURANCE 
AND REAL ESTATE
OTHER SERVICES













1967 .4366 71.8 31.35 .2305 74.9 17.26
1968 .4313 72.6 31.31 .2353 76.6 18.02
1969 .4306 73.7 31.73 .2358 79.0 18.62
1970 .4339 85.5 37.10 .2428 84.1 20.42
1971 .4230 93.2 39.42 .2432 94.4 22.96
1972 .4164 100.0 41.64 .2457 100.0 24.57
1973 .4133 116.1 48.35 .2455 106.2 26.07
1974 .4084 156.5 63.91 .2470 124.2 30.68
1975 .3970 168.1 66.73 .2405 140.7 33.84
1976 .3719 182.8 67.98 .2359 161.9 38.19
1977 . 3732 200.4 74.79 .2290 173.1 39.64
1978 .3744 220.3 82.48 .2268 189.9 43.07
1979 .3736 253.1 94.56 .2213 211.6 46.83
1980 . 3800 288.0 109.44 .2225 239.1 53.20
1981 . 3682 324.7 119.55 .2225 271.2 60.34
1982 .3662 360.5 132.01 .2231 302.1 67.40
1983 . 3785 396.0 149.89 .2157 331.3 71.46
1984 . 3966 568.8 225.58 .2175 414.7 90.19
Source of basic data: Data for Pn’s were obtained from the Philippine
Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue for 1967-74 data; Table 4-14, pages
180-81; and 1985 issue, Table 3-11, pages 186-87.
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TABLE 48. SUB-SECTORAL OUTPUT
In Million Pesos, At Constant Prices




(1) (2) (3) (4) (3) (6) (7)
1967 44093 6881 1772 628 1934 1837 664
1968 46544 7221 1732 629 2425 1974 802
1969 48779 7323 1756 696 2470 2167 926
1970 51014 7787 1761 614 2590 1982 1093
1971 53526 8199 1884 732 2699 1943 1282
1972 56075 8860 1762 724 2682 2012 1346
1973 60931 9013 1992 753 2873 2395 1400
1974 64139 9858 2059 765 3023 1760 1403
1975 68361 11198 1704 865 3186 1265 1445
1976 72962 12069 1740 868 3300 1594 1491
1977 77990 12707 1808 1057 3491 1583 1742
1978 82797 13282 1912 1207 3655 1564 1809
1979 88346 14149 1957 1387 3667 1435 2134
1980 92706 14996 1841 1633 3876 1386 2236
1981 96207 15418 1925 1958 4132 1175 2175
1982 98999 15932 2017 2192 4254 983 2016
1983 100068 14968 2170 2481 4407 819 1966
1984 95490 15591 2162 2589 4032 671 1755
Column (l) is the sum of columns (2) to (14).
Source of data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue,Table 4-13, 
pages 176-77 and 1985 issue, Table 3-10, pages 184-85.
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TABLE 49. SUB-SECTORAL OUTPUT




























1967 2926 6920 1978 278 1684 10858 5733
1968 3151 7327 1797 320 1785 11246 6135
1969 3308 7589 1942 352 1946 11828 6476
1970 3552 8271 1738 394 2056 12295 6881
1971 3688 8923 1889 440 2184 12484 7179
1972 3623 9765 2240 468 2418 12688 7487
1973 3871 11381 2433 501 2657 13589 8073
1974 4129 11852 2745 581 2933 14351 8680
1975 4245 12292 4101 607 3277 15056 9120
1976 4558 12923 5254 678 3875 14999 9513
1977 4922 14610 5568 712 4235 15838 9717
1978 8622 12486 5913 768 4501 16861 10217
1979 7865 14374 7121 849 4613 18085 10710
1980 8419 14756 7139 921 4827 19345 11331
1981 8803 15156 7830 999 5040 19695 11901
1982 9099 15436 8079 1084 5165 20355 12386
1983 9246 15862 7689 1192 5266 21656 12346
1984 9344 13975 5866 1211 5029 21482 11783
Source of data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1979 issue,Table 4-13, 
pages 176-77 and 1985 issue, Table 3-10, pages 184-85.
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TABLE 50. TRADEABLE AND NON-TRADEABLE OUTPUT
IN Million Pesos, At Constant 1972 Prices















1967 44093 9418 34675 12344 31749 19225 24868
1968 46544 10100 36444 13251 33293 20472 26072
1969 48779 10683 38096 13991 34788 21314 27465
1970 51014 11340 39674 14892 36122 22679 28335
1971 53526 12145 41381 15813 37713 24012 29514
1972 56075 13122 42953 16745 39330 25605 30470
1973 60931 15172 45759 19043 41888 28056 32875
1974 64139 15015 49124 19144 44995 29002 35137
1975 68361 14998 53363 19243 49118 30441 37920
1976 72962 16000 56962 20558 52404 32627 40335
1977 77990 17930 60060 22852 55138 35559 42431
1978 82797 15856 66941 24478 58319 37760 45037
1979 88346 17934 70412 25799 62547 39948 48398
1980 92707 18384 74322 26803 65903 41799 50907
1981 96207 18501 77706 27304 68903 42722 53485
1982 98999 18444 80555 27543 71456 43475 55524
1983 100068 18643 81425 27889 72179 42857 57211
1984 95490 16396 79094 25740 69750 41331 54159
Wo denote gross domestic product as GDP. We denote output of the 
tradeable sector (Qj) as QT which is the sum of the output of the 
sub-sectors comprising the tradeable sector for each classification. We 
denote output of the non-tradeable sector (Q^) as QN, which is the 
sum of the output of the sub-sectors comprising the non-tradeable 
sector For each classification, GDP = QT + QN.
Source of basic data: Tables 48 and 49.
222
TABLE 51. SECTORAL SHARES TO GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, IN PERCENT
YF AR













1967 21.36 78.64 28.00 72.00 43.60 56.40
1968 21.70 78.30 28.47 71.50 43.98 56.01
1969 21.90 78.10 28.68 71.32 43.69 56.30
1970 22.23 77.77 29.19 70.81 44.45 55.54
1971 22.69 77.31 29.54 70.46 44.86 55.13
1972 23.40 76.60 29.38 70.13 45.66 54.34
1973 24.90 75.10 31.25 68.75 46.04 53.95
1974 23.41 76.59 29.85 70.15 45.22 54.78
1975 21.94 78.06 28.15 71.85 44.52 55.47
1976 21.93 78.07 28.17 71.82 44.72 55.28
1977 22.99 77.00 29.30 70.70 45.59 54.40
1978 19.15 80.85 29.56 70.43 45.60 54.39
1979 20.30 79.70 29.20 70.80 45.22 54.78
1980 19.83 80.17 28.01 71.09 45.08 54.91
1981 19.23 80.77 28.38 71.62 44.41 55.59
1982 18.63 81.37 27.82 72.17 43.91 56.08
1983 18.45 81.36 27.87 72.13 42.83 57.17
1984 17.17 82.83 26.95 73.04 43.28 56.71
For each classification, [(QT/GDP) + (QN/GDP)] = 100. 
Source of basic data: Table 48.
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1967 11184 4262 888 843 52 395
1968 12482 4937 1248 1016 46 417
1969 11234 4292 1083 951 51 392
1970 11358 4210 1071 819 51 406
1971 12543 4424 1103 794 59 420
1972 12582 4855 1147 861 36 358
1973 13865 5365 1309 1092 51 354
1974 13824 5543 1354 787 47 368
1975 14517 5871 1358 539 54 424
1976 14238 5757 1284 618 81 417
1977 14334 5641 1261 572 52 382
1978 16101 6315 1481 607 61 712
1979 16434 6547 1371 535 94 641
1980 17452 6949 1457 522 80 656
1981 17371 6999 1495 425 75 640
1982 18117 7092 1499 348 131 690
1983 19212 7803 1751 326 102 694
1984 19673 7907 1566 260 141 777
Column 1 
Table 52
is the sum 
to column




employment, from column 2 of
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1983 issue for 
1967-69 data, Table 1.(A), page 7; and 1985 issue, Table 11-4, pages 
478-79.
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TABLE 53. SUB-SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT, IN ’OOO
YEAR OTHER CONS UTILI TRANS TRADE, OTHER
MANU TRUC TIES PORTA BUILDING SERVICES
FAC TION TION INSURANCE
TURES &R.ESTATE
(?) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1967 994 347 33 385 1352 1633
1968 970 378 27 380 1379 1684
1969 899 349 29 383 1109 1696
1970 948 438 33 498 838 2046
1971 1019 420 49 529 1559 2167
1972 965 432 44 467 1478 1939
1973 1042 350 37 504 1537 2224
1974 1055 403 36 491 1549 2191
1975 1227 456 46 492 1623 2427
1976 1181 429 51 600 1785 2035
1977 1133 484 42 681 1693 2393
1978 1031 516 50 696 1981 2651
1979 1173 588 58 732 1996 2699
1980 1151 592 66 734 2280 2965
1981 1101 604 53 758 2299 2922
1982 1172 698 69 807 2416 3194
1983 1193 697 78 831 2553 3184
1984 1163 743 75 891 2849 3301
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1983 issue for
1967-69 data, Table 1.(A), page 7; and 1985 issue, Table 11-4, pages
478-79.
TABLE 54. SUB-SECTORAL SHARES TO TOTAL EMPLOYMENT, IN PERCENT
YEAR TOTAL AGRI FI SHE FORES MINING FOOD
EMPLOY CUL RIES TRY AND MANU
MENT TURE Q’YING FAC
TURES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1967 100.0 38.11 7.94 7.54 0.46 3.53
1968 100.0 39.55 10.00 8.14 0.37 3.34
1969 100.0 38.20 9.64 8.47 0.45 3.49
1970 100.0 37.07 9.43 7.21 0.45 3.57
1971 100.0 35.27 8.79 6.33 0.47 3.35
1972 100.0 38.59 9.12 6.84 0.29 2.84
1973 100.0 38.70 9.44 7.88 0.37 2.55
1974 100.0 40.10 9.80 5.69 0.34 2.66
1975 100.0 40.44 9.35 3.71 0.37 2.92
1976 100.0 40.43 9.02 4.34 0.57 2.93
1977 100.0 39.35 8.80 4.00 0.36 2.66
1978 100.0 39.22 9.21 3.77 0.38 4.42
1979 100.0 39.84 8.34 3.26 0.57 3.90
1980 100.0 39.82 8.35 2.99 0.46 3.76
1981 100.0 40.29 8.61 2.44 0.43 3.68
1982 100.0 39.15 8.27 1.92 0.72 3.82
1983 100.0 40.62 9.11 1.70 0.53 3.61
1984 100.0 40.19 7.96 1.32 0.72 3.95
Column 1 is the sum of the employment shares of the different sub-
sectors to total employment , ie. from column 2 of Table 54 to column
12 of Table 55.
Source of basic data: Tables 52 and 53.
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1967 8.89 3.10 0.30 3.44 12.09 14.60
1968 7.77 3.03 0.22 3.04 11.05 13.49
1969 8.00 3.11 0.26 3.41 9.87 15.10
1970 8.34 3.85 0.29 4.38 7.38 18.01
1971 8.12 3.35 0.39 4.22 12.43 17.28
1972 7.67 3.43 0.35 3.71 11.75 15.41
1973 7.51 2.52 0.27 3.63 11.09 16.04
1974 7.63 2.91 0.26 3.55 11.21 15.85
1975 8.45 3.14 0.32 3.39 11.18 16.72
1976 8.29 3.01 0.36 4.21 12.54 14.30
1977 7.90 3.38 0.29 4.75 11.81 16.70
1978 6.40 3.21 0.31 4.32 12.30 16.46
1979 7.14 3.58 0.35 4.45 12.15 16.43
1980 6.59 3.39 0.38 4.21 13.06 16.99
1981 6.34 3.48 0.31 4.36 13.23 16.82
1982 6.47 3.85 0.38 4.46 13.33 17.63
1983 6.21 3.63 0.41 4.32 13.29 16.57
1984 5.91 3.78 0.38 4.53 14.48 16.78
Source of basic data: Tables 52 and 53.
TABLE 56. TRADEABLE AND NON-TRADEABLE EMPLOYMENT
Shares to total employment, in 7.













1967 16.89 83.11 20.42 79.58 58.53 41.47
1968 16.28 83.72 19.62 80.38 59.17 40.83
1969 16.92 83.08 20.41 79.59 58.60 41.40
1970 16.00 84.00 19.57 80.43 56.64 43.36
1971 14.92 85.08 18.27 81.73 53.54 46.46
1972 14.80 85.20 17.64 82.36 56.23 43.77
1973 15.76 84.24 18.31 81.69 57.01 42.99
1974 13.66 86.34 16.32 83.68 56.42 43.58
1975 12-54 87.46 15.46 84.54 55.90 44.10
1976 13.20 86.80 16.13 83.87 56.56 43.44
1977 12.26 87.74 14.92 85.08 53.27 46.73
1978 10.55 89.45 14.97 85.03 54.19 45.81
1979 10.97 89.03 14.87 85.13 54.71 45.29
1980 10.04 89.96 13.80 86.20 53.62 46.38
1981 9.21 90.78 12.89 87.10 53.19 46.81
1982 9.11 90.89 12.93 87.07 52.08 47.92
1983 8.44 91.56 12.05 87.85 52.67 47.33
1984 7.95 92.05 11.90 88.10 52 09 47.91
We denote share of employment of the tradeable sector to total employ­
ment (Lt/L) as LT/L and share of the non-tradeable sector to total 
employment (LN/L) as LN/L. For each classification, [(LT/L) + 
(LN/L)] = lOO. Column (l) is the sum of columns 4, 5 and 7 (Tables 54 
and 55). Column (2) is the sum of columns (2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 
12) from Tables 54 and 55. Column (3) is equal to column 1 of Table 56
plus column 6 of Table 54. Column (4) is equal to column 2 of Table 56
less column 6 of Table 54. column (5) is equal to column 3 of Table 56
plus column 2 of Table 54. column (6) is equal to column 4 of Table 56
less column 2 of Table 54.
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Price Index: Price Inde 
of Exports :of Imports
(PX*) : (PM*)
In pesos :Pesos/US$ In US dollars
1967 126.5 60.00 47.44 58.42 102.7 81.2
1968 123.1 63.74 51.76 58.42 109.1 88.6
1969 121.4 63.97 52.69 58.42 109.5 90.2
1970 118.8 100.27 84.38 90.25 111.1 93.5
1971 110.6 101.74 92.01 96.35 105.6 95.5
1972 100.0 100.OO 100.00 100.OO 100.0 100.0
1973 113.3 147.66 130.36 101.21 145.9 128.8
1974 114.5 246.39 215.18 101.69 242.3 211.6
1975 87.8 209.36 238.46 108.59 192.8 219.6
1976 77.7 188.16 242.11 111.47 168.8 217.2
1977 71.0 190.OO 267.40 110.91 171.3 241.1
1978 78.8 213.75 271.24 110.35 193.7 245.8
1979 87.4 261.07 298.54 110.53 236.2 270.1
1980 68.6 276.82 403.52 112.53 246.0 358.6
1981 60.4 284.75 471.74 118.35 240.6 398.6
1982 58.7 255.75 435.63 127.94 199.9 340.5
1983 61.3 349.29 570.06 166.49 209.8 342.4
1984 59.8 578.90 967.65 250.17 231.4 386.8
Column (l) is obtained by dividing the domestic price of exportables
(column 2) by the domestic price of importables (column 3) times 100 
The domestic price of exportables is obtained as the product of the 
nominal peso-US dollar exchange rate index (column 4) by the foreign 
currency price of exportables (column 5) divided by 100. The domestic 
price of importables is obtained as the product of the nominal 
exchange rate index and the foreign currency price of importables 
(column 6) divided by 100.
Source of basic data: For column (4), see Table 63; for columns (5) & 
(6), Philippine Statistical Yearbook; 1979 issue, for 1967-74 data, 
Table 12-8, page 528; and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data, Table 7-8,
page 387.
TABLE 58. RELATIVE EXCHANGE RATE ESTIMATES
YEAR
(1)DOMESTIC PRICE 













1967 70.0 85.69 67.75
1968 72.7 87.66 71.18
1969 74.8 85.48 70.41
1970 83.1 120.64 101.52
1971 93.3 109.08 98.65
1972 100.0 100.00 100.00
1973 111.8 132.05 116.58
1974 147.6 166.98 145.83
1975 159.9 130.90 149.10
1976 174.7 107.71 138.60
1977 193.8 98.05 138.00
1978 210.1 101.74 129.10
1979 241.3 108.17 123.70
1980 278.9 99.26 144.69
1981 314.6 90.50 144.93
1982 343.2 74.50 126.91
1983 377.5 92.52 151.00
1984 523.0 110.68 185.00
Columns (2) and (3) axe obtained by dividing columns (2) and (3) 
from Table 57, respectively, by column (1) from this table. Domestic 
prices of non-tradeables were obtained using classification III (see 
Table 10 or Table 36).





































1 9  7 2 = 1 0  0
1967 69.07 51.5 93.5 64.5 51.8 68.0 70.02
1968 68.17 52.2 113.0 71.0 55.5 75.2 72.71
1969 66.87 54.3 100.0 72.6 71.6 78.8 74.83
1970 84.97 71.7 143.5 77.4 108.6 87.2 83.11
1971 93.94 84.8 130.4 93.5 95.1 94.3 93.27
1972 lOO.00 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 lOO.OO
1973 120.50 110.8 273.9 110.0 161.2 113.2 111.82
1974 332.19 213.0 547.8 185.5 205.8 171.5 147.55
1975 328.30 217.4 217.4 161.3 123.4 172.2 159.93
1976 324.72 178.3 241.3 200.0 128.9 186.2 174.68
1977 326.23 130.4 369.5 267.7 127.8 204.0 193.76
1978 305.37 130.4 441.3 290.3 130.6 211.8 210.09
1979 370.04 130.4 586.9 359.7 200.0 249.6 241.35
1980 511.54 171.7 371.7 516.1 231.0 298.5 278.89
1981 536.30 189.1 337.0 580.6 192.1 335.5 314.63
1982 480.29 245.6 271.7 554.8 161.7 362.7 343.25
1983 515.12 265.2 510.9 562.9 218.5 399.7 377.51
1984 546.75 484.7 1341.0 856.4 270.4 532.0 523.03
These price indices were estimated from the wholesale prices in pesos. 
Source of basic data: For column (l), World Bank Report: Price Pros­
pects for Major Commodities, page 77. For columns (2) to (6), see IMF 
International Financial Statistics: May 1976 issue for 1967-75, pages 
310-13 with 1970 as base year; 1981 issue for 1967-80, pages 352-53 
with 1975 as base year; and March 1985 issue for 1978 to 1984, pages 
378-79 with 1980 as base year. Then we expressed the series in just 
one base year (1972=100). Column (7) was based on classification III 






































58.78 57.08 75.70 73.55
53.15 54.97 69.40 71.80
50.72 53.41 68.90 72.56
70.81 87.20 82.20 86.27
91.40 92.42 89.90 90.92
lOO.OO 100.00 100.OO 100.00
127.05 128.62 97.90 99.09
349.51 406.20 124.20 144.36
361.77 389.52 126.20 135.93
368.64 392.96 95.80 102.07
366.25 385.62 63.90 67.30
353.74 356.62 61.50 61.92
433.50 448.32 52.20 54.03
605.15 647.71 57.50 61.56
636.82 679.06 56.40 60. lO
575.53 608.14 67.70 71.55
616.04 652.25 66.30 70.25
680.62 692.29 91.10 92.67
of basic data: Table 59.
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TABLE 61. RELATIVE PRICES OF COPRA, LUMBER AND COPPER
YEAR
i































1967 137.50 133.53 94.85 92.11 76.18 73.98
1968 150.26 155.41 94.41 97.65 73.80 76.33
1969 126.90 133.63 92.13 97.02 90.86 95.68
1970 164.56 172.66 88.76 93.13 124.54 130.67
1971 138.28 139.81 99.15 100.24 100.84 101.96
1972 100.00 100.00 100.OO lOO.OO 100.00 lOO.OO
1973 241.96 244.95 97.17 98.37 142.40 144.16
1974 319.42 371.26 108.16 125.72 120.00 139.48
1975 126.25 135.93 93.67 100.85 71.66 77.16
1976 129.59 138.14 107.41 114.50 69.22 73.79
1977 181.13 190.70 131.22 138.16 62.65 65.96
1978 208.35 210.05 137.06 138.18 61.66 62.16
1979 235.13 243.17 144.11 149.03 80.13 82.87
1980 124.52 133.28 172.90 185.05 77.39 82.83
1981 100.45 107.11 173.05 184.53 57.26 61.05
1982 74.91 79.15 152.96 161.63 44.58 47.11
1983 127.82 135.33 140.83 149.11 54.67 57.88
1984 252.06 256.39 160.98 163.74 50.82 51.70
Source of basic data: Table 59.
Figure 1: R E LATIV E  PRICE OF OIL AND SUGAR TO CONSTRUCTION
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I'igure 2:R E LA T IV E  PRICE OF COPRA, LUM BER COPPER TO  CONSTRUCTION
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APPENDIX F: DATA INPUT REQUIREMENTS FOR CHAPTER 7
TABLE 62. SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT
In Million Pesos., At Current Prices
GROSS CURRENT GROSS GROSS SECTORAL SAVINGS-
NATIONAL ACCOUNT DOMESTIC DOMESTIC INVESTMENT GAP
YEAR PRODUCT SURPLUS SAVINGS INVEST-
MENT PUBLIC PRIVATE
SECTOR SECTOR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1970 41751 - 136 8856 8992 271 - 407
1971 49599 49 10503 10454 431 - 382
1972 55526 244 11817 11573 - 484 728
1973 71616 3950 19394 15444 2108 1842
1974 99948 - 957 25875 26832 - 740 - 217
1975 114265 - 5836 29869 35705 - 2059 - 3777
1976 132712 - 7820 33233 41053 - 4467 - 3353
1977 154280 - 4810 39441 44251 - 5893 1083
1978 178067 - 8375 43331 51706 - 5052 - 3323
1979 220957 - 9760 59080 68840 - 4972 - 4788
1980 265078 -13533 67615 81148 - 3876 - 9657
1981 303644 -15338 77923 93261 -10165 - 5173
1982 335423 -25339 71182 96521 -14024 -11315
1983 379170 -26394 78020 104414 - 6516 -19878
1984 537363 -14756 85229 99985 619 -15375
Column (2) is the difference between columns (3) and (4). This follows 
from the identity that the excess of savings over investment is the 
current account surplus. A negative sign indicates a current account 
deficit (investment exceeds savings). Column (3) and column (4) are 
equal to the sums of columns (7) and (8), and of columns (9) and (10), 
respectively, from Table 63. Column (5) is the difference between 
columns (7) and (9) from Table 63.Column (6) is the difference between 
columns (8) and (12) from Table 63. See section 7.3 for the discussion 
of the procedure in estimating sectoral savings and investment.
Source of basic data: For column (l), see Appendix C, Table 5. For 
column (2),see Appendix D, Table 11; and for column 4, data were taken 
from the Philippine Statistical Yearbook: 1982 issue for 1970-74 data, 
Table 3-6, pages 144-45, and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data, Table 3-1 
pages 166-67.
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TABLE 63. SECTORAL SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT






























































Column (9) is the sum of columns (10) and (ll) while column (12) is 
the sum of columns (13) md  (14).
Source of basic data 'hilippine Statistical Yearbook: 1982 issue for 
1970-74 data, Table 3 6 pages 144-45; and 1985 issue for 1975-84 data, 
Table 3-1, pages 166-67 for columns (9), (10), (12) and (13). Given the 
total change in stock, sectoral increases(decreases), ie. columns (ll) 
and (14), were estimated based on the weighting procedure discussed in 
chapter 7, section 7.3.
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TABLE 64. ESTIMATION ÜF CAPITAL STOCK, 1967-1984














CAP tTAL STOCK 
ESTIMATE 
(5) (6)
1967 9706 248.87 108811 2789.99 106021 176124
1968 10691 274.12 119502 3064.11 116438 184699
1969 11231 287.97 130733 3352.08 127380 193571
1970 10835 277.82 141568 3629.90 137938 198531
1971 11226 287.84 152794 3917.74 148876 206430
1972 11573 296.74 164367 4214.48 160152 212818
1973 12540 321.54 176907 4536.02 172371 219139
1974 15651 401.31 192558 4937.33 187621 233367
1975 18984 486.77 211542 5424.10 206117 239930
1976 20225 518.59 231767 5942.69 225824 n.a.
1977 20828 534.05 252595 6476.74 246118 n.a.
1978 23089 592.02 275684 7068.76 268615 n.a.
1979 26336 675.28 302020 7744.04 294276 n.a.
1980 26609 682.28 328629 8426.32 320203 n.a.
1981 27220 697.95 355849 9124.27 346725 n.a.
1982 26267 673.51 382116 9797.78 372319 n.a.
1983 25029 641.77 407145 10439.55 396705 n.a.
1984 15556 398.87 422701 10838.42 411862 n.a.
Column 1 refers to the gross domestic capital formation data obtained 
from the NEDA Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 1979 k 1985 issues. We 
actually used the 1946-1984 data series for column 1 so that we have 
39 years of observation. Column 2 refers to the estimated annual 
depreciation. The constant rate of depreciation is equal to (l/39)xl00 
= 2.56 7. for each year Column 3 refers to the cumulative investment 
from 1946 to 1984 Column 4 refers to the cumulative depreciation from 
1946 to 1984 F«>Llowing Roemer and Stern (1980), we estimated capital 
stock (column 5) as the difference between cumulative investment 
(column 3) and cumulative depreciation (column 4). Column 5 estimates 
are then compared with estimates arrived at by Sanchez (1983, p. 139). 
For the discussion of procedure in estimating capital stock, see chap­
ter 7, section 7 4. The notation n.a. means not available.
Source of basic data: Philippine Statistical Yearbok: 1979 issue for 
1967-74 data, Table 4-7, pages 150-51;and 1985 issue, Table 3-7, pages 
178-79.
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TABLE 65. COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL WEALTH
In Million US Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Gross Foreign Domestic Peso- Price







1970 2297 251 128 6.0246 83.11
1971 2368 375 148 6.4317 93.55
1972 2663 549 186 6.6748 100.00
1973 2846 1037 379 6.7562 118.41
1974 3538 1502 475 6.7879 156.02
1975 4392 1360 718 7.2479 168.46
1976 6345 1642 564 7.4402 181.19
1977 8035 1525 738 7.4028 197.89
1978 10608 1883 1312 7.3658 213.25
1979 13192 2423 1308 7.3776 245.07
1980 17122 3155 1904 7.5114 279.42
1981 20291 2573 2297 7.8997 307.12
1982 23797 1711 2540 8.5400 332.80
1983 24972 864 1576 11.3127 371.39
1984 25418 886 1836 16.6984 556.67
Sources of basic data: For column (l),
Economic Developments in the Philippines, 
Column (2) refers to the official reserves 
ting of gold, foreign exchange and SDRs 
foreign assets held by the domestic banks. 
were obtained from tables on International
see the IMF report on Recent 
June 1984, Table 12, page 72. 
of the Central Bank consis- 
Column (3) refers to the 
Data for columns (2) and (3) 
Liquidity in the Philippine
Financial Statistics, several quarterly issues. Exchange rates (column 
4) were obtained from Appendix D, Table 9. The price indices (column 5) 
were estimated as the weighted average of prices of tradeables and non- 
tradeables (based on classification III, see Table 10 or Table 36).
